Conversations on Cognitive Cultural Studies: Literature, Language, and Aesthetics by Hogan, Patrick Colm & Aldama, Frederick Luis, 1969-
C o n v e r s a t i o n s  o n 
C o g n i t i v e  C u lt u r a l  s t u d i e s
“In Conversations on Cognitive Cultural Studies: Literature, Language, 
and Aesthetics, Frederick Luis Aldama and Patrick Colm Hogan illu-
minate the myriad implications of cognitive studies for the study of 
literature. Scrutinizing issues ranging from subjectivity to aesthetics to 
history and politics, they seek ever greater precision in our methods 
and assumptions. This lively critical dialogue is sure to spark much-
needed thought and discussion.”
 —Sue J. Kim, author of On Anger: Race, Cognition, Narrative
“Conversations on Cognitive Cultural Studies gives a strong sense of 
cognitive studies in their present state of organization, as represented 
by two of its most respected and best informed spokesmen, who are 
seen grappling with basic and, in some cases, still unresolved prob-
lems in aesthetics.”
 — Irving Massey, professor emeritus of English and comparative 
literature, University at Buffalo
t h e  o h i o  s t a t e  u n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s  •   C o l u m b u s
Conve r sat ion s  on 
Cognitive Cultural studies
literature, language, and aesthetiCs
Frederick luis aldama 
and Patrick Colm Hogan
Copyright © 2014 by The Ohio State University.
All rights reserved.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Aldama, Frederick Luis, author.
  Conversations on cognitive cultural studies : literature, language, and aesthetics / Frederick Luis 
Aldama and Patrick Colm Hogan.
       pages cm
  Includes bibliographical references and index.
  ISBN-13: 978-0-8142-1243-1 (cloth : alk. paper)
  ISBN-10: 0-8142-1243-3 (cloth : alk. paper)
  ISBN-13: 978-0-8142-9346-1 (cd-rom)
  ISBN-10: 0-8142-9346-8 (cd-rom)
 1.  Psychology and literature. 2.  Cognitive science—Philosophy. 3.  Narration (Rhetoric)  I. 
Hogan, Patrick Colm, author. II. Title.
  PN56.P93A43 2014
  801'.92—dc23
                                                            2013028050
Cover design by Laurence J. Nozik
Text design by Juliet Williams
Type set in Adobe Minion Pro
Printed by Thomson-Shore, Inc.
 The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National 
Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials. ANSI 
Z39.48-1992.
9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1
acknowledgments vi
Prologue vii
1 Puzzling out the self 1
2 verbal art and language science 32
3 on matters of narrative Fiction 79
4 a scientific approach to aesthetics 116
5 situating history, Culture, Politics, and ethics in literary studies 149
Works Cited and suggestions for Further reading 187
index 197
C o n t e n t s
An earlier version of chapter 1 appeared as “Puzzling Out the Self: Some Ini-
tial Reflections,” English Language Notes 49.2 (2011): 139–60. We are grateful 
to the editors, Julie Carr and John-Michael Rivera, for permission to reprint. 
Herbert Lindenberger, Javier Gutiérrez-Rexach, Irving Massey, Robyn War-
hol, and James Phelan provided very helpful comments on earlier versions 
of this manuscript. Our editor at The Ohio State University Press, Sandy 
Crooms, was invaluable in the process of planning, evaluating, and produc-
ing this book.
vi
a C k n o W l e d g m e n t s
The following dialogues, which took place at various times between 2010 and 
2012, focus on the place of cognitive science in the study of culture, particu-
larly literature. For readers unfamiliar with the field, cognitive science is a 
recently developed approach to the study of the human mind. It integrates a 
range of disciplines including anthropology, cognitive psychology, computer 
science, evolutionary biology, linguistics, and others, with empirical studies of 
human and nonhuman mental processing. Beyond biological and social sci-
ences, the contributing disciplines include art history, musicology, and, most 
important for our purposes, literary criticism and theory. In each case, the 
traditional discipline (e.g., literary study) is enhanced by the contributions 
of general cognitive scientific theory and research while at the same time the 
general theory is itself advanced and refined by research in the disciplines, 
again including literary study. Cutting across the traditional academic disci-
plines, cognitive science also comprises a number of subfields, including cog-
nitive neuroscience, which focuses on brain research; social cognition, which 
treats the interaction of human minds in, for example, shared tasks; and affec-
tive science, which examines human emotions or motivation systems. These 
subfields in turn combine with one another and with traditional disciplines to 
produce further areas of research, such as social neuroscience (the study of the 
operation of the brain in social interaction), neurolinguistics (the study of the 
neurological processes of language and speech), and so on.
vii
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 Thus cognitive science is, in part, a research program shared across a 
range of disciplines and subfields. But that alone would not give the field much 
coherence. It is, in addition, defined by a set of theoretical principles about 
“cognitive architecture.” Cognitive architecture comprises structures (the 
enduring organizational categories of the mind), processes (the operations 
that occur within the structures), and contents (the objects on which pro-
cesses operate). For example, most cognitive scientists would agree that there 
are different types of memory, thus different memory structures. These include 
episodic memory (concerning events that one experienced), skills memory 
(concerning how to do things, such as ride a bicycle), semantic memory (con-
cerning meanings and facts), working memory (what we keep in mind at 
any one time), and so on. These involve processes, such as memory storage 
and retrieval, as well as contents (the memories themselves). The example of 
memory may seem to suggest that cognitive architecture is isolated and, so 
to speak, inward-oriented. However, cognitive architecture is at the basis of 
social interaction as well. For example, one important component of social 
cognition is “Theory of Mind” (ToM). ToM is simply the means by which we 
come to understand what other people are thinking or feeling.
 The cases of memory and ToM are instances of what is sometimes called 
“phenomenological” or “mentalistic” architecture. This sort of architecture is 
to some extent intuitively comprehensible, since it is based on our ordinary 
understanding of various mental structures and processes. We all know intui-
tively what “memory” is, even if we do not spontaneously organize it in the 
way that is done by cognitive scientists—and certainly not with the precision 
and empirical guidance of cognitive scientists. There is also a “neurocogni-
tive” architecture correlated with this mentalistic architecture. The neuro-
cognitive architecture comprises the structures and processes of the human 
brain—for instance, the regions of functional neuroanatomy. Thus, in speak-
ing of neurocognitive architecture, we might refer to the hippocampus. It is a 
crucial part of current cognitive science that the phenomenological architec-
tures are continually revised by reference to the neurocognitive architectures 
while the neurocognitive architectures are understood by reference to the 
phenomenological architectures—as when we speak of the operation of the 
hippocampus in episodic memory.
 Beyond these two basic architectures, we may also distinguish different 
sorts of cognitive theory. The basic architectures are fairly general. The theo-
ries tend to be more particular and are often developed in relation to specific 
cognitive domains (e.g., language). For example, different linguistic theories 
accept that there is something along the lines of semantic memory, but they 
specify and explain this in sometimes very different ways. These differences 
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are often related to the theories’ precise relation to basic architectures. Thus 
in linguistics we may distinguish theories that stress mentalistic architecture 
from theories that stress neurocognitive architecture. The former find one 
influential form in Noam Chomsky’s work, which is based on sets of rules 
with variables. The neurocognitive approach appears in a rather abstract 
form in Connectionism, which posits only networks of interlinked neuron-
like units with distinct activation patterns. Cutting across this division is a 
distinction between theories that rely solely on general architecture and those 
that draw on a specialized architecture for the domain at issue. For exam-
ple, both “Generative” linguists, such as Chomsky, and “Cognitive” linguists, 
such as George Lakoff and Ronald Langacker, stress a mentalistic architecture 
(though they draw on neurocognitive research in formulating and developing 
that architecture). However, Generative linguists tend to maintain that the 
general architecture must be supplemented by principles specific to language, 
whereas Cognitive linguists try to explain language processes by principles 
available in the general architecture.1
 The example of language is particularly apt here for the obvious reason 
that language is fundamental to literature. Thus understanding language is 
presumably fundamental to our understanding of literature. A simple, com-
municative model of literature involves at least four components: 1) a speaker 
or author, 2) a listener or reader, 3) an utterance or text, and 4) a social and 
historical context. We have used this basic structure to organize the topics 
for our dialogues. The first chapter addresses the fundamental element of any 
communicative act, the component most obviously related to cognitive neuro-
science—the person, the self, either as speaker or as hearer. The final chapter 
turns to the social and historical context. This may seem most problematic for 
neuroscientific treatment, but it is an area with rich possibilities. The inter-
vening chapters concentrate on the text, though with constant reference to 
the selves that actualize those texts. Specifically, chapter 2 explores the linguis-
tic aspect of verbal art (including treatment of the linguistic theories briefly 
mentioned above). Chapter 3 takes up narrative. Finally, chapter 4 turns to 
aesthetics, the area of research that is most directly concerned with the dis-
tinctive features of verbal art. In each of these cases—linguistics, narratology, 
 1. Chomskyan and related approaches are commonly referred to as “Generativist,” since 
they set out to generate the sentences of a given language from a set of (language-specific) 
principles. The name “Connectionism” derives from that theory’s stress on network-defining 
connections across units. “Cognitive Linguistics” is so called due to its use of general cognitive 
principles (rather than language-specific principles) to explain linguistic processes. Unfortu-
nately, the word “Cognitive” in “Cognitive Linguistics” can be confusing for readers new to the 
field. Cognitive Linguistics is only one form of linguistic theory within cognitive science. (We 
will consider these theories in greater detail in chapter 2.)
x  •  P r o lo g u e
and aesthetics—cognitive neuroscience has begun to demonstrate its great 
value. However, its potential contribution to these fields extends much further.
 One purpose of these dialogues is to indicate some of what has been 
accomplished thus far. But a more important purpose is to suggest what may 
be accomplished in the future. In a field that is far from settled—indeed, is 
very much alive with debates and disagreements—we felt that a dialectical 
approach would be most fruitful for both purposes. Our hope is that, in our 
discussions, we share enough to speak to one another productively, but differ 
enough to hint at the breadth of the field and to provoke further thought and 
debate on these important issues. In short, our hope is that these take up at 
least the spirit of Socratic dialogues.
PCH (for the authors)
Frederick luis AldAmA: Our writing on the self is not new territory; it is one 
that has been crisscrossed by all variety of scholarly inquiry for over two 
millennia, from ancient Greek pre-Socratic philosophy, to eighteenth-
century metaphysics, nineteenth-century psychology and anthropology, 
to twentieth-century poststructuralist antifoundationalist skepticism, 
to today’s empirical-based cognitive and neuroscience research. With 
its long tradition of rich and learned discussion and debate that encom-
passes all variety of disciplines, any stab at this puzzling out of the self, 
which will always be constrained by the physical limitations of printed 
matter, is bound to bewilder.
PAtrick colm HogAn: The history of profound (and humbling) reflections on 
the self is not confined to the West either. Take the Vedāntic tradition of 
ancient India. In classical Advaita (nondual) Vedānta, the self is a purely 
spiritual entity that mistakenly identifies itself with the (illusory) mate-
rial world. In Sāṁkhya, it is a spiritual entity that observes real but dis-
tinct material processes that are part of a material world—processes that 
are simultaneously mental and bodily. Note that, in this tradition, the 
“ātman” or self is distinct from mind, but mind is composed of the same 
constituents as body (specifically, the “gun. as” or “strands”). In keeping 
1
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with this, a third, materialist school accepted only the existence of 
“prakr.ti” or “nature,” the world of the gun. as, rejecting any distinct spiri-
tual world. Finally, absolute monism accepted both a spiritual world or 
ātman and a material world of prakr. ti (itself both mind and body, com-
prising the same component gun. as). However, it viewed them as two 
aspects of a single (“monistic”) reality.
  To complicate matters even further, there is an additional division 
of schools into those that accept distinctness of selves and those that do 
not. In Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtras, for example, the “observing self ” is pretty 
clearly individual. Indeed, it reaches its highest form in absolute solitude. 
However, in most Vedāntic schools (schools deriving from the “end” or 
“conclusion” of the Vedas in the Upanis.ads), the ultimate form of the self, 
the ātman (or, in some versions, purus.a), is identical for everyone. Thus 
the ultimate understanding of “self ” is an understanding of “brahman,” 
which is to say, an absolute that encompasses all apparently individual 
selves. In the case of classical Advaita Vedānta, this identity is spiritual. 
But in the case of absolute monism, it is equally a matter of being part of 
prakr. ti, nature.
tHe BiologiCal and tHe soCial
FlA: Perhaps we might delimit the territory by defining what we will talk 
about (and not) so as to provide a roadmap of sorts for our reader? I 
suggest we start with the most elemental and foundational structures or 
ingredients and then move to how these might inform our making and 
creating of narrative fiction.
  At the most elemental and biologically material level, the neuro-
chemical makeup of the brain and its complex web of physical electro- 
neuroactivity results in what we understand to be selfhood. Of course, 
this simple reduction (and very superficial overview of the work of 
Joseph LeDoux, among many others) is far from the last word on the 
matter. As with chemistry, so too here the substance we call the self grows 
from and is entirely different from the many ingredients that make up the 
self.1 Roughly, cognitive neuroscience seeks to identify the neural pro-
cesses that perform known psychological functions, and to explain these 
in terms of the work of specific neural systems, while eventually help-
ing psychiatry to treat mental disorders. Jean-Pierre Changeux, Stanislas 
 1. See Aldama, Why, especially chapters 1 and 2.
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Dehaene, and Lionel Naccache have proposed a limited but highly inter-
esting theory of the self called the “neuronal workspace hypothesis.” (See 
“The Global Neuronal Workspace Model of Conscious Access: From 
Neuronal Architectures to Clinical Applications.”) It does not seek to 
solve the problem of consciousness as such, nor does it deal as yet with 
all aspects of consciousness, but as a research program it has a strong 
momentum. It posits that in the brain we can distinguish two main com-
putational spaces: 1) a processing neural network “operating upon pri-
mary and motor stimuli, the contents of long-term memory (including 
a semantic database), the self and subjective personal experience, and 
systems of attention and evaluation involving motivation, rewards, and, 
in a general way, emotion” (Changeux, The Physiology of Truth 88); and 
2) a global workspace “consisting of a distributed set of excitatory corti-
cal neurons that are very richly interconnected” (88). This model is akin 
to what Mario Bunge calls in Philosophy in Crisis and elsewhere “emer-
gent materialism,” and, because it acknowledges that mental processes 
are strongly influenced by the social context, it can be supplemented by 
empirical developmental psychology and social psychology.
PcH: I largely agree about the biology of selfhood but with some qualifications. 
It is important to make some distinctions here. First, “reductionism” (the 
explanation of evidently “higher”-level phenomena, such as conscious-
ness, through “lower”-level phenomena) is generally a good thing. But 
it is not clear that such a reduction is possible in the case of mind. Let 
me briefly recapitulate an argument I have made elsewhere.2 It is quite 
possible to reduce any restricted set of mental phenomena to physical 
phenomena. For example, you could give a purely physical account of 
me. You could go on to give a purely physical account of LeDoux and 
his books and articles (his motor cortex produced such-and-such fin-
ger movements, producing such-and-such key presses, producing pages 
with such-and-such marks, etc.). But you could not continue the process 
all the way to yourself. If you tried to apply this to yourself, you would 
reduce your own sentences to bits of matter (ink) on other bits of matter 
(paper). Lacking intention (except as some sort of dorsolateral prefrontal 
activation pattern, conjoined with motor cortex activity, etc.), these bits 
of matter would lack meaning and thus truth conditions. Therefore, in 
order to make any claims about the mind, brain, or self, we need to leave 
something outside of physicalistic reduction—namely, the intentional 
subjectivity of the speaker.
 2. See, for example, “Literature.”
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  This argument is, of course, not without precedents. In effect, it is a 
version of the quantum mechanical idea that in order to describe any sys-
tem, you need to place a “cut” between the observer and the system. Here, 
the system is the physiological reduction. The observer is what is presup-
posed by the reduction. In almost identical terms, it is what we find in 
Patañjali’s Yoga philosophy. In Patañjali, the self is an “observer” of even 
the mind’s own processes (see 2.17, 20, and 23). We also find a version of 
this in phenomenology in the idea of the transcendental ego. Each act of 
self-reflection makes the self into an object of consciousness. Once that 
occurs, however, the self-object is no longer identical with the self, for 
the self “transcends” self-objectification; it is, again, what observes the 
self-object.
  Some people try to solve the problem by claiming that meaning is an 
“emergent property of the system.” But this does no good. An emergent 
property is a well-defined idea in, say, systems theory. There it refers to 
a property that applies to a collection of elements—for example, sym-
metrical distribution across a space—but does not apply to individual 
elements (a single particle cannot be symmetrically distributed across 
space). In the context of mind “emerging” from brain, it is far from clear 
that the notion is well defined.
  On the other hand, none of this says that intentionality is anything 
additional to the body. This “incompleteness of material reduction,” as 
we might call it, applies globally, not locally. In any delimited system, the 
reduction is perfectly complete.
  Having mentioned quantum mechanics, I should note, however, that 
my account here differs sharply from that of most treatments of mind/
body issues in the framework of quantum mechanics. Most significantly, 
the idea of the epistemological cut is simply not taken all that seriously. 
Rather, it is assumed that the intentionality of the observer is causal with 
respect to the observed phenomena. (See Henry Stapp for a discussion of 
the standard views, by which “mind and matter . . . become dynamically 
linked in a way that is causally tied to the agent’s free choice” [888].)
  Finally, as to the material you have added on Changeux and others, 
I should mention two things. First, the processing network of Changeux 
cannot explain the self, since it presupposes the self. As you quote, the 
network operates on “the self and subjective personal experience” (Chan-
geux, Physiology 88). Moreover, as just indicated, it seems to me a fun-
damental error to say that any neural process operates on “subjective 
personal experience” rather than on the neural correlates of that expe-
rience. I do not mean this as a criticism of Changeux. The technical 
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distinction may not be important for his specific claims about neural 
architecture. But it is important for our understanding of the self. As to 
the developmental and other factors allowed by Bunge, these do not nec-
essarily bear on biological reductionism. All such factors will have their 
neurological consequences through the usual biological routes. Thus, 
allowing developmental and other influences on the self—as everyone 
would—does not qualify biological reductionism, but rather rejects what 
might be called “strong genetic determinism.”
FlA: As you and I both know well, there is the inseparable other side to this 
equation: the crucial component of the social. As we know firsthand 
and also explore in our work, the social in time and place matter signifi-
cantly in the shaping of the self. This is what allows us to talk about how, 
say, in the time of the American Revolution such and such a personality 
emerged. I have the impression that a new personality or self emerged in 
the eighteenth century. Before this time, we did not have, say, a Benjamin 
Franklin, Thomas Paine, or Thomas Jefferson. These kinds of personali-
ties are visibly new. And this perception that a new self emerges in new 
circumstances is not entirely objective or arbitrary.
PcH: I see what you are getting at here. But I would put it differently. First, I 
would isolate practical identities as individual sets of propensities, capac-
ities, and ideas.3
  One could reasonably identify a practical identity as the “self ” of a 
person, and that practical identity would be instantiated in the brain. 
This is a different sense of “self ” from the more minimal, momentary, 
philosophical sense I described before. Given practical identity at the 
individual level, we need to distinguish two things. First, there are some 
genuine impossibilities in prior periods—for example, no one had the 
procedural schemas for driving a car in the third century. However, my 
view is that these impossibilities are pretty banal.
  The more interesting constraints are not on individual practical iden-
tity but on the systemic consequences of individual practical identity. 
Insofar as you are thinking of Franklin, Paine, and Jefferson as, say, egali-
tarian, I would not actually agree that this is a new personal identity. 
The same general ideas seem to arise continually throughout history. For 
example, there are egalitarian tendencies in many early Indic writings, 
ranging from the anticaste orientation of Buddhism to the revolutionary 
 3. For a more in-depth discussion of “practical identity” see Hogan, Empire. 
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zeal of the Sanskrit drama Mr.cchakat.ikam. The difference is that the 
social conditions were not such that the ideas and impulses were able to 
produce widespread, systemic consequences.
  Here, I take a sort of Marxist view. On the one hand, there is broad 
social determination. But that social determination does not operate at 
the level of the individual. Sometimes Marxists act as if it does operate 
at the level of the individual. However, if that were true, it would seem to 
violate a fundamental principle of Marxist activism—“Class origin does 
not determine class stance.” But this nondetermination does not apply to 
the entire system. If one thinks it applies to the entire system, one violates 
another fundamental principle of Marxism—the opposition to “volun-
tarism,” the notion that social agents can simply join together and change 
the world, whatever the prevalent conditions of political economy. (On 
voluntarism, see Lukács, History 4, 124, 134, 191, 318, and 322. By the 
way, the extension of Marxism to systems theory has been developed 
by a number of writers. One forceful development of this sort is that of 
Immanuel Wallerstein.)
FlA: Are we thus biologically social and socially biological? This would make 
sense and allow us to understand more clearly why our existence in time 
and place is not static.
  As biological entities we are always already born in a social envi-
ronment, and all our senses and all our neurobiological equipment are 
trained and educated by our parents, caregivers, extended family mem-
bers, and others who attend to our needs as children. It is our social envi-
ronment, our social existence, our social being, that triggers and molds 
the functioning of all the faculties inscribed in our DNA, such as our 
capacity for language. In this sense, then, we are a social nature that is 
capable of knowing and changing the world by its social activity, and this 
social activity in its turn changes us as individuals and changes our cul-
ture and our society, partially and as a whole.
PcH: Absolutely. Among the questions that arise here are those relating to 
the degree of genetic determination. To a great extent, neuronal growth, 
for example, is “activity dependent” (i.e., it occurs in response to some 
input, for instance, some social experience). But the precise nature of that 
activity dependence is important. Is the growth pattern fully fixed? Is it 
strongly biased to one outcome (such that, roughly, something has to go 
wrong to produce another result)? Is it confined to a limited set of specific 
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options (as in linguistic principles and parameters theory, where lan-
guage learning is primarily a matter of setting predetermined parameters 
embedded in innate principles)? Is it simply a matter of having a range 
of possible degrees (as when musicians increase the density of neuro-
nal connections in relevant areas through practice)? This makes a differ-
ence. As you know, I tend to view the brain as being much more plastic 
than, say, evolutionary psychologists do. But, at the same time, I am gen-
erally inclined to view the broad social outcomes as changing only in 
proportions, not in kinds. Consider, for example, child rearing. It seems 
likely that the same general types of attachment patterns occur in differ-
ent societies and different historical periods. However, the proportion of 
each attachment type may differ across societies. (For example, the dis-
tributions of attachment types may differ in Japan and the United States, 
but the distributions would span the same attachment types.)
FlA: Our faculties of reasoning (deduction, induction, abduction), judging 
(distinguishing, separating, ordering, classifying), and evaluating (good/
bad, right/wrong, tasty/unsavory, attractive/repulsive), as well as our 
emotions, our motivation (or will or willpower), and our intentionality 
(our capacity to plan, to have an action and its result in our mind before 
materializing it as an entity out there in the world)—these and very 
importantly our language faculty are all biological adaptations, are all 
biological products of evolution, are all biologically innate, genetically 
present in all healthy human beings.
  As a part of the human genome, they are a feature of our biological 
(animal) nature. They are part of our nature, we being in our turn a part 
of nature, the social part of nature that has the unique capability to trans-
form the whole of nature, to “socialize” nature, that is, to change nature 
in order to adapt it to our (human, social, universal) needs.
  So, in that sense, these faculties are not only biological adaptations. 
They are at the same time social adaptations. Their nature is in fact social 
and biological.
  I mentioned Ben Franklin among others; however, we can surmise 
that our more ancient ancestors not only “metabolized” the nature sur-
rounding them but also transformed their own genome many times. Thus 
we can say that even our genome is both biological and social and biolog-
ical, in the sense that we are biological beings through and through, but 
we are a biology that is capable of transforming all biologies (including 
our own) by means of our social activity.
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PcH: You are raising important issues here. We may have a slight difference 
on the issue of adaptation. It is not at all clear to me that everything you 
mention is adaptive. Just to be clear, as you know, an adaptation is a 
genetic mutation that (in interaction with then-current bodily and non-
bodily environments) produces some metabolic, behavioral, or other 
mechanism that leads to increased reproduction. For ease of analysis, we 
typically explain this increase by reference to a function that the mecha-
nism approximates. For example, fear is clearly a product of adaptation. 
Specifically, we tend to flee from certain sorts of things. That helps to 
prevent us from being killed, and staying alive increases our chances 
of reproducing. We usually explain this functionally by saying that fear 
makes us flee dangers. However, the mechanisms here are distinct from 
this function—clearly, since we fear many innocuous things and do not 
fear many dangerous things.
  There are three problems with the adaptationist emphasis of much 
current evolutionary psychology. The first is that it often passes over the 
distinction between mechanism and function. The second is related. It 
often passes over the existence of nonadaptive features. Finally, it fre-
quently multiplies adaptationist explanations—explaining not only com-
ponents but also complexes of components in adaptive terms. This relates 
to, for example, “literary Darwinism.” If we can explain the likely func-
tion of both emotional response and simulation in evolutionary terms, 
then it is a violation of fundamental principles of simplicity in science 
to posit a further adaptive explanation for the conjunction of the two in 
literature.
  You also touch on the issue of coevolution—the idea that our cul-
ture changes our biological makeup, which in turn changes our culture, 
all in adaptive ways. I am very skeptical about this. First, it seems that, 
for any given social trait, we only need the explanation in terms of cul-
ture without any reference to biology. For example, if something turns up 
across cultures, people tend to assume it is biological. But that is a non 
sequitur. There are many reasons something can recur cross-culturally. 
All that is required is that our biology be plastic enough to accommodate 
the cultural practice. For example, we do not need to evolve as cooks in 
order to cook things. We just need to have adequate neural plasticity to 
be able to learn to cook once the practice develops culturally (i.e., we do 
not need coevolution for cooking; we do not need cooking-enhancing 
genetic mutations). Second, even when something is not easily explained 
by culture, it is often hard to spell out in terms of coevolution. Indeed, 
discussions of coevolution sometimes appear to suggest that adaptive 
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genetic mutations can be provoked by cultural conditions, which is, of 
course, bizarre (and something everyone would deny if faced with the 
idea explicitly).
FlA: What do we make of the fact that in spite of the commonsense evidence, 
there is a long tradition in philosophy, theology, and even science of 
serious scholars ascribing to selfhood a status that takes it totally out-
side the boundaries of scientific explanation, of suggesting that we will 
never arrive at a material explanation of the self? I think here of someone 
like Emmanuel Mounier (1905–50), who founded the magazine Esprit 
(1932) and articulated his Jesuit position in the guise of “a philosophy of 
engagement . . . inseparable from a philosophy of the absolute or of the 
transcendence of the human model” and whose “Omega point” identified 
the highest and most accomplished state of selfhood (135).
PcH: Well, there is a religious impulse here that begins from the premise that 
the self is an enduring soul. I do not believe that, but I do not find it 
absurd. In fact, I think it is something we can expect, given the human 
experience of self and human feelings of attachment. The primary 
motivation for such religious beliefs may not be a primitive attempt at 
explaining the world (as is commonly thought). Rather, it may derive 
from the emotion of grief and the nature of consciousness with its expe-
rience of loneliness.4 In that sense, it is not something that one could 
readily oppose with science—and maybe one should not oppose it at all, 
since it may provide grieving people with comfort.
  On the other hand, there is the rational version of the idea that I men-
tioned earlier. This does not make the self eternal (unfortunately). But it 
does remove one aspect of the self from scientific explanation—in prin-
ciple, since that part is outside the system being described. (By the way, 
note that even in order to say this, I have to distort the point by making 
that observing self part of the described system.)
identity: Continuity and disContinuity
FlA: What do we make, too, of the seeming paradox of the discontinuous yet 
continuous self? Here I am thinking of the phenomena whereby I can 
say that I am forty-three years old and that I am Frederick Aldama—the 
 4. For more discussion on issues of grief and loneliness, see Hogan, “Literature.”
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same guy I cannot even remember but only have photos of when I was 
first born, then one, two, three, four, and so on years old.
  There is a continuity from birth to death in our conception of self. 
Yet there is almost no continuity in the biological existence—the forty-
three-year-old Frederick is biologically nearly completely different from 
Frederick at one or two or three years old. The whole organism is almost 
totally different. Yet I recognize myself continuously as being Frederick. I 
think too of the fact that my father before he began to suffer from diabe-
tes, sleep apnea, and depression was a completely different biological per-
son in his functioning. Yet, he still considers himself to be Luis Aldama. 
Likewise, my daughter Corina is not the same person today as a six-year-
old that she was as a five-year-old. I perceive her to be the same and my 
care of her is the same, but she’s not the same organism.
  We are not the same—even at the molecular level—yet we conceive of 
ourselves to be the same person. I do not wake up in the morning, wash 
my face, and ask “Who is that guy?” in any ontologically significant way. 
We are changing constantly, yet we take the default position: to recognize 
our selves and others as the same. I am always certain that I am I. I am 
whom I am. . . . Ego sum qui sum.
  It is a phenomenon that we observe worldwide: all children, world-
wide, develop this idea of the “me,” the “I,” the idea of self-agency, of self-
responsibility for one’s actions. This is certainly genetically determined. 
(Only in cases of serious and rare illness or brain damage does this sense 
of self disappear.)
PcH: These too are important issues. Of course, in part we are simply dealing 
with a definitional question. We can use “identity” to mean “comprising 
all the same properties” (including constituents, time, place, etc.). Then 
I cannot step into the same river twice, as Herakleitos famously put it, or 
be the same person from moment to moment. We can also define iden-
tity in a way that allows for continuity—most obviously, in terms of cer-
tain sorts of causal relations.
  A fundamental issue here is whether we are asking what a third per-
son might count as the identity of an individual and what that individual 
himself or herself might count as definitive of his or her identity. As to 
the former, we can stipulate a range of criteria, many in keeping with 
ordinary usage. One obvious way of stipulating identity is by reference to 
bodily continuity (as when we say of a corpse that it is Jones). Another 
is bodily continuity and life (as when we say that Jones is no more, even 
though his body is there). A third is bodily continuity and consciousness 
or possible consciousness (as when we say that this body on life support 
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is not really Jones). Another is continuity of memory (the sort of case you 
address). An analytic of this kind is valuable. But, in the end, our prefer-
ence for one or another alternative is largely a matter of stipulation.
  The more interesting issue is how someone understands himself or 
herself as having a particular identity. Here, it is probably necessary to 
distinguish different sorts of self-identification. As a first approximation, 
we might distinguish two. The first is the imagination and categoriza-
tion of oneself as an object of thought. This is what most people seem 
to have in mind when they speak of self-identity. We might refer to this 
as “explicit” or “self-conscious” identity. Note that our sense of ourselves 
as self-objects is highly reductive. It tends to be a matter of categories—
salient, functional, emotionally provocative categories (such as religion 
or ethnicity; the question “Who are you?” elicits the response “I am 
James Flaherty, an Irish Catholic,” and so on).
  The other type of self or self-experience is implicit. It is our sense of 
the uninterrupted process of thought or action. I would say that we tend 
to expand this implicit sense of self to the point where it encounters a 
contradiction. (This tendency to expand our sense of self is probably at 
the root of the Vedāntic identification of ātman with brahman.) Often 
that contradiction comes in the form of other people—as when I want to 
eat the last piece of cheesecake, but Jones gets to it first. Then I differenti-
ate my self from Jones. But if Jones and I together rescue the last piece of 
cheesecake from Smith, I may say that “we” saved the cheesecake, thus 
suggesting a sense of shared implicit self. Note that this contrast can even 
take the form of a distinction between our sense of self and our own bod-
ies—I (i.e., the self) wanted to run the final lap, but my body just would 
not let me; or I wanted to resist the cheesecake, but my hunger (now 
understood as nonself) got the better of me; or I tried to recall, but my 
memory (now nonself) failed me. The minimal implicit self is, roughly, 
working memory supplemented by current motivational states that enter 
into working memory.
FlA: How has our brain evolved to deal with this discontinuous yet continu-
ous self as noncontradictory? What mechanisms are in place to help with 
this? I think of memory function. . . . And Michael Gazzaniga identifies 
an “interpreter” entity interpreting everything 24/7 that generates in each 
of us a sense of self (see his Human).
PcH: I doubt that we need to worry much about potential contradiction here. 
Everything that we identify as a particular is both unified and disunified. 
It is not just the self. The point holds for a tree (it is a tree, but it is also 
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branches and a trunk—sometimes leaves or even flowers). There are, of 
course, empirical issues here bearing on the brain. But such identification 
is presumably part of the usual complex of brain operations.
FlA: To have consciousness of our selves, in this case of Frederick Aldama or 
Patrick Hogan, there must be brain mechanisms sending this informa-
tion—sources telling the brain that Frederick is Frederick and Patrick is 
Patrick. Can we ask where this information comes from?
PcH: Yes, you are certainly right that there are brain mechanisms involved. But 
I suspect that the precise complexes of neural circuits change with the 
type of identity at issue. It is one thing to recognize one’s face in a mirror 
and another thing to remember what one did yesterday. For example, the 
implicit sense of self is probably connected with lateral prefrontal opera-
tions of working memory and anterior cingulate cortex-related monitor-
ing of task contradiction.5
  By the way, it is important to stress that self-recognition and self-
understanding are not a matter of Cartesian certainty, as we are often 
inclined to think. We make inferences about ourselves, just as we make 
inferences about others. (Though Descartes was probably right that we 
do not need to make inferences about our current working memory, to 
put it in contemporary terms.) It is, admittedly, pretty rare that we make 
a mistake about seeing ourselves in a mirror—though it is possible (and 
we can certainly make mistakes about photographs). But we get our 
memories mixed up with disturbing frequency (see Schacter 104–13), as 
well as our motives (see Nisbett and Ross).
FlA: To be able to identify a coherent self in our selves and others has other 
less heady implications. If our default position is a sense of a coherent 
and unified self, so too is this the case with us as authors and readers of 
narrative fiction. Characters are built on the basis of this understanding: 
that there is a self, a person, and that this self is unique.
PcH: Actually, I do not think our purely cognitive sense of uniqueness is 
very consequential. It is merely a sense of particularity. Of course, as a 
sense of particularity, it is consequential. (Imagine a mind that has only 
category-level thinking and no way of differentiating instances; it would 
 5. On working memory and lateral prefrontal cortex, as well as anterior cingulate cortex, 
see LeDoux, Emotional 276–77; on the anterior cingulate cortex and task contradiction, see Ito 
and colleagues 199; on working memory and consciousness, cf. LeDoux, Synaptic 190–95.
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be pretty rudimentary.) But at this level, uniqueness is simply our sense 
that instances of a category may be differentiated by time, place, and vari-
able features. In my view, the real force of “uniqueness” comes with our 
emotion systems. We feel that some particular is unique to the extent 
that it has a powerful effect on one or another emotion system, especially 
when that force goes against category-based responses. For example, we 
fear strangers but not someone who is familiar. Attachment is probably 
the system most bound up with a sense of uniqueness.
FlA: I consider myself unique, not just because I recognize myself when I 
look in the mirror but because of decisions I make and an awareness of 
a responsibility for my own actions and behavior. In this sense, I am the 
author of my actions. I make decisions and am responsible for (answer-
able to) my actions. My sense of self as unique seems to grow from this 
sense of agency.
PcH: I agree about one’s sense of self being bound up with agency. Again, that 
is why nonself is defined by inhibition. (I am not sure I would call it 
“uniqueness.”)
FlA: Authors and directors I tend to like make narrative fictions that turn 
upside-down my sense of codes that encourage behaving, or acting, 
responsibly; those like Christopher Nolan tickle me with characters—
and stories—that shake a little the self-as-stable-and-coherent brain 
mechanisms. It is probably why I like the first half of Crime and Punish-
ment (1866) so much. I do not agree in my own action to the killing of 
the pawnbroker, Alyona Ivanovna, but can relish this action in its fic-
tional form.
simulation and tHeory oF mind
PcH: My approach to fiction would be similar but perhaps not quite identical. 
Specifically, I see fiction as fundamentally the simulation of emotion-
ally consequential goal pursuit.6 The simulation involves us adopting the 
point of view of other people. But it does not necessarily involve us shar-
ing a sense of self with them. (It may or may not; that is a complicated 
 6. For an extended treatment of literature and simulation, see Hogan, How Authors’ 
Minds Make Stories.
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issue.) This is fully continuous with simulation in ordinary life. I simu-
late what I might do tomorrow (e.g., ask my department head for some 
favor), and I simulate what other people will do (e.g., how my depart-
ment head might respond). The evolutionary function of simulation is 
well known. It allows us to try out scenarios that may be beneficial or 
harmful, then pursue or avoid them. We pursue or avoid them based 
on “story” emotions, as we might call them—the emotions we feel with 
respect to the content of the simulation. For example, I imagine asking 
my department head for something (say, a different classroom), then I 
imagine him responding by requesting a return favor (say, me attending 
graduation this year), which leads me to imagine the consequences of 
doing as he asks (having to delay my summer travel). I feel aversion to 
this outcome, so I decide not to approach my department head about the 
initial favor.
  In addition to this “story” emotion, however, there is some sort of 
pleasure in simulation itself. If there were not, then the evolutionary 
function would be entirely lost. We would simply avoid any simulation of 
aversive outcomes.7
  Given all this, we would expect fictional storytelling to arise as a plea-
surable activity.
FlA: I would consider simulation to be an expression of our causal, counter-
factual, and probabilistic thinking—those mechanisms involved not 
only in generating hypothetical situations (scenarios played out in our 
minds with our bosses or stories generally) but also in the way we project 
a continuous sense of ourselves in the future. This self-identity (our “I” 
or “me”) involves centrally what some have called our autobiographical 
memory; our capacity to recall events that happened in the past and to 
use that recollection to project our self toward the future.
PcH: Yes, this is, of course, crucial to simulation. Again, it holds not only for 
self-simulation but also simulation of others. Indeed, the operations of 
self- and other-simulation are fundamentally the same. We do not simply 
know how we are going to act; we come to understand through simula-
tion, just as we do with others—and as inaccurately.
FlA: Knowing my state of mind and another’s is crucial to our growing of a 
sense of self. Infants already ascribe intentions to others. They already 
 7. For discussion, see chapter 1 of Hogan, What Literature.
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manifest the rudiments of what is called a “theory of mind.” At the same 
time, the infant is developing the material sense of the world in which he 
or she exists.
PcH: This too is key. As you well know, theory of mind comes in two flavors—
inference and, once again, simulation. Though initially these were seen as 
two competing accounts of theory of mind, most writers seem to agree 
now that both inference and simulation are aspects of theory of mind, 
though one or the other may be more important depending on the pre-
cise task (see Doherty 48). Emotion (e.g., understanding that Jones is 
sad) may involve greater simulation, whereas certain sorts of general 
knowledge (e.g., understanding that Jones does or does not know about 
debates on the theory of mind) may involve greater inference.
FlA: As we have talked about informally before, much has been made of the 
rather recent discovery of the mirror neuron system (MNS). To remind 
our readers, this is that set of neurons that become active in the brain’s 
superior temporal sulcus and the Broca region (one language center) 
when we perform and observe action-oriented gestures that have inten-
tionality and teleology in them. They fire (identify) the intention of the 
action or movement and its purpose or goal. To this extent, they are cer-
tainly an important part of our theory-of-mind capacity. Indeed, much 
has been inferred from this discovery about precisely how we empathize, 
interpret, and understand other people’s emotional states, produce lan-
guage, and seemingly now everything under the sun. What is your sense 
of this discovery?
PcH: This work is certainly of major importance, and there are many things 
one might say about it. Here are two. First, it is unsurprising that mir-
ror neurons seem to bear on “everything under the sun” and even that 
some fairly wild claims are sometimes made about how they determine 
everything from language to ethics. However, it seems reasonable to 
assume that mirror neurons are important—at some level even neces-
sary—to all forms of social learning. Our only access to the world is sen-
sory. Before language, our access to other people’s minds is extremely 
limited. Of course, we have inferential capacities. However, it is not clear 
that there would be any basis for our inferences if we did not have some 
sense of identification with the purposes of others. For example, it may 
seem that we could infer Jones is interested in the cheesecake because he 
is looking at it. But we can infer this only on the basis of knowing that 
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people tend to look at things when they are interested in them. Thus the 
specific inference seems already to presuppose a general theory of mind. 
The obvious way of solving this problem is through simulation. But that 
just pushes back the problem—how do we get simulation with no prior 
sense of other minds? Mirror neurons provide, so to speak, the traction 
we need to get either simulation or inference started. In effect, they are a 
form of spontaneous simulation that allows for subsequent inference and 
effortful simulation.
  The second thing to note is that mirror neurons seem particularly 
crucial in emotion. They are crucial in two ways. First, they do indeed 
seem to be the foundation of empathy, because empathy is impossible 
without simulation. In What Literature Teaches Us About Emotion, I dis-
tinguish between empathy and emotion contagion. The initial, sponta-
neous simulation of emotion is presumably closer to contagion. But it 
is probably a necessary condition for empathy proper. Second, mirror 
neurons are probably crucial for the development of enduring emotional 
responses as these emerge in childhood (probably a sort of critical period 
for emotion). Specifically, there is evidence that we acquire various emo-
tional responses from caregivers (see, for example, Damasio, Looking 47). 
This acquisition is presumably based on mirroring responses.
emotion and selF
FlA: As you have already pointed out, emotion is central to our sense of self. 
Indeed, the recent research shows how we bind and process somatosen-
sory information. It is the emotion center that triggers a reflex emotion 
in us in our everyday encounters with and response to the world: nega-
tive emotion to the threatening and unsafe and positive emotion to the 
comforting and safe. Either way, the stimulus is then processed by the 
reason or “executive brain” system. When we are watching a film, this 
reason system overrides the emotion center, telling the brain that we do 
not have to actually run from the living room or cinema.
  This area of research on emotion is rich for those of us interested in 
the how and why of fiction. It seems to suggest that the way we process 
emotions can tell us much about why we may have like emotions when 
we experience fictional worlds but know all along that it is not reality. 
Both real-life and fiction-elicited emotion signals follow the same neu-
rologic circuits from the brain’s emotional system to its cognition system 
and then diverge in their effects when the cognition system determines 
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what kind of response is warranted: to act or react when the information 
is identified as pertaining to real life and to stop or not initiate action 
when the information is identified as pertaining to the make-believe of 
the film, say. This is why when we watch a film, the emotions already 
triggered can be felt as intensely as the real emotions triggered in a simi-
lar real-life situation even though our executive center knows film is 
make-believe.
  There is the all-pervading myth that somehow our cognitive and 
emotion functions are separable; that Spock is more rational because he 
does not feel. However, the constant stream of sensory stimulation and 
information (sound and image primarily) is first processed by our emo-
tion system, or what biologists call the “limbic system,” which includes 
the hypothalamus and amygdala.
  I have been thinking about this in terms of video games—something 
that seems to be taking up much of the attention of all walks of life these 
days, and the topic of a new book I am working on. When marauding 
zombies try to get you in the video game Resident Evil (1996), rabid 
mutants gnash at you in Left 4 Dead 2 (2009), or monsters crawl from 
spacecraft cavities in Dead Space, they activate our limbic system—our 
fight-or-flight response mechanism. We experience the reflex emotion 
of fear and the adrenaline kicks in. However, our brains are equipped 
with a conceptual filtering capacity; it is, grosso modo, a prefrontal cortex 
response that allows us to distinguish between the real and the unreal, 
or between fictional and nonfictional events. So when those monsters 
attack, the sensory stimulus is prefiltered as nonfiction by the emotion 
system, then resolutely distinguished as such by our reason system, or 
the executive cortex that includes the orbitofrontal, prefrontal, anterior 
cingulate, and motor cortex, for instance. The executive brain sets in 
stone, so to speak, this evaluation of the monster as unreal. All the while, 
another monster has jumped out at you that you must destroy, triggering 
once again the emotion system with its respective reflex emotion, its pre-
filtering of real versus unreal, and its signaling of the executive brain for 
confirmation. The emotion and executive brain centers trigger an appro-
priate body response—and the body reaction in turn can intensify the 
emotion experienced.
PcH: These are very important topics.
  On the issue of why we do not run screaming from the theater when 
a lion appears on screen—I have held different views on this at different 
times. Part of what is happening is, of course, prefrontal inhibition, as 
18  •  c H A P t e r  1
you say. But I do not actually think prefrontal inhibition is that strong, 
nor do I think it has to be that strong in our response to a film. Part of 
what is happening is habituation (i.e., the reduction of emotional force 
through repeated exposure to an emotion elicitor), but that cannot be 
definitive, since full habituation would presumably mean that we would 
cease to have emotional responses to film at all. Critical-period experi-
ences of safety during childhood film-watching may also play a role. In 
other words, having grown up with film, we have a set of critical-period 
experiences and associated emotional memories that qualify our emo-
tional responses in the cinema (or the living room before the television). 
But that would not explain the response of adult viewers who did not 
grow up watching, say, horror films.
  All these factors are probably relevant. However, right now, I am 
inclined to give particular weight to something else. Specifically, intensity 
of emotional response appears to be bound up not only with immedi-
ate emotion elicitors but also with very short-term projections into the 
near future.8 Moreover, these projections crucially involve our sense of 
“peri personal space,” a very proximate space that organizes our feeling of 
bodily security and potential action (see Iacoboni 16). The various per-
ceptual cues that arise in a movie theater tend to inhibit short-term antic-
ipations that impinge on peripersonal space.
FlA: As seen in our lives and at all levels, the emotions play a central role; 
they are as essential for survival as cognition. Our cognitive and emo-
tive systems are inseparable—even from the evolutionary point of view. 
You need this automatic knee-jerk reaction to survive, but you also need 
appraisal and reappraisal to survive. This develops organically; like lan-
guage, it grows with you even before you are born.
PcH: As you suggest, the entire idea of opposing reason and emotion is, 
frankly, kind of silly—though one finds it all over the place. It is like 
opposing the circulatory system and the respiratory system. Emotions 
provide us with motivations. If we did not have emotions, we would 
never do anything. In the broad sense of “emotion,” which includes hun-
ger and thirst, the emotion systems are what lead us to function in the 
world at all. In contrast, processes of inference, categorization, and so 
forth (roughly, “reason”) serve three functions. They help us to ascertain 
current conditions in the world, to infer future conditions, and to plot 
 8. See Hogan, “Sensorimotor Projection.”
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actions related to those conditions. Of course, this division is somewhat 
artificial since emotions enter at every point in our simulations. But these 
distinct systems and distinct functions remain.
  This is not to say that I am an advocate of the view that emotions 
are great storehouses of reason. Emotions are evolved mechanisms. As 
such, they approximate functions in the environment of evolutionary 
adaptation. But they are not identical with those functions. We have vari-
ous goals. Owing to the nature of our emotion systems, some emotional 
responses are very intense in dysfunctional ways relative to some of those 
goals. For example, I may feel intense hunger for cheesecake. At the same 
time, I may have a goal of keeping my girlish figure in preparation for the 
swimsuit competition of my local beauty pageant. Nonetheless, I scarf 
up the cheesecake. This is what people seem to have in mind when they 
speak about a conflict between emotion and reason. But this is not really 
accurate. Both my hunger for the cheesecake and my craving for the 
admiration of onlookers at the swimsuit competition involve emotion 
as well as inference, categorization, and other processes associated with 
reason. It is simply that one emotion is stronger—hunger, in this case 
(unsurprisingly, given that our emotion systems evolved at a time when 
simply getting enough calories was probably highly adaptive).
FlA: If I understand correctly, as I grow a balanced reason and emotion sys-
tem in Corina, I’m growing a more sophisticated appraisal system that 
subordinates the impulse to be immediately satisfied by eating a bucket 
of Halloween candy in one sitting. This is to say, a balanced reason and 
emotion system does not achieve its full development, its full poten-
tial, outside of a social context. While infants arrive in the world with a 
charged emotion system—they cry when hungry or neglected, and smile 
when touched and fed—caregivers function as surrogate reason systems 
until the infant grows one of its own. They soothe and inhibit so that the 
little ones can think instead of reflex emote. As they grow, their emotion 
and reason systems come more into balance—they even begin to think 
about the emotions we experience. Working together, the emotion and 
cognitive systems allow us to ponder, assess, and modify our actions—
and sometimes in ways that run counter to our reflex emotions.
  Working together, the emotion and reason systems allow for the 
growing of our capacity to causally and counterfactually (and probabilis-
tically) map our physical (objects and functions) and social (people and 
institutions) worlds. We get nice kickbacks here too. When we plan, put 
into play, and accomplish a goal, whether in relation to the physical or to 
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the social environment, we are rewarded with neurochemical release of 
oxytocin and dopamine—the feel-good brain drugs.
PcH: It is certainly true that prefrontal emotion modulation matures. More-
over, such modulation does involve inference, categorization, spatial 
organization (e.g., recognizing where Mom is physically), imagination, 
and so forth—the processes that one might refer to as “reason.” But I 
still hesitate to call such development a balance of emotion and reason. 
It is, rather, a growing ability to modulate response by reference to infer-
ence or related processes, and to emotion. In that sense, it is a balance 
between immediate emotional response and another, more complex 
sort of emotional response (which incorporates nonaffective cognitive 
processes as well). For example, children begin to develop mood-repair 
mechanisms that ameliorate aversive feelings (on mood repair, see Forgas 
258). These mechanisms involve, for example, the recruitment of emo-
tional memories to qualify the current emotional state, the imagination 
of pleasing outcomes, alternative and often more complex categorizations 
of both external and internal phenomena, and other processes. In other 
words, mood repair involves an integration of emotion and cognition 
throughout.
  I should also mention that it is unlikely that emotion systems are fully 
developed at birth. Rather, it seems fairly clear that they develop through 
critical-period experiences, the aggregation of emotional memories 
throughout life, and perhaps other processes.
FlA: I think this is why I am so drawn to social neuroscience. Not only are 
we the most social animals among the mammals and primates, but we 
cannot develop biologically outside of the social, outside the existence of 
parents, family, teachers, and mentors. This is why emotions play such a 
central role in our growing of a self. Emotions are mechanisms involved 
centrally in the establishing (and cutting off) of relationships that ensure 
our protection in the social.
  I mentioned the importance of memory to our sense of self in the 
past and our ability to project this self into the future. This imagining 
or hypothetical thinking is part of our growing of a capacity for causal, 
counterfactual, and probabilistic thinking. In our constant interaction 
with the natural (organic and inorganic) and social (people and institu-
tions) world, we imagine and work through in our minds possible and 
probabilistic outcomes to actions and actually do the work to modify our 
environments and/or our expectations. As we modify our natural, per-
sonal, and social environs, we also get to know our own abilities better.
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  Because we grow in this capacity to formulate or perceive relations of 
causality, we therefore also automatically possess the capacity to perceive 
and formulate counterfactual hypotheses, arguments, and thoughts gen-
erally. We also grow and sharpen our capacity to create maps—of the 
human (social) and physical (natural) world—learning thereby to create 
new maps within the chain that allow us to consider new possibilities and 
formulate plans with probabilistic outcomes for what our situation will 
be in the world in the future.
PcH:  I am sure you are right on the whole. But I suspect that, except in limited 
contexts, our capacities for inferring probabilities (or explaining causes) 
plateau pretty quickly. One problem is that there are just too many vari-
ables that we do not know about. It becomes very difficult to anticipate 
particulars in any detail. When one first begins to drive, one might be rel-
atively clueless about what to expect from other drivers. It does probably 
take some years to acquire a good set of expectations. But I doubt that it 
keeps improving. I happen to be working right now on literature treat-
ing Kashmir. My sense in reading the scholarship about the history and 
politics of Kashmir is that there is agreement on a few basic points, but 
other than that no one has any idea what is going on and who is likely to 
do what when. Of course, that is a much more complex and unstable situ-
ation than the ones you have in mind. But I feel that most of life is only 
less dangerous in its unpredictability, not necessarily less unpredictable.
  Moreover, it is not just complex, objective conditions that are a prob-
lem. Our capacities are limited. The point is obvious even with respect to 
the presumably easier task of explaining what has happened in the past. 
Our causal inferences have a basic functionality, of course. However, they 
remain simplistic and highly biased.
FlA: Many different experiments show that from a very early age children 
have everyday ideas about psychology, biology, and physics. Their brains 
are equipped from birth with the capacity to construct a surprisingly 
quite accurate picture of the way their surrounding world and its inhabit-
ants work.
  The awareness of self and body and the awareness of our inter-
connected lives follow the same neural circuit and make possible our 
physiological resonance with others and our capacity for empathy. The 
evidence from neurobiology confirms that the social informs directly 
the manner in which the brain develops its capacity to fully explore the 
world as it is (by coming to understand causality) and the way(s) it might 
be (by positing counterfactual scenarios); how the social from birth 
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through adulthood shapes the basic neurobiological and neurosociologi-
cal mechanisms required for further and deeper knowledge of the world 
as it is and as it could be. It is this “could be” that might offer us some 
insight into our fiction making and consuming activities.
stories
PcH: Certainly, our processes of simulation are guided by some sense of pos-
sibility. There seem to be a couple of alternatives here, bound up with 
the evolutionary functionality of imagination. We can simply imagine 
desirable outcomes. We may refer to this as “fantasy.” But that has very 
limited evolutionary benefits—confined basically to temporary mood 
repair. Functional simulation requires that we sometimes imagine aver-
sive outcomes. But simulation of aversive outcomes is not beneficial in 
itself. For example, it is not beneficial if it is random. Suppose I simulate 
going someplace to eat fruit. That simulation incorporates a memory of 
a predator lying in wait at the spot. My aversive “story emotion” will pre-
vent me from going to eat the fruit. But that helps me to survive only if 
the simulation is more accurate than chance. If I imagine the predator 
wherever I imagine food, then it won’t do me any good. So, clearly the 
imagination has to be constrained by some degree of accuracy. Moreover, 
that constraint seems to be connected with our pleasure in simulation. 
This is part of the endogenous production of reward for “correct predic-
tions of the future” discussed by Peter Vuust and Morten Kringelbach 
(266). Clearly, the simulation itself is not immediately verified or falsi-
fied. However, constrained simulation (as opposed to fantasy) should be 
associated with emotional memories of correct prediction, which would 
have the same motivational function. That is the functional background 
for our predictive capacities in simulation. It also suggests why we often 
find a narrative emotionally ineffective if it includes ad hoc violations of 
causal principles.
  There are, however, two qualifications to these points. First, the rel-
evant mechanisms are undoubtedly limited in scope and applicability. If 
our ancestors were more accurate than chance in avoiding predators, it 
does not follow that our responses to the world are, in general, particu-
larly accurate. Second, with respect to fiction, there is the strange fact that 
we can alter the principles guiding our simulations almost at will. I would 
be doing a very bad job of simulating my day tomorrow if I imagined that 
I could fly or magically transform my evil nemesis into a frog. But we do 
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that in literature all the time. Moreover, this is not identical with “fan-
tasy” in the technical sense. We can establish rules guiding imagination 
that we do not violate in the course of the literary simulation. For exam-
ple, in Sanskrit literature, curses can be effective and they can be qualified 
or limited after the fact, but they cannot be entirely reversed. Put simply, 
the causal principles of a story need not be the causal principles of our 
ordinary simulations that are functional in the real world.
FlA: Building on your important point I would say that our causal mecha-
nisms allow us to emplot stories but, because we exercise this along with 
our counterfactual and probabilistic reasoning, this in no way determines 
the final shape of the story. These innate cognitive mapping capacities 
grow in ways that express themselves in the making and consuming of 
narrative fiction in all its guises, including in video games, films, short 
stories, novels—and comic books.9 Indeed, when we watch a film, we 
exercise the same cognitive mechanisms (causal, counterfactual, natu-
ral, and social mappings) already at work in young children who play-
fully invent storyworlds populated with imaginary companions and 
characters.
PcH: Absolutely. Of course, creativity in verbal art and elsewhere is connected 
with expertise. A fundamental principle of “creative cognition theory” is 
that creative work must be both novel and task appropriate, thus mani-
festing expertise. (For recent work exploring creativity, see the essays in 
Kaufman and Sternberg.) But creativity is also bound up with the more 
diffuse associations that characterize childhood imaginations.10
FlA: Just as the research on our growing of cognitive mapping mechanisms 
can shed light on our storymaking activities, I wonder if the research on 
personhood and the emergent functions that relate to this can enrich our 
understanding of how readers recognize a first-person versus a third-
person narrator, or a flat or round character.11
PcH: Undoubtedly. This returns to the idea of predictability. Arguably, a round 
character has two characteristics that a flat character does not have. First, 
he or she provokes simulation. It is much more difficult to simulate the 
 9. See Aldama, Your Brain on Latino Comics.
 10. On the issue of childhood associations, see chapter 3 of Hogan, Cognitive Science, and 
citations.
 11. See Aldama, “Characters in Comic Books.”
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thoughts and actions of a flat character. Second, he or she resists inferen-
tial prediction. Conversely, it is much easier to use inferential theory of 
mind on a flat character. This is in keeping with the sense of subjectiv-
ity that goes along with character “roundness.” A round character is like 
we are for ourselves. As is well known, we see ourselves as responding 
flexibly to circumstances, whereas we view others as acting from fixed 
character traits (see Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, and Thagard 222–24). 
The genius of authors creating a round character is that they manage to 
imagine a character as “selflike” in responding flexibly to circumstances.
FlA: In my work I put certain limits to how I consider theory of mind operat-
ing within the narrative fictional space; it is and always will be an arti-
ficial construct. Jane Austen’s characters that misread other minds to 
elaborate degrees will do so for now to eternity. We as readers simply 
follow the author’s scripts and cues. Whereas in everyday life, our use 
of theory of mind is a rather messy business; we often misread interior 
states of mind in our everyday activities. In narrative fiction there is no 
guesswork.
PcH: You seem to be suggesting some disagreements with Lisa Zunshine here. 
As you know, I disagree with Zunshine about the degree of theory-of-
mind embedding to be found in literary works (character A believing 
that character B imagines that character C anticipates that character D, 
and so on). I also feel that she leaves aside many factors when she treats 
“why we read fiction.” But I do not agree with the criticism of her work 
on the grounds that characters are not real people. That makes some dif-
ference, of course. But the difference is, in my view, very limited.
  I take it that you say “in narrative fiction there is no guesswork” 
because there is no fact there—or, rather, there is no fact unless the 
author explicitly tells us. But I do not believe this follows. There are at 
least two sorts of fact about unstated properties of characters’ minds, and 
both bear on our usual simulative (or inferential) theory-of-mind pro-
cesses. First, there are general facts about the world. We may reasonably 
say that if someone in the real world acted in this way and said these 
things, then we could conclude that he or she had such-and-such psy-
chological properties or made such-and-such inferences; therefore, it is 
reasonable to impute the same properties or inferences to the character 
in a novel who acts in this way and says these things. The point applies to 
embedded theory of mind, thus one character’s understanding of another 
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character. For example, I recently watched Ralph Fiennes’s Coriolanus. 
That production suggests particularly strongly that Coriolanus has a very 
deep, but also troubled (“insecure”) attachment bond with his mother. 
Moreover, when he agrees to pursue a peace treaty with Rome, it appears 
that he is profoundly concerned about just what his mother’s feelings are 
about him and how they will be affected by his decision. This is a theory-
of-mind concern. Clearly, Shakespeare did not state any of this explicitly. 
But it would be strange to deny the validity of this simulation—that is, 
the viewer’s simulation of Coriolanus’s simulation of his mother’s feelings 
and intentions—or an inference that supports such a simulation. Con-
versely, it would be strange to deny that this has the same type of uncer-
tainty or ambiguity as our usual “messy” theory-of-mind simulations.
  The second sort of fact bearing on characters concerns how the 
author himself or herself simulated the character. Note that this does not 
involve precise labeling or even self-conscious judgment. Neither Shake-
speare nor Fiennes needed to know anything about attachment theory 
for one or both of them to have simulated Coriolanus as having profound 
but insecure attachment to Volumnia and a response of something like 
panic to the thought that she would withdraw her love (and perhaps die 
in the course of continuing war).
  In short, the theory-of-mind situation in literature seems to be largely 
the same as it is in life, with two limited differences. The differences are 
that we sometimes know more about characters than we do about people 
and that we sometimes have to simulate the author’s simulation of the 
character, not merely the character alone. We are particularly likely to 
shift from general facts to author simulations when the author was writ-
ing in a cultural or historical context different from our own, thus ren-
dering our life-based generalizations or associations less trustworthy.
FlA: Perhaps I was not clear in what I meant by there being no guesswork. To 
put it very briefly, an author in possession of emotions, intelligence, per-
sonal and social experience, and so forth, does her educated guesswork 
and uses many other mental operations to formulate theory-of-mind 
hypotheses in real life. On the basis of this experience, he or she knows 
how and when and in what guise to ascribe to his or her characters a 
theory of mind. Like in all other instances of creating narrative fiction, 
the author uses aspects of reality as building blocks for the invention of 
storyworlds and characters in possession of all sorts of psychological 
or mental traits and forms of behavior. That said, a reference to theory 
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of mind may offer a useful analytical tool for us to understand how an 
author creates characters and their behaviors (in a specified way) as well 
as how readers use theory of mind to engage with a work of fiction . . .
PcH: To some extent, then, it seems that our disagreements are superficial and 
terminological.
FlA: More generally, the scholarship on fictional characters today one way 
or another also appears to conflate the fictional with the real, the con-
structed character with the flesh-and-blood human being. I think here 
of Alex Woloch’s The One vs. The Many that seeks to give nuance to E. M. 
Forster’s flat and round character taxonomy in his formulation of a typol-
ogy of character (or character system) that is based on the character’s 
minor or maximum presence in storyworld spaces. Enough is said with 
this, however, so I’ll move on.
  While we share universal biological mechanisms that together allow 
for the growing of the self, our infinitely rich and complex social environ-
ments shape the expression of this biology in radically different ways. It is 
why we cannot predict or establish causal laws that describe how millions 
of people will react in the face of any aesthetic experience.
  Our radically different selves grow from a shared biology. It is a fact 
established now by biolinguistics and neuroscience that there is what 
Chomsky calls a faculty of language—a brain-based faculty universally 
present in human beings. We all have this faculty, but not everyone uses 
it the same way and with the same skill. Goethe had it, but so did Hitler. 
Goethe wrote the West-Eastern Divan (1814-1819) and Faust (1808), and 
Hitler wrote Mein Kampf (1925). Goethe favored the arts and science of 
his day, and Hitler favored capitalistic barbarism. Faulkner wrote Absa-
lom, Absalom! (1936) and George W. Bush could hardly get a sentence 
right.
PolitiCal and etHiCal imPliCations
PcH: Responses to fiction clearly differ to some extent. In part, this is a matter 
of personal experiences, prominently emotional memories.12 There are 
also differences in encoding sensitivities (when my students read Indian 
works there are culturally key moments that they do not even notice). 
 12. See chapter 2 of Hogan, The Mind and Its Stories.
P u z z l i n g  o u t  t H e  s e l F  •  27
Inclinations to engage in effortful simulation also vary, as do inhibitions 
of empathic response due to identity categories. These and other factors 
work against uniformity of aesthetic response—though some of them 
are alterable. For example, one can enhance one’s encoding sensitivities, 
decide to engage in effortful simulation, self-consciously modulate in-
group/out-group prejudices, and so forth.
  On the other hand, we may disagree about radical differences in 
social environments. It depends what you have in mind. If you mean 
different cultures, then I would demur. Again, cultures may differ in the 
precise proportions of various attitudes, ideas, propensities, and other 
matters. But they do not seem to differ on which attitudes, ideas, propen-
sities, and so forth, are present. The remarkable recurrence of the same 
literary genres (e.g., romantic tragicomedy) in culture after culture sug-
gests this. Of course, if you mean that particular, individual conditions 
can vary radically, that is true. Although even here I would not say that 
this is the usual case. There are certainly variables in how people develop 
emotionally, for example. But I suspect that the variability has a normal, 
bell-curve distribution, with radical differences only at the tails. These 
would largely be pathological cases.
  As you know, I have written about both Hitler and Bush.13 But I can-
not claim to understand them, especially Hitler. In a sense, Mein Kampf 
falls within the normal distribution since it is a fairly standard sacrificial 
emplotment of history. It combines this with a particular form of cat-
egorial identification and in-group/out-group division, one involving a 
high proportion of disgust motivation. The particular historical circum-
stances in which he was born not only contributed to this combination 
but also contributed to his success. In other words, it was a matter of 
the system in which he found himself. With even slight changes in that 
system, Hitler would simply have been a crank. In these ways, then, we 
have a common phenomenon in the operation of complex systems. A 
particular set of small variations at the outset (the nature of his sacrifi-
cial emplotment, the precise emotion systems involved in his in-group/
out-group divisions, and so on) produce catastrophically different 
outcomes.
FlA: So do we throw in the towel and say that it is all a matter of opinion based 
on personal experience? We cannot know how each individual will actu-
ally experience the novel, film, and so forth, but we can generate what 
 13. See Understanding Nationalism.
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the text’s ideal audience response would be by sleuthing out the respec-
tive devices and structures that make up the narrative blueprint. This is 
where I think the approach and aims of narratology can be useful.14 It 
can provide concepts and instruments through which we can study the 
blueprints created by authors, artists, and directors that circumscribe the 
phenomena of narrative fiction making and consuming.
PcH: I agree. It even helps to some extent with cases such as Hitler. Mein Kampf 
crucially involves emplotment. Examining that emplotment gives us a 
better sense of the work’s effects. Similar points could be made about its 
target audience, though presumably our aims in this case would be rather 
different from isolating, say, Faulkner’s ideal reader.
FlA: Narratology and the advances in the cognitive and neurosciences of 
memory, empathy, theory of mind, causal and counterfactual social and 
physical mappings, and much more can offer a foundational analysis of 
how an author or artist is able to create effective blueprints—effective in 
the sense of being able to have an impact on an audience.
PcH: I of course agree—though, with my usually pessimistic attitude, I would 
add that it is the effectiveness not only of artists but also of demagogues.
FlA: The self, agency, action, and responsibility are central to what has been 
called ethics. Within the tradition of the study of human behavior and 
action we have three main threads: virtue ethics (formation of a character 
aspiring to the good), deontology (duties or rules), and consequentialism 
(consequences of actions).
  I am interested in what we might identify as a fourth strand, one that 
shares aspects of the virtue and consequentialist ethics. It is an ethics that 
says that all human beings are part of nature; they are part of the animal 
kingdom. They are special, social kinds of animals but animals notwith-
standing, and therefore they all share the same genetic neurobiological 
architecture. It understands that humans in their activity (always a social 
activity) develop norms of behavior (conduct) that are also social; these 
could refer to anything from table manners, hygiene, and grooming to 
not committing adultery or murder. Among these norms also develop 
norms of interaction of one toward others: specific kinds of social norms 
we call moral norms—or simply morality.
 14. See Aldama, A User’s Guide to Postcolonial and Latino Borderland Fiction.
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PcH: It is interesting that you pick virtue and consequentialism from this triad. 
It relates to our partial disagreements about prediction. In general, I am 
Kantian in ethical attitudes. In other words, I would favor basing moral 
decisions on evaluations of the intrinsic morality of the action (in light 
of moral principles—such as always treat others as ends in themselves and 
never as mere means). I generally accept the criticism that consequential-
ist ethics relies on impossible predictions. On the other hand, I do qualify 
Kant with respect to some short-term consequences that are predictable 
with a high degree of confidence. In other words, I see the value of conse-
quentialism as severely limited by our poor capacities at prediction.
  Virtue ethics tends to enhance our tendency to think of people as 
good or bad. This seems to me to have unfortunate consequences. I 
would much prefer to confine claims of good and evil to acts.
FlA: I have kept at bay the deontological position, Patrick, simply because it 
appears to me to allow too much room a faith-in position concerning 
social justice and the like. I think either way we look at it, we can both 
agree that our existence as social, productive beings requires work and 
action to modify our own self (nature) and our societies and relations 
within society. This transformative capacity in time and place also modi-
fies our codes of behavior in time and place. Human behavior and its 
codification that appears in The Iliad (ca. 1194–1184 BC) or Gilgamesh 
(ca. 2500 BC) is not the same codified behavior today.
  At the same time that there is a great variety of sources for ethics, 
we have the whole domain circumscribed by frontiers established by our 
socio-neurobiological nature. This is what allows us to understand why 
we are essentially, fundamentally, a single species and why morality or 
ethics, notwithstanding its myriad particular manifestations, is at the 
same time a universal phenomenon. The basic rules of ethics are essen-
tially based on what we are neurobiologically and the way we maintain 
our existence, our lives, through social life.
PcH: I wish I could say that the “heroic” ethics of The Iliad are absent today. It 
seems, rather, that they are all too prominent. Happily, so are the ethics of 
Euripides’ Trojan Women.
FlA: As an infant learns to map its social and natural world, it is also fulfilling 
some basic needs in order simply to exist: need of affection and security 
and protection, of food and shelter and clothes, of learning, of beauty and 
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knowledge and know-how, of social collaboration, altruism and fairness, 
of happiness and laughter, love and touch. There is also the sense that the 
6.6 billion people on Earth today are almost identical from the point of 
view of the early cognitive development, anatomy, and the physiology 
and the functioning of their brains.
PcH: Yes. I would only add that many things enter here—contingencies of 
child rearing, continuities of the physical environment, patterns in group 
dynamics and complex systems. Due to these and other factors, the con-
ditions into which children are born are largely the same as well. More 
precisely, these and other nonbiological factors constrain the range of 
variability in those environments.
FlA: Our most basic neurobiological mechanisms such as our capacity for 
empathy and mind reading are involved in our codes of behaving and 
our moral judgments. It seems this is necessarily involved in our saying 
that such and such an activity is wrong, harmful, or should be punished. 
In a court of law today, we as a jury are asked to determine the intent—
the interior state of mind—of the defendant. We need to determine that 
person’s state of mind and in so doing also ascribe responsibility or not; 
hence, too, certain protections that are in place to protect children, whose 
brains are at a different stage of brain development than those of adults: 
adults have rights together with responsibilities, whereas children have 
protections, rules that protect them.
  We are the only social part of nature that is capable of transforming 
through work, through our social being, the totality of nature, or at least 
that part of nature contained in the planet Earth. And by doing so, we are 
exclusively capable of bringing in factors that continue our evolution as 
part of nature in ways that change our selves. We have needs just as bea-
vers and ants have needs that they must satisfy in order to survive, but no 
other animal society does what humans do: by satisfying our needs, we 
transform those needs and even multiply them.
PcH: I know what you are getting at here, but I am not sure that we actually 
transform our needs. This goes back to the idea of coevolution, of which, 
again, I am skeptical. I am not saying that we are simply born with all 
our needs. A child bonds with a particular person after birth. Then it 
is entirely reasonable to say that he or she needs that person. In other 
words, the child may suffer physical decline if separated from that person. 
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Similarly, various addictions alter our needs (indeed, romantic love and 
attachment appear to be connected with addiction15).
  Of course, we do change the means by which we achieve ends. If one 
wants, one can refer to those means as “needs” also. If we need food and 
the only means to get food is money, then one could say that we “need” 
money. Nonetheless, I feel it would be clearer to say that the need itself 
hasn’t changed but rather the means of achieving the needed outcome.
FlA: What I find so exciting and scientifically powerful about the findings in 
cognitive science and neurobiology is that they have established as a solid 
fact that we as humans are one; that historically (prehistorically) we all 
share a common origin; that we all came from that initially small group 
of walkers who went from Africa to the other continents spreading more 
and more of their common genes, their common genome.
  And that this fact of our common humanity is the strongest support 
for the view that all of us should have the same rights and opportunities 
to develop fully our cognitive and emotive selves and to realize our causal 
and counterfactual potentials in the form of science, narrative fiction, or 
anything yet to be imagined.
PcH: There is nothing I can add to your eloquent statement, with which I 
wholeheartedly agree.
 15. See Hogan, What Literature 83–83 and citations; Stein and Vythilingum 240; and 
Panksepp 54.
PAtrick colm HogAn: It goes without saying that literary study has been 
deeply indebted to the study of language, particularly linguistics, since 
at least the first wave of structuralism. This is unsurprising, in some ways 
quite intuitive. After all, literature and orature are made out of language. 
Given this, it seems that no discipline could provide more appropriate 
and effective theoretical tools for literary study.
  On the other hand, the rise of linguistic approaches to literature 
has made the limits of such approaches painfully obvious. This is true 
in several respects. First, whenever there is some sort of “master disci-
pline,” other potentially important areas of study are likely to be ignored. 
For example, literature involves language, but it also involves emotions, 
imagination, and other psychological processes. Mainstream narra-
tology seems to have been so dominated by linguistic ideas that it has 
largely ignored affective science or theories of simulation—even as it has 
expanded to treat non- or only partially verbal media, such as film and 
graphic fiction.
Frederick luis AldAmA: Yes; although I am working to establish a unified 
theory of aesthetics, I think that the idea that one discipline (in this case 
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ture is untenable. Of course, there has been a strong impulse to turn to 
linguistics precisely because literature is expressed in words through 
language. This said, while we clearly access characters and their worlds 
through the medium of language, we need also to attend to how the emo-
tions and ethical moral attitudes are built into the characters we con-
sume as well as other important psychological processes involved in the 
making of narrative fiction.
  I mentioned already in chapter 1 our causal, counterfactual, and prob-
abilistic faculties—areas of study that are generally bypassed for one rea-
son or another and ignored in the study of fiction. (Alison Gopnik studies 
these faculties in her coauthored 1999 book, Scientist in the Crib, and in 
the single-authored Philosophical Baby, where she forcefully shows how 
children grow theories of the social and natural environments.) Such causal 
and counterfactual mechanisms are at work when the author chooses 
to invent a character with such-and-such emotion and ethics system. 
Whatever we find in the character’s mind the real-life author placed there.
  Of course, no author, no human being to be more exact, functions 
only in terms of emotions or only in terms of reasoning or in terms of 
moral attitudes. We function as a whole. To think in a way that puts aside 
the concept and experience of causality is only possible through the use 
of another mental faculty: our capacity to conceive counterfactual situa-
tions and concepts.
  Our mind works as a whole, as you well know. If I have a jumble of 
ideas and images in my mind as an author, then it will be a jumble of ideas 
and images that the reader will find in my stories and also in the minds 
of the characters. I am the author. I put whatever is there there. I can very 
consciously put into the minds of my characters beliefs, thoughts, emo-
tions, and attitudes that I do not share as an author. But I put them there.
  It is inevitable that narrative fiction will be built with the building 
blocks that come from every aspect of reality that has entered the author’s 
mind and that the author will put into his stories and characters. It is 
unavoidable.
  This is why this myth associated with Hemingway—created essen-
tially by media such as Life magazine, sensational biopics, and the like—
that continues to spin its web in some creative writing workshops asserts 
in one way or another that you can only write well that which you know 
from firsthand experience.
  This is nonsense—at the level of both the creating and the co-creating. 
Imagine a teenager living in a small town in Mexico surrounded by tropi-
cal forests who reads Dostoevsky; she reads about the terrible cold the 
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protagonist feels in St. Petersburg, about the snow, the iced-over rivers, 
and so on. She has never had any direct experience of snow, yet she is 
able to imagine fully the scenes, successfully filling in the gaps in the 
blueprint. This concerns the visible part of our natural reality. However, 
she might also read a story written by Tolstoy that concerns financial 
transactions, marriage, and a guy who is dying that build all sorts of emo-
tions into its blueprint, including, most importantly, those that surround 
the act of dying. Yet, this teenager is only at the beginning of her journey 
through life. If the Hemingway myth (in whatever iteration) were true, 
such a reader would not be able to experience the emotion system of the 
story. Of course, this concerns the act of reading. We can also say the 
same of her choice to write a story. This same teenager might choose to 
write a story that has nothing to do with her proximate experience—a 
story set in a Nordic climate about a man on his deathbed, say—and she 
would have the cognitive and emotive faculties to do so.
  This is a hypothetical, but we can see such a refutation of the “you can 
only write what you know” myth many times over with examples from 
world fiction authors. Think of Carlos Fuentes in his mid-twenties, who 
did not have any direct experience of the 1910 Mexican Revolution yet 
was able to write one of the most magnificent novels of the Revolution, 
The Death of Artemio Cruz (1962).
  This is to say, firsthand experience comprises not only that which I 
have touched (or that has touched me) physically directly but everything 
that I have read, discussed, seen in motion and in static pictures, and so 
on. It involves all my aesthetic capacities and feelings; all the education of 
my senses through direct experience (through direct acquaintance) and 
indirect experience (indirect acquaintance).
Past uses oF linguistiCs in literary study
PcH: Another difficulty with linguistic approaches to literary theory is that 
they tend to rely on historically particular linguistic theories, often theo-
ries that are no longer current in linguistics. This is not merely incidental. 
It tends to result from ordinary disciplinary developments. Theoreti-
cal work in linguistics is often highly technical, and it tends to become 
more technical as it develops within any particular theoretical tradi-
tion. Researchers outside of linguistics are often ill prepared to under-
stand technical developments. In consequence, they are more likely to 
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be attracted to theories that are available in more accessible summaries 
(usually older theories), as well as the early stages of theories.
  The most notorious case of this is Saussurean linguistics, which 
entered into literary study in the 1960s, long after it was understood by 
most linguists as inadequate to explain or even describe fundamental 
linguistic phenomena. In The Politics of Interpretation, I discuss how 
many of Derrida’s conclusions about meaning—its differential and 
deferred character, its relation to binary oppositions, and so on—are not 
a working out of instabilities in language. Rather, they are a working out 
of some inadequacies in the Saussurean account of language—specifi-
cally, an account of phonology generalized to semantics. In this way, one 
can see almost fifty years of mainstream literary theory as suffering from 
an unfortunate assumption of implausible linguistic principles.
FlA: I will admit that in my younger days as an undergraduate at UC Berke-
ley I found extremely attractive the systematic and deep-level approach 
offered by scholars who used a linguistic approach to the study of litera-
ture, such as Ann Banfield and Julian Boyd. The more I worked in this 
area, however, the more I realized its shortcomings.
  I wonder if it might be beneficial to consider viewing this from yet 
another angle. To give us a chronological signpost, after World War II we 
see a rich variety of linguistic theories appear. Most of these post–World 
War II theories were developed in France, England, and the United 
States. Before this surge of diversity, there were essentially a handful of 
linguistic theories—all of them with a strong family resemblance and all 
of them one way or another related to Saussurean linguistics, or, more 
accurately, the proposals made by Saussure under the domain of linguis-
tics. There was no big clash or contradiction between these theories.
  Before we talk about the different theories, however, I have to say a 
few more words about Saussurean linguistics. As a young man in 1878, 
Saussure published his dissertation on the primitive vowel system in 
Indo-European languages, which earned him a lot of prestige. This thick 
book (four hundred pages or so) is about vowel systems in what was 
called at the time the Indo-European languages. It is perfectly coherent 
and consonant and inscribes itself easily within the dominant school of 
linguistics in the whole of Europe formed by the New Grammarians, 
essentially concentrated in Germany, France, and Britain but that also 
sprouted up in the United States with the German expatriate Franz Boaz, 
the teacher of Bloomfield and Sapir.
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  There were, of course, important scholars before these fellows who 
made important progress in the study of linguistics, studying language 
in a quite systematic way and establishing regularities in Sanskrit, for 
instance; this in contrast to others who mixed myth with equal doses of 
speculation in the quest, for instance, to discover an Adamic language. 
However, it was the New Grammarians that contributed something very 
important: a scientific approach to prove the global hypothesis of the 
existence of a protean mother lode for all Indo-European languages. They 
were the first international school of linguists to have a scientific meth-
odology and outlook that set aside all attempts at explaining linguistic 
phenomena by theological or politically motivated pseudo means.
  One of the most prestigious Francophone New Grammarians was the 
very young Saussure. The publication of his dissertation when he was 
twenty-one years old suggested great promise for the development of the 
field of linguistics internationally. However, he knew that he would have 
to redirect his New Grammarian training and scientific (empirical find-
ings and results accompanied by observation and the discovery of regu-
larities) impulse elsewhere if he were to take the study of language to the 
level of generality of a science of linguistics. He asked himself what lan-
guage was and how it functions, operates.
  The product of the work that grew from this can be found in the notes 
(turned into the Cours de linguistique générale [1916]) from his courses 
on “general linguistics” taught at the University of Geneva. Here he dis-
cusses the foundational problems I have already mentioned: what lan-
guage is and what the proper domain of the study of linguistics is.
  Before Saussure’s notes were published as a book (the diligent work 
of his students), his theories had already caught the eye of Roman Jakob-
son and Nikolai Sergeyevich Trubetzkoy—who later wrote an extraor-
dinary book on philology. It was Jakobson who met with members of 
the Moscow and St. Petersburg circles of the Russian formalists and 
explained what Saussure had done. Through Jakobson and the work that 
Trubetzkoy was doing in phonology, scholars interested in the scientific 
study of literature were given a model for the scientific foundation for 
the study of literary phenomena.
  The first attempts by the formalists failed because they tried to use 
the parole/langue system as a way to identify the differences that make 
a difference between the language essentially of poetry (its literariness) 
and that of everyday usage. The attempt to directly apply Saussurean lin-
guistics to the study of literary texts (essentially poetry) quickly led to 
dead ends, although the formalists also increasingly studied prose narra-
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tive fiction. Indeed, in their turn to prose narrative fiction, they dropped 
the strictly linguistic approach and followed instead the story versus dis-
course approach. Of course, the Stalinist bureaucracy cut short the life of 
this research program; it wasn’t until Gérard Genette’s student Tzvetan 
Todorov translated the formalists into French that their work on this 
score was rebooted.
  The ambition to make this linguistics a more solid, scientific disci-
pline—even formalized in the sense of formal systems such as logic and 
mathematics—took root and grew many branches in other places such 
as Czechoslovakia and the Nordic countries, particularly Denmark. This 
ambition to make linguistic structuralism something much more scien-
tific and much more susceptible to verification and refutation took the 
name “glossomatics.” (See the work of Louis Hjelmslev and Hans Jorgen 
Uldall.) In the United States, building on the work of Boaz, Bloomfield 
and Sapir began to establish regularities not of one mother-lode lan-
guage of European languages, but of two big mother lodes. This is why 
American structuralism in linguistics shares many traits with European 
structuralism and at the same time has many of its own unique features.
  This leads me to Zellig Harris, the post–World War II scholar who 
made important attempts at formalizing (mathematizing) linguistics and 
who was the direct teacher of a very young Noam Chomsky. We see in 
Chomsky’s work the use of tools developed by Harris in his first stab 
at what he called the transformational generative grammar; transforma-
tional grammar was a tool developed by Harris in the analysis of syntax. 
In his very first version of his theory, which he later returns to and refines 
in the 1980s, Chomsky uses this tool.
  Patrick, you mention that linguistics has become a very specialized 
field. You are right. In fact, today it is very difficult to follow and read. 
This impulse was accelerated greatly with Chomsky. As a disciple of Har-
ris who had introduced a mathematical methodology in linguistics, par-
ticularly in his use of transformations, Chomsky made linguistics as a 
whole a more and more formal discipline—a more and more mathema-
tized discipline. Already in this early work, we have to know quite a bit 
about mathematics to understand the theory.
  Another part of the increased complexity of the discipline is that 
Chomskyan linguistics has evolved in several directions. Chomsky’s orig-
inal proposal made in the 1950s is very different from versions of it that 
you find today, for instance. The discipline as a whole has never remained 
stable or had the same aspect over the years. Scholars in English depart-
ments may think that they are applying a cutting-edge theory of linguis-
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tics, when in fact what they are applying is a very outdated linguistic 
theory; even Chomsky’s own work has evolved radically from his formu-
lations in the 1950s.
  All this aside, there remains the issue of applying linguistic science as 
such to the study of phenomena that are not linguistic; that do not per-
tain to the domain of the science of linguistics.
  We all use language in our everyday communication and find lan-
guage in many places—books, newspaper, movies, television, you name 
it. Literature is made with language. But the proper study of linguistics 
is not language. Its proper study is not language use or linguistic use—it 
is the study of the faculty of language. Otherwise stated, what linguistics 
has to explain is not how Spanish works and much less how Frederick 
Aldama’s Spanish works; the domain of linguistics is not the study of any 
particular language. The domain of linguistics is all languages in the most 
abstract sense of the term. Therefore, the domain of linguistics is that 
which is essential to the language faculty. (The proper study of the theory 
of gravity is the minimum essential traits of the phenomena of gravita-
tion that we find in any and all forms of matter.)
literature and tHe sCoPe oF linguistiC tHeory
PcH: There is another potential problem with the use of linguistics in literary 
theory that relates to the level at which the application occurs. The most 
basic sort of application occurs when linguistic and literary study over-
lap. This overlap is limited, but it is not insignificant. It tends to occur at, 
so to speak, two ends of linguistic inquiry. Specifically, it is common to 
divide linguistics into a series of subfields. At the most minute level, we 
have the study of speech sounds in phonetics and phonology. Research 
in these areas—such as the work of Paul Kiparsky, Nigel Fabb and Mor-
ris Halle, and Geoffrey Russom—has guided some enormously valuable 
work on universality and variation in principles of meter or other aspects 
of verse.
FlA: There is also the work of Carlos Piera and Bruce Hayes.
PcH: At intermediate levels, we find morphology and lexical semantics, treat-
ing meaningful units (largely words), then syntax and sentence-level 
semantics. Finally, the study of language above the sentence level is dis-
course analysis. Discourse analysis encompasses such practices as story-
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telling. Linguists tend to be more concerned with conversational stories 
than with narratives of verbal art. Nonetheless, some very important 
work in narrative theory has been done directly in discourse analysis and 
related areas, such as sociolinguistics. One towering figure in this field is 
William Labov. His model of conversational storytelling has been a major 
contribution to our understanding of narrative generally (see Labov and 
Waletzky). There have also been some subtle linguistic analyses of more 
clearly linguistic features of discourse, such as free indirect discourse, as 
in research by Sharvit.
FlA: Or Ann Banfield.
PcH: As these examples suggest, the majority of consequential work in direct 
application has been by linguists. This is unsurprising, at least in the case 
of sound analysis, since there have been great technical advances in pho-
netic and phonological analysis. It is difficult for literary critics without 
training in formal linguistics to apply this work. The major exception to 
this comes from one narrow aspect of semantics—the study of metaphor. 
On the other hand, even there it seems that, from the literature side, real 
theoretical contributions have been made largely by Mark Turner, who 
has a breadth of scientific training rare among humanists.
FlA: This reminds me, Patrick, of a time in France when a group of linguists, 
philosophers, mathematicians, biologists, poets, and fiction writers 
affiliated with the cultural journal Change (1968–85) gathered together 
their disciplinary forces in an attempt to apply linguistic approaches 
and methods to the study of poetry and fiction; they were particularly 
interested in applying Chomsky’s generative linguistics. Among its mem-
bers were Mitsou Ronat, Jean Paris, Leon Robel, and Jacques Roubaud. 
(One of its members, Jean-Pierre Faye, worked to push against the most 
ideologically charged forms of structuralism represented mainly in the 
later Barthes and in the Tel Quel group and therefore against the nov-
elist Philippe Sollers and Jacques Derrida.) Ultimately, the product of 
the labors of the members of “Change” was rather small. Arguably their 
biggest impact was the publication of what became a best-selling book-
length interview between the linguist Mitsou Ronat and Chomsky, Lan-
guage and Responsibility (1979; reprinted in 1998 in On Language). In 
this interview, Chomsky tellingly remarks how “ever since the ancient 
Greeks people have been trying to find general principles on which to 
base literary criticism, but while I’m far from an authority in the field, 
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I’m under the impression that no one has yet succeeded in establishing 
such principles . . . That is not a criticism. It is a characterization, which 
seems to me to be correct” (On Language 56–57). In this dialogue and 
elsewhere, Chomsky identifies clearly the benchmark: to find general 
principles in the study of literature, to obtain results that are empirically 
verifiable and that possess a general explanatory power.
  One of the big achievements of Chomsky is that he introduced for the 
first time the notion and imperative of making absolutely explicit the goals 
of the science of language. Very early in his work, he gave a mathematical 
and logical formulation to the goals of this science. He left no ambigu-
ity in his formulations, no room to squeeze in pseudoscientific goals by 
those inclined toward obscurantism.
  After Chomsky’s clarification, most philosophy of language became 
irrelevant, and so too did much applied linguistics. Scholars were forced 
to clarify and be explicit about their goals or else face expulsion from the 
field of philosophy of language. Derrida was an exception; he was never 
explicit about his goals in anything; and one has to be very attentive to 
his interviews and writings to discern his prelapsarian linguistic impulse.
  I agree that the contribution of linguistics to literary study is minimal; 
there have been some important studies at the level of phonology and 
phonetics that allow us to better understand how the sound pattern or 
system of a language is important in poetry, for instance.
  Gestures in literary studies toward other levels of linguistic analysis 
include the study of the morphosyntactic patterning of language and its 
study of word formation (how words are put together with the bricks 
of the sound pattern of the language such as vowels, consonants, stress, 
prosody—all that belongs to the phonological level) and word combi-
nations (how we form strings of words one after another), semantics 
(sometimes the study of lexicology is included here) or the study of the 
meaning system as a lexical pattern (the accumulation of the thesaurus 
of its lexicon, say), and the pragmatics or the study of the specific usage 
of the sound system, the word formation system, the syntax, the lexi-
con and the meaning patterns and how they are used in specific situa-
tions, moments, societies. Pragmatics also includes work done in what 
is called the Theory of Argumentation launched by the contributions of 
the French linguist Oswald Ducrot. Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson’s 
theory of relevance is also a pragmatic theory.
  Within the study of pragmatics is the study of certain approaches 
found in applied linguistics such as discourse analysis. However, this is 
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a rather idiosyncratic methodology that applies to the particular. Much 
like Barthes’s brilliant yet rather idiosyncratic interpretations in S/Z, 
the analysis and the tools of analysis apply to one specimen of narrative 
fiction.
  At what point, then, can linguistics shed light on a formulation of a 
general theory of narrative fiction? The first step is to see what pertains to 
linguistics and what does not. For instance, does discourse analysis have 
anything to do with linguistics, actually? A theory of the sound pattern in 
English perhaps only identifies a particular instantiation of the universal 
properties of the faculty of language and therefore cannot operate at the 
level that would allow it to generate a general theory of language.
  Once we make these distinctions, then we have to ask why, for 
instance, studies of phonetics and phonology have been useful for the 
study of poetry. Why and in which specific way have the findings of lin-
guistics in the field of phonetics and phonology been applicable to the 
study of something as particular as poems and something more general 
but still particular like poetry within such and such a language? And 
why is this not the case for other fields pertaining to linguistics?
  Even if we have as our focus a novel like Joyce’s Finnegans Wake I 
am not sure you need a huge theory of morphosyntactics, semantics, or 
pragmatics to enrich an understanding of its aesthetics. (I speak to this 
more in chapter 4.) Precisely because it is not just a sum of linguistic 
devices, it could be that even a narrative fiction that plays on multiple 
levels with language does not benefit much from the use of scientific find-
ings of linguistics.
  We have magnificent fictions such as Absalom! Absalom! with very 
long sentences that sometimes run for pages, yet I am not so sure we 
need the heavy apparatus of linguistic science to describe what Faulkner 
does here and how it works—to figure out how he can build such long 
sentences without losing his readers, for instance. Maybe we do not need 
the heavy apparatus of the science of language to describe and show how 
this works. Perhaps, too, an ordinary school-level grammar textbook 
would do just as well.
  To put it in a nutshell: the language in narrative fiction is rarely a 
constant flaunting of linguistic devices, whatever they may be and at 
whatever level. Narrative fiction rather almost always features the use 
of everyday ordinary language with the addition of some less frequently 
used words—words that you find in dictionaries. Maybe the application 
of linguistics to the study of narrative fiction is simply the ability to use a 
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dictionary. I suppose what I’m saying is that perhaps it is a bit excessive 
to use the heavy machinery of syntactics and semantics in the study of 
literature.
PcH: Of course, none of this is to say that literary critics should either vigor-
ously take up current linguistic theories or rely on linguists to extend cur-
rent theories to literary concerns. After all, even if a particular theory is 
now widely accepted (and most linguistic theories are highly contested), 
it is almost certain to be discarded eventually. This may be true particu-
larly in linguistic theory today. As John Ingram points out, “If current 
trends of technical and scientific advances continue, all currently com-
petitive theories of language processing will probably seem ridiculously 
simplistic from a vantage point not far into the new millennium” (14). 
Part of the reason that Labov’s insights have been so enduring is that they 
are not too narrowly tied to a particular, technical theory. Put differently, 
sometimes the basic descriptive account of some literary phenomena 
is so interwoven with complex (and doubtful) theoretical presupposi-
tions that it is difficult to extricate the insights from the presuppositions 
once the theory is discarded. One might argue that this is the case with 
certain aspects of psychoanalytic work, to take an example from outside 
of linguistics. For instance, much of Peter Brooks’s account of narrative 
relies on a psychoanalytic account of drives that does not seem to have 
much validity in terms of current theories of human motivation systems.
  At the same time, this does not mean that we should discard cur-
rent linguistic theories (or current theories in affective science or else-
where). Rather, it means (I take it) that we should try to learn about the 
theories in their complex, particular arguments and analyses so that we 
can approach them critically. At the same time, we should learn about 
alternative approaches in linguistics-related fields. Finally, we should pay 
attention to the specificity of verbal art itself, seeking to capture its prop-
erties in ways that can be preserved across changes in theoretical fashion.
FlA: Your salient points lead us back to basic distinctions: theoretical versus 
applied linguistics. It is interesting that you mention Labov as the most 
enduring example. Perhaps he has endured both because his so-called 
linguistic work is less dependent on one linguistic theory and because 
it does not pertain to the field of theoretical linguistics but rather to 
applied linguistics. Hence, symptomatically, he identifies his own work 
as sociolinguistics. Indeed, Labov’s work easily found its way into schools 
at all levels from elementary all the way up through high school, giving 
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teachers the necessary knowledge to show that African Americans were 
not speaking incorrect substandard English. All these findings were very 
easily appropriated by activists everywhere in favor of civil rights and the 
civil rights movement. Now it is part and parcel of our ordinary opinions. 
Labov’s findings have become a part of today’s common doxa.
  This has nothing to do with linguistics as a science or with the study 
of narrative fiction. One way or another, Labov’s work is more an applied 
sociology than an applied linguistics.
  Yes, we have to study very carefully as far as we can the different offer-
ings we have today in the scientific study of language—linguistics as a 
science—and try as hard as we can to understand the details in order to 
be able to decide if any of these options in science might be useful for our 
analysis of literary texts.
  The existence of options today in linguistic science is not in any way a 
negative feature—a lack, say, of a scientific quality of linguistics. In many 
ways we have the same phenomena in most sciences as with, for example, 
physics: there are perfectly good scientific reasons to accept the hypoth-
esis of black matter, but at the same time there are very good reasons to 
reject the hypothesis of black matter, too. The same can be argued and 
counterargued concerning the ultimate structure of the universe. Some 
find string theory compelling and believe that the ultimate components 
of matter are strings; others consider it not valid and on the contrary 
useless, arguing that it complicates things and keeps people from going 
deeper into the research.
PcH: Before going on to some particular theoretical approaches, there are a 
couple of further general points that are worth pursuing. First, we have 
been speaking of direct applications of linguistic theories to verbal art. 
Such applications have evident value when literature falls within the 
scope of the initial theory. However, literary critics have been perhaps 
overly generous in their interpretation of what falls within the scope of a 
linguistic theory. Indeed, they sometimes seem to have assumed that the 
various objects of literary study—for example, narrative—are subcom-
ponents of an overarching language system. But this does not seem very 
likely. We may wish to view narrative as modular (thus as an autonomous 
system that “interfaces” with language, etc.) or we may understand it as 
“emerging” from the interaction of various distinct systems (language, 
emotion, causal inference, theory of mind, simulation, etc.). In either 
case, we cannot assume that all the structures, processes, and contents 
peculiar to language apply directly to narrative. Although, of course, they 
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will operate in the language of narrative, they need not operate in the 
processing of, say, story structure.
  This is all a bit abstract, so let me provide a more tangible example. 
Suppose we accept for the moment the existence of a language module. 
That language module will involve certain structures (e.g., perhaps dis-
tinct phonology, morphology, and syntax components), certain processes 
(e.g., in an early generative theory, transformations), and certain contents 
(e.g., phonemes marked by distinctive features). It does not follow that 
narrative operates in precisely the same way. In other words, it does not 
follow that there are distinctive features defining elementary constituents 
of narrative. Nor does it follow that there are transformations underlying 
story structure. Much linguistically oriented work in narrative theory is 
in my view vitiated by sometimes implicit, sometimes explicit assump-
tions of some identity or continuity along these lines.1
FlA: I agree that it doesn’t follow that a modular theory equals a theory of 
narrative fiction. To see this clearly, I think it worth taking a step back to 
detail the modular hypothesis. The modular theory of mind was formu-
lated in the late 1960s and early 1970s by Jerry Fodor. He has worked on 
this hypothesis in a systematic way ever since; some have abandoned the 
hypothesis and others simply stopped writing about it, whereas he has 
continued to develop the idea. In connection with the modular theory 
of mind that was very well accepted by Chomsky and rejected by others, 
he developed the language of thought (LOT) theory—a sort of operating 
system within the module of language. (See his Language of Thought.)
  From the beginning it was a controversial hypothesis, and it has been 
hashed out now for more than thirty years. Today we can say that the 
hypothesis as such has been clarified and explored in almost all of its 
aspects. So when we talk about the modular theory of mind and we are 
for or against the hypothesis, we know what we are talking about. There-
fore, it is something manageable that we can talk about in a rational way.
  As you well know, the modular hypothesis is that the mind is made 
up of a whole series of modules—a module of the mind is a region of the 
brain that specializes, for instance, in language, perception, memory, or 
movement. By definition each module is a module because it operates 
according to its own principles: the language module is really distinct 
from the vision module. The problem with the hypothesis is that after a 
while we have as many modules as we have mental faculties and mental 
 1. See Hogan, “Generative.”
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activities. Some have multiplied the number of modules in a viral-like 
way. Like a conductor who helps the musicians in an orchestra play as an 
organic whole, so too, according to the modular theory of mind, the brain’s 
executive function helps get all the modules to work in a harmonious 
way in a healthy brain.
  The idea of a modular structure of the mind remains controver-
sial, even though concerning certain modules there is more and more 
empirical confirmation (and therefore less and less debate). For example, 
research has allowed a mapping within the brain of all the regions 
involved in language production, and such mapping identifies what we 
might call a language area, a language module. Some have posited a mod-
ule for narrative fiction, even.
  I find the hypothesis that narrative fiction is a specialized function 
of a part of the brain highly unconvincing. It does not seem adequate 
to import every single transformation or operation available in syntax; 
on the other it is somewhat unappealing to postulate  a specific narra-
tive module isolated from other components. I believe we create fiction 
through the workings of all faculties of the brain. The author of fiction 
uses all the faculties of her mind. She thinks in terms of causal relations. 
She thinks in terms of colors, shapes, counterfactual reasoning or imag-
inings. She counts—that is, she uses mathematical abilities; she uses her 
linguistic abilities. Her linguistic module of specialization is certainly fir-
ing constantly when at work; she is using mental faculties for calculating 
distances, balance, looking at things without losing sight of what she is 
supposed to be focused on. Some authors have to walk in order to write, 
and while walking, they are also using many mental faculties, including 
the faculty that allows us to shift focus in vision and shift in focus on 
imagining—these are just some examples of many others.
  Quite obviously the creation of narrative fiction makes use of what 
would be dozens of modules of the brain. We would have to hypothesize 
that this narrative fiction module would have to be both specialized in 
fiction and in telling other modules what to do and when to do it at the 
same time—a kind of super module. In many ways it would be equivalent 
to the executive brain module.
  Yet it is counterintuitive: why would the brain waste energy and time 
with having two executive brains? Even assuming the modular theory of 
the brain is true, it is doubtful that one of the modules of the brain would 
be a narrative fiction module.
  Both the production and the consumption or reproduction of nar-
rative fiction involve most if not all the brain faculties, including those 
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faculties that have an inhibitory function that stops us from acting and 
fleeing a movie theater when the brain signals that what is happening on 
the screen is not real.
  Let us suppose I am wrong and that those who posit the existence of 
a fiction module are right. Well, this is not a matter of opinion. Today we 
have the means to determine which areas of the brain become more vis-
ibly active when they are playing whatever role they are supposed to play. 
Through different imaging techniques we know that certain areas are 
particularly active when we use language. We could use these techniques 
to explore the brains of writers. It is an empirical question, and we have 
the means to address this question with all the imaging techniques out 
there today. So the ball is in the court of those positing the existence of a 
specialized area of the brain in the creation of fiction to give us empirical 
proof and to show us if this same area or a different area lights up during 
the consumption of the fiction.
  Further, what kind of distinctly new or innovative information would 
we obtain by knowing that it is a module and not the brain working in 
toto or a large number of areas of the brain working together that makes 
fiction? What would this add to our knowledge? It might tell us some-
thing about the functioning of the brain, but does it tell us something 
about such functioning in relation to the making and consuming of fic-
tion itself? This all speaks yet again to the importance of posing the ques-
tions correctly to see the problems and to arrive at an understanding as to 
how solve them.
PcH: A more recent example of extending linguistic theory to narrative is the 
use of thematic roles.2 As Heidi Harley explains, “A thematic role is a 
general characterization of an argument’s role in the situation described 
by a verb.” Thus “an agent is an argument that initiates and executes 
the action of the verb” and a “patient is an argument undergoing the 
verbal action,” while “an experiencer is an argument whose mental state 
is affected or described by the verb” (861). Some recent writers have tried 
to draw on this theory in order to analyze story structures. There are 
several problems with this. First, we still do not have a decent account of 
thematic roles or a list that is widely accepted. In other words, the cat-
egories themselves are disputed even within linguistics—of the “numer-
ous attempts,” Ingram writes, “[n]one have been entirely successful” (34). 
Second, it is not clear that these categories “scale up” above the sentence 
 2. This is undertaken by David Herman in his influential, wide-ranging, and insightful 
Story Logic.
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level. Suppose we have a slave narrative in which we have the following 
sentences: “John broke his shackles and escaped into the swamp”; “John 
heard the dogs yelping in the distance”; “After discovering the hideout, 
the foreman beat John.” In the first case, John is an agent; in the second, 
he is an experiencer; in the third, he is a patient. It does not make any 
sense to make claims about his thematic role in the story as a whole.
  This is not to say that thematic role analysis cannot yield insight into 
narrative. It can. But it can do so only when applied literally, only when 
we look at the sentence level and consider whether there are patterns 
to thematic role assignment there. In other words, here too it is a mat-
ter of direct application of linguistic theory. Consider the following pas-
sage from late in the 1910 chapter of Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury 
(111–12).
The three quarters began. The first note sounded, measured and tran-
quil, serenely peremptory, emptying the unhurried silence for the next 
one and that’s it if people could only change one another forever that 
way merge like a flame swirling up for an instant then blown cleanly 
out along the cool eternal dark instead of lying there trying not to 
think of the swing until all cedars came to have that vivid dead smell 
of perfume that Benjy hated so. Just by imagining the clump it seemed 
to me that I could hear whispers secret surges smell the beating of 
hot blood under wild unsecret flesh watching against red eyelids the 
swine untethered in pairs rushing coupled into the sea and he we 
must just stay awake and see evil done for a little while its not always.
 The passage is remarkable for many things. One of them comes to light 
when we think about thematic roles. Human agency is almost entirely 
occluded in this passage. Quentin is reduced almost entirely to an 
observer. Sound or time becomes an agent “emptying the unhurried 
silence.” Animals too have agency—thus the swine “rush . . . into the sea.” 
But death, the flame blown out, is in the passive voice with no agent. The 
most agency that Quentin shows is vainly trying not to be the patient 
recipient of thoughts—and even there the subject pronoun (“I”) is absent. 
His imagination of the clump is immediately construed as a passive expe-
rience that “seemed to me.” Other than that, he merely hears and smells. 
Note that this is a pattern of specific sentences. Indeed, that is what 
makes the pattern in thematic roles striking. In the story itself, Quentin is 
very much an agent. Indeed, he is an agent comparable to the swine, for 
he, like them, is about to plunge to his death in the water. The confine-
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ment of his thematic roles in the sentences here is significant precisely 
because it is not a simple function of some putative thematic role in the 
story. Throughout the passage, in some way, Quentin is in effect repudi-
ating his own agency, understanding himself as a passive observer of his 
own death. The point may suggest an emotional numbing that accompa-
nies something like a depressive state.
FlA: With your own superb analysis of the example you invent and the exam-
ple from Faulkner you are very clearly and swiftly giving definite proof 
to the fact that the direct transposition of linguistic concepts, hypoth-
eses, and theories into the study of fiction is a mission impossible. Why? 
Because the initial and fundamental assumption that narrative fiction is 
structured as a language is simply wrong. Indeed, just because language is 
used in narrative fiction does not mean linguistics should automatically 
become the privileged instrument of narrative analysis.
  The way you analyze the concept of thematic role shows clearly that 
this concept is way insufficient to explain even some of the most elemen-
tary and simple forms of narrative fiction; it is completely inadequate for 
explaining the more complex forms, of course. That is, whether we take 
your invented example or the passage from Faulkner, it is clear that the 
direct transposition of linguistic concepts in the analysis of narrative fic-
tion can be a dangerous enterprise.
  You use the example of thematic role. Of course, many other concepts 
used in linguistic science appear one way or another in these attempts of 
what in fact boils down to a will to replace a science of narrative fiction 
with a science of language—when language is only a small part of nar-
rative fiction. If we look statistically at the presence of language in most 
films as compared to the percentage of images conveying the story, we 
find that it is much smaller (approximately 30 percent). And then there 
are films like Spielberg’s 1971 Duel, which has almost no dialogue, only 
the terrorizing sound of the tractor-trailer chasing a guy traveling across 
the desert. Let us not forget either the whole era of silent cinema, where 
the written word is the occasional signboard appearing on the screen.
  This said, and to return to the Faulkner example, the use of linguistic 
concepts with great precision can perhaps enrich our understanding of 
how he might select linguistic devices in the making of a nonagentive 
stream of consciousness we identify with Quentin and that amplify our 
sense of his passivity. Perhaps, we might argue, that it is only when we 
know about the theory of thematic roles that we can ultimately under-
stand how Faulkner manages to use language selectively to do so.
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  However, all this speaks to a larger issue we have been seeing all 
along: ascertaining what the questions are and what problems we are try-
ing to solve. If one is going to use linguistic concepts and formulations 
to analyze literature, then one must be clear at the outset what questions 
one is trying to answer.
  There was this argument in the Middle Ages exemplified famously by 
the question of how many angels can dance on the tip of the needle. This 
presupposes first that there are angels and second that they can be enu-
merated and therefore that angels are each one separate, distinctive enti-
ties. Last, it presupposes that angels, because of all the aforementioned 
features, of course occupy a certain amount of space. If we say one or one 
hundred angels, then we presuppose that they occupy space like any res 
extensa. The question involves a whole ontology of unverifiable entities—
there is no experiment, no way we can identify the existence of angels; 
no way to measure the corporality of an angel. The whole question as 
an empirical question is meaningless. It refers to a completely invented 
ontology, and so whatever answer we give to the question is as meaning-
less or senseless as the question itself. It could be the same if we were to 
establish an equation between language and narrative fiction, because 
this assumes a state of affairs—an ontology—in which language (imag-
ine a Venn diagram) covers the whole field of narrative fiction. So what-
ever questions are asked on the basis of these ontological presuppositions 
would be as faulty as the ontological presuppositions themselves.
PcH: One way out of the problems we have been considering is to take up 
features of language that seem to be well established across theories 
and, even more important, across cognitive systems. Thematic role 
analysis occurs across competing theories in linguistics and is therefore 
promising as a method of analysis, when it is applied within its proper 
linguistic scope. Similarly, at least in my view, Lévi-Strauss’s work on 
transformation sets (in the volumes of Mythologiques) manages to avoid 
the problems of much structuralism. This is because he takes up larger 
mapping relations. Specifically, it seems likely that a range of cognitive 
systems involve processes that map structures onto one another in com-
plex ways that are sensitive to context. This is just what Lévi-Strauss 
finds in myths. It is very different from taking specific principles of 
transformational displacement from Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures and 
extending them to narrative. At the same time, this attention to gener-
alized mapping relations has close connections with some aspects of 
Chomsky’s transformational grammar. (Actually, I would make similar 
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claims for Lacan, whom I read very differently from most Anglophone 
Lacanians.3)
  Other potentially generalizable features might include the relation 
between hierarchical and linear structure, or recursion and embedding. 
Consider recursion and embedding. These are fundamental properties 
of language. But they also operate in other cognitive systems. The most 
obvious instance of this is in the recursive embedding of narrators, where 
Jones begins a story, which includes Smith telling a story about Doe, 
who tells a story, and so on. This sort of recursive embedding appears 
from early on, reaching dizzying levels in a work such as the Sanskrit 
Kathāsaritsāgara.
FlA: Yes, at a certain level we can consider how generalizable features of lan-
guage and cognition might find expression in narrative fiction. I wonder, 
however, what it would mean to consider narrative fiction as a product 
of the work of a human being—a human being working (hopefully, I 
say, because it is statistically probable in a minority of cases) with aes-
thetic goals in mind. You as author want to tell a story but also engage 
your reader, so you as author in a very deliberate way make a myriad of 
choices at all levels of the telling of the story.
  The two basic coordinates (elements) of narrative fiction—story and 
discourse—open the whole field of narrative to aesthetic choice. The 
choice of a story is already an aesthetic choice, and the way the author 
chooses to tell the story (picking among the many devices that are pos-
sible to use) is an aesthetic choice—of course, in serious writers and not 
copycat rhetors that use devices mechanically with no aesthetic intent 
and only because they are useful at getting the message across.
  The two examples (invented and Faulkner) that you provide concern-
ing thematic role speak to deliberate, conscious efforts at attaining an aes-
thetic goal. That’s why Faulkner, for example, chooses to tell this part of 
the story in the way that he does; he works on the notions of thematic 
role and agent and even agency and sets them up in the background until 
they nearly disappear, making agents out of entities that are not normally 
presented as such. This is the aesthetic ambition of Faulkner in this case, 
but it could be a filmmaker, comic-book author/artist, and so on.
  Your example of using the concept of the “thematic role” as an analyt-
ical tool in an interpretation of the passage from The Sound and the Fury 
(1929) clearly shows that we cannot map linguistic concepts onto narra-
tive fiction. This also holds for all other linguistic concepts.
 3. See, for example, “Structure.”
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  Perhaps, however, we are just adding an unnecessary complication by 
even trying to apply linguistics to narrative fiction?
  There have been attempts at using linguistic findings, concepts—even 
whole linguistic theories—to replace a strict theory of narrative fiction. 
These attempts have borrowed concepts developed in semiotics (or semi-
ology, according to scholarly preference) on the grounds that since fic-
tion is a matter of signs, the study of signs will allow us to develop fully a 
theory of fiction. Others have tried to provide a version of psychoanalysis 
that could become at the same time a theory of narrative fiction. The 
methods and concepts Lévi-Strauss uses in his analysis of myths have 
been considered as a possible substitute for a theory of fiction. (His study 
of myths is meant to tell us something verifiable about the human mind 
in its most innate form; as such, myths are elevated to the truth cor-
respondence of the factual document. Just as the actual study of myth 
disappears with Lévi-Strauss, so too does the actual study of narrative 
fiction disappear with those who treat it also as a factual document of 
you-fill-in-the-blank.)
  That is, the attempts to supplant or replace a proper theory of fiction 
have been numerous and have come from different quarters (semiotics, 
psychoanalysis, analysis of myths, etc.). I would not be surprised if quite 
soon the concepts and the methods used in neurobiology will be the new 
science that is meant to single-handedly replace a true, proper science of 
narrative fiction; some in the English departments will read neurobiol-
ogy and find it compelling and give up narratology entirely and declare 
that what we have to study is not the text but the human mind and there-
fore will try to replace the proper study of narrative fiction—the product 
of human work—with the study of the mind.
  I am very mindful of this slippery slope whereby we forget that nar-
rative fiction and the study of the human mind have their own questions, 
methods, and approaches. Neurobiology can tell me something very 
interesting about how the mind works in making the aesthetic choices 
that the duality of story and discourse make possible—a duality that gen-
erates the whole field of narrative fiction—and about how it works in our 
co-construction and consumption of narrative fiction.
  Physics cannot replace chemistry and chemistry cannot replace biol-
ogy and linguistics cannot replace narrative theory. Each can explain a 
lot of the other, but we cannot replace one with the other.
  I have not seen this problem posed in the clear way we are posing it 
because the science of narrative fiction is still very undeveloped. Indeed, 
it appears that it is an impatient attempt to make a big leap in the under-
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standing of narrative fiction that moves the most level-headed of literary 
scholars to try to replace this incipient science with other much more 
developed sciences, including linguistics.
CHomsky and internalism
PcH: Having mentioned Chomsky, we might now go into his work in a lit-
tle more detail. There was a brief period of enthusiasm for generative 
grammar in narratology. However, this faded fairly quickly. For decades, 
Saussurean linguistics remained dominant, either in its celebratory 
structuralist form or in its skeptical deconstructive form. Recently, some 
writers in literary and narrative theory have evidenced enthusiasm for 
cognitive linguistics and related trends. In most of this, Chomskyan gen-
erativist theories remain largely unread—which does not prevent many 
critics and theorists from dismissing Chomsky on the basis of rumor. 
Though globally esteemed for his work in linguistics and the philosophy 
of language, as well as related areas, Chomsky is largely misunderstood 
and undervalued in literary study.
FlA: I agree wholeheartedly—and wonder with puzzlement why Chomsky has 
been swept under the carpet, Patrick. Again, I think it might be useful to 
retrace some of the territory opened up by Saussure then Chomsky. We 
might then ask if and how they might be useful to those of us interested 
in enriching our understanding of narrative fiction.
  Saussure’s ambition was to bring to bear to the study of language as 
a whole the precision and scientific outlook that the New Grammarians 
were applying to a diversity of isolated linguistic phenomena. As I have 
already mentioned, Saussure sought a global vision of language as such 
and wanted to build a science that would encompass this totality in a rig-
orous way.
  He had already begun to train in the New Grammarian tradition as 
a teenager, but then in Paris he became ill at ease with linguistics as a 
science, coming to the conclusion that linguists were doing good work 
but keeping it in the dark because they did not see the whole, only the 
parts. When he returned to Geneva, this discomfort was expressed in 
the attempts he made in the courses he taught at the university to clarify 
two important elements: the proper territory of linguistics and the most 
appropriate methods for studying this delimited territory. Even though 
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he never wrote the book on the subject, the notes compiled by his stu-
dents and the diligent and creative use of the notes by the editors of the 
Cours allowed those lessons to become an influential book. It was the 
first and only book that explicitly stated that we have to first establish the 
cartography of the territory and then explicitly establish the tools. That 
is, it was the first book to establish the methods scholars could use to 
explore this territory.
  The whole of Chomsky’s initial work was likewise focused on exactly 
the same aims. That is, from the huge dissertation up to the small booklet 
that he published as a spinoff from the dissertation titled Syntactic Struc-
tures (1957) that put him on the map, he declared explicitly that we do 
not know what language is nor what linguistics does, nor do we under-
stand what the proper means are of knowing what language is and what 
linguistics does.
  Chomsky uses a very sophisticated logical and mathematical appara-
tus to give the cartography to the territory: The more explicit it is, the more 
we can give a clear, mathematical expression to the approach, the easier it 
will be to confirm or disconfirm whatever is being posited. The first task 
is to know what we are doing. In order to know what we are doing, we 
have to draw the borders of the discipline. When Chomsky was study-
ing linguistics as a young teenager, linguistics was already a real mixed 
bag; all kinds of studies were being fit into the discipline—that which we 
would classify more or less as variants of applied linguistics. A heck of a 
lot of what is called descriptive linguistics (the accumulation of a lot of 
data unaccompanied by an explanation of what the data might mean) 
was going on at the time.
  If we identify explicitly what linguistics is, then we can actually build 
knowledge and decide on empirical criteria to determine which theory is 
good. Chomsky gave us the criteria to compare, reject, or accept different 
theories. Therefore, he gave linguistics a much firmer empirical, scientific 
foundation than it ever had before.
  This is what generated all sorts of enthusiasm. Chomsky had arrived 
to clean up the mess and supplied the tools for the cleanup—for the dis-
carding of whatever rubbish was being peddled as part of linguistic sci-
ence. This has been the general achievement of Chomsky since early in 
his professional life, even from the time he was a student: the delimita-
tion of a territory and the means for exploring and cleaning it up.
  His other huge achievement is his placing the domain of linguis-
tics squarely within the functioning of the mind. He considers that the 
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language faculty is a mind/brain faculty; it is an area of the brain. There-
fore, at the same time that he gives a deeply mentalistic turn to the study 
of linguistics, he grounds this turn in neurobiology.
  If there is anything we can take from Saussure and Chomsky (never 
usually mentioned in the same breath, but here I do) is that with differ-
ent means at their disposal, they both set themselves the goal of turning 
linguistics into a real science of language. Therefore, they directed a lot 
of intellectual energy to tracing the cartography of the field and to devis-
ing the most cutting-edge methods of scientific inquiry to use as tools to 
explore this delimited field.
  Of course, if Saussure’s or Chomsky’s work and results were to have 
any application in the domain of narrative fiction, it would be accidental. 
Happy accidents occur; I am not denying this a priori. It was, however, 
never either Saussure’s or Chomsky’s purpose to make any contribution 
to understanding of narrative fiction.
  What those like Gérard Genette, Seymour Chatman, Gerald Prince, 
David Herman, James Phelan, yourself, and others not mentioned share 
with Saussure and Chomsky is a scientific worldview. In a certain way, by 
working and proceeding the way he did, Chomsky energized a lot of peo-
ple and made them confident that the study of mind could be a scientific 
endeavor, contrary to what behaviorists claimed. The task at hand was to 
precisely delimit the territory and devise the necessary tools. Those who 
went this way made real contributions to science and our understanding 
of reality. We ask, what delimits the territory of fiction and poetry? What 
do we need to do to delimit and to explore this territory? So our real 
problem is to determine the field and the tools for exploring this field of 
narrative fiction.
PcH: As you know, Chomsky-like or “generative” approaches to literature have 
been displaced almost entirely by cognitive linguistic approaches. I cer-
tainly see value in cognitive linguistic study of literature. For example, 
I believe that Lakoff and Turner’s More than Cool Reason is a brilliant 
book. As is clear in these conversations, I have significant disagreements 
with some cognitive linguistic claims as well. But, for present purposes, 
my most profound disquiet with the state of literature and linguistics has 
to do with the ways in which Chomsky and other theorists are misrepre-
sented and dismissed.
  Obviously, time does not allow us to consider much of Chomsky’s 
work. However, we might touch on a couple of points, particularly some 
recent theoretical developments in generativism. We might begin with a 
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few basic architectural features of Chomsky’s recent account of language. 
There is a language module and thus a cognitively autonomous language 
system. That language module can produce infinitely many well-formed 
sentences. Precisely because it is autonomous, the language module must 
interface with other cognitive systems. Chomsky identifies two such sys-
tems: the sensory-motor system and the conceptual-intentional system. 
The development of Chomsky’s current ideas, termed “the Minimalist 
Program,” involves considerations of computational complexity in the 
language module (including the elimination of separate phrase struc-
ture and transformational components [see Lasnik and citations]). It also 
involves an analysis of the degree to which the interfaces with other mod-
ules are or are not optimal. A key point here is that the language mod-
ule produces hierarchical structures. Consider, for example, the sentence 
“Who does Quimby say ate the last Twinkie?” We connect “who” with its 
structural partner “ate,” not with its linear partner “does” (Quimby being 
the one who “does . . . say”). This hierarchical organization is a ubiqui-
tous feature of language. Hierarchy does not cause any problems for the 
conceptual-intentional system, since it is also viewed as hierarchically 
structured, according to this account. However, the sensory-motor sys-
tem is linear. This produces a degree of nonoptimality at the language/
sensory-motor interface.
  In combination with other factors, the relative optimality of the lan-
guage/conceptual-intentional interface and relative nonoptimality of the 
language/sensory-motor interface suggest something about the nature 
of language. Specifically, in Chomsky’s view, language evolved not as a 
communication system but as a system of thought. Had it developed as 
a communication system, then we would expect greater optimality at 
the sensory-motor interface, since that is what allows for expressing or 
receiving communication. Chomsky bolsters his argument by pointing 
out that mutations do not take place in groups. They take place in indi-
viduals. Whatever mutations produced the language module, they had to 
occur in individuals. As such, they would be useless for communication, 
since no one else would have them yet. If language-generating mutations 
had selective advantages, those advantages must have been a matter of 
thought, at least initially.
  I am not entirely convinced that Chomsky is right about this (as I 
will explain in a moment). However, it seems clear that he is providing a 
valuable counterweight to a widespread, unconsidered prejudice in the 
study of language. This is the prejudice that language is simply commu-
nicative. In fact, it seems that the great majority of language use is not 
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communicative at all. The great majority of language use seems indeed to 
be a matter of thought. But this is almost entirely ignored. For example, 
discourse analysis is defined as the study of language above the level of 
the sentence. However, it is almost invariably treated as virtually identi-
cal with pragmatics, which concerns speaker–hearer interaction, despite 
the fact that a great portion of our discourse must be internal.
  The point is relevant to literature—and particularly salient in Mod-
ernist literature—which frequently represents noncommunicative speech 
in the form of directly or indirectly presented verbal thought. Of course, 
this is not to say that the author is using this speech noncommunicatively. 
He or she is definitely communicating—an important and consequential 
point, as theorists such as James Phelan have shown. Nonetheless, in the 
storyworld, inner speech is not communicative, at least not directly.
FlA: If I understand you correctly, it would seem that a theory of literature 
might also contribute to the study of internalism: in literature language is 
used to represents thoughts or other levels of consciousness.
PcH: I wouldn’t say “for the study of internalism,” but “for the study of lan-
guage and thought,” as I hardly want to commit myself to an internalist 
program.
FlA: I think this is a very interesting idea, and it points to a potential expan-
sion, at another time and in another venue, of Fodor’s Language of 
Thought idea. Let me follow another train of thought here. Since one way 
or another language and thought are connected with action in any of its 
guises, it is clear that language has to connect with a system that involves 
action (some form of activity, form of behavior). I can give public expres-
sion to my thoughts through the phonetic system that involves the move-
ment of a whole series of muscles and nerves (mouth, tongue, etc.), and 
this is just one among several sensory-motor systems. And the use of the 
language faculty sets in motion the mental faculties associated with goal 
setting and deliberately oriented (focused) thought. The intentional part 
of this bipartite entity is that language implies the application of a focus, 
an orientation, a goal, and also that it is language connected to the mind/
brain (mental) system that gives content to the thought that is expressed 
or formed through language. So conceptual-intentional is one unit that 
gives orientation or purpose or goal to language expression or language 
use. The same is true of concepts. Both refer to the content, shape, and 
orientation of thought as shaped by the language faculty (as in universal 
language).
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  My point here is that you summarize Chomsky’s hypothesis very well.
  Yes, Chomsky does not believe that the language faculty developed 
for purposes of communication—the common doxa since Aristotle and 
Plato. Since Chomsky (who picks up other philosophers’ positions on 
this), very few people today insist that language is not essentially a mat-
ter of thought. Today we know that the language faculty forms and gives 
shape to thought. The communicative function is totally secondary. The 
trait that defines language is thought rather than communication.
  From the point of view of evolution and the presence of language 
with the birth of homo sapiens, language was born and language devel-
oped as a thought-shaping instrument. It is a completely internal instru-
ment. Language could exist and in fact existed at a certain time without 
any communication between one human being and another.
  From this point of view, Chomsky’s position is so radical that he con-
siders it likely in our evolution that in individual A, and individual B, 
and individual C, and so on, each developed this strange capacity that 
we call the language faculty that boils down to a mechanism that shapes 
thought. Therefore, it is something completely individual; before having 
any social function it existed in individuals. But because language made 
individual A, B, and C more apt for survival, when they reproduced they 
spread more and more this faculty of language through their genes they 
were able to transmit to children, and it gave them an advantage (focused 
thought allows for tool-making advantage and our transformation of 
nature, etc.) over those without this faculty. So eventually in most or all 
homo sapiens you found the faculty of language.
  As you so pertinently remind us, the common doxa says that lan-
guage originated in the need of one person to communicate with another. 
This is what is called the externalist view (vs. Chomsky’s internalist view, 
which is why he names the language faculty the “i” language; this stands 
in contrast to the “e” language that is English, Spanish, etc., that is used as 
a vehicle for communication).
  What I would like to insist on is that Chomsky’s position is a radically 
immanent position. It is a radically internalist approach. This entails that 
we cannot mix internalism with externalism. They are radically opposed. 
Any attempt at fusing or adopting an eclectic position—partly internalist 
and partly externalist—does not make sense. Chomsky’s radical internal-
ism has a very specific theoretical and therefore explanatory function 
within his theory.
  Either you go the internalist way (Chomsky) or the externalist way, 
and the implications are radically different, including for our under-
standing of evolution. This is why eclecticism here does not work. This 
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is an empirical matter. We can try to carry out large-scale studies of what 
happens in people’s minds, say, during the whole time they are awake 
and see if statistically we spend more time communicating together with 
people or if we spend more time with our own internal thoughts.
  This is also an empirical question; we could design such a study with 
relative ease. Beyond this study that would not require a huge amount of 
technology, we can think about our own everyday activities. I am in con-
stant interaction with my daughter Corina, for instance. Even though I 
am with her many hours a day, the part of my thinking that is verbalized 
is still a small part. Why? I am not verbalizing the moment when I step 
around a computer cable that runs from the kitchen table to the socket. 
I am not verbalizing the thought that I should get a better backpack for 
Corina. I am not verbalizing the fact that I need to use the bathroom. 
I am not verbalizing that I’d like to sit down. Examples detailing what 
is going on in my mind compared with what I actually communicated 
can be multiplied ad infinitum. And this is true of everybody during the 
eighteen or so hours they are awake. Most of the linguistic shaping of my 
thought takes place internally with no communicative intention. Again, 
we do not have to take my word for it. It is perfectly possible to devise a 
study that would gather data from a lot of people for statistically signifi-
cant results.
  I think Chomsky is right that the common doxa is wrong and there-
fore so is the approach. Language is not essentially a communication 
device, and therefore the concepts and hypotheses derived from this 
empirically and theoretically incorrect position and approach lead to a 
whole series of misunderstandings concerning the nature of the language 
faculty as such and of the functioning of this language faculty.
literature, internalism, and dialogue
PcH: Continuing with Chomsky’s internalism for a moment, I would say that, 
for researchers in literature, even a very weak version of internalism 
has several apparent implications. First and most obviously, as I noted 
briefly before, it suggests that the representation of internal, linguistic 
thought in literature should be highly prized as a source of understand-
ing language. To a great extent, linguistics has focused on language that 
is “externalized,” spoken, written, or signed by an utterer to an addressee. 
Of course, authors are externalizing when they represent internal 
thought. However, they are doing so with the particular aim of depicting 
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unuttered language. Moreover, readers respond to those depictions in 
ways that suggest their emotional power, if nothing else. Needless to say, 
authors can get things wrong. But the success of many authors’ depictions 
of unuttered speech suggests that their depictions are not entirely fanci-
ful. Each of us has experience of our own unspoken language. It seems 
unlikely that an author’s representation of such speech would affect us if 
it were wholly inaccurate.
  Put simply, Chomsky’s internalism suggests that literature should 
have a role in the development of linguistics, and not simply the reverse. 
Moreover, just as the contribution of linguistics to literature has been 
largely in the hands of linguists, this contribution of literature to linguis-
tics should be largely in the hands of literary critics and theorists. I say 
this because the understanding of unuttered speech in literature requires 
nuanced hermeneutic analysis of the sort that literary critics are trained 
in. Specifically, even at its most fully developed—even in the form of 
interior monologue and stream of consciousness—literature cannot sim-
ply present a transcription of unuttered speech. There seem to be at least 
three ways in which literary depictions are likely to deviate from unut-
tered speech and thus three situations in which critical and interpretive 
evaluation are needed.
  First, writers can get things wrong in ways that are emotionally effec-
tive. While we would not expect entirely fanciful depictions to be effec-
tive, we would expect certain sorts of nonmimetic developments to be 
effective. For example, we would expect depictions of interior speech 
to be more coherent with the author’s aesthetic and thematic goals than 
would ever occur in real interior speech. Thus we would expect there to 
be certain sorts of “idealization.” Second, all inner speech has to be rep-
resented in its sensory-motor form. Thus it has to be translated into the 
sort of linearity that Chomsky claims does not characterize either the 
language module or the conceptual-intentional system. Finally, a range 
of nonlanguage thought must be represented in linguistic form. Thus, for 
example, perception and attentional orientation probably are not linguis-
tically identified in thought. However, in literature, they need to be sig-
naled, and the only way of doing this is through language. (The problem 
is partially mitigated in film, graphic fiction, and other partially nonlin-
guistic outlets, but these commonly have other problems with the depic-
tion of inner speech.)
FlA: I understand well your position here. However, I have found in my work 
that it is problematic to ascribe to characters the neurobiology and the 
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behavior of real flesh-and-blood people and that it is problematic to 
ascribe to fiction a mimetic function.
  I hold to the notion that the blueprint of narrative fiction is a new 
product—like the making of a table that adds something new to the 
world. When Joyce uses the interior monologue to represent the mind 
of Molly Bloom in Ulysses (1922), he’s seeking devices to create an aes-
thetic effect; he’s trying to move his reader through a series of completely 
artificial, completely created sentences, and he’s not reproducing any 
real thought processes in anybody. For his own aesthetic purposes he’s 
writing specific sentences that he wishes the reader to read as being at 
the same time a highly elaborate, highly aestheticized representation of 
mind processes (which he conveys through the typography and lack of 
punctuation and lack of segmentivity in the monologue). He wants to 
dazzle the reader with his virtuosity. He wants us to experience an aes-
thetic satisfaction through the reading of this chapter. And at the same 
time, he does not want the devices to be so overwhelming that the whole 
set of sentences composing the chapter are not felt by the reader to be a 
recognizable representation of mental processes.
  The aesthetic purpose he fixes for himself in Finnegans Wake (1939) 
is to reproduce the functioning of the mind while it is dreaming. Nobody 
dreams the way the drunken HCE (Humphrey Chimpden Earwicker) 
dreams in Finnegans Wake. I have never dreamed in forms of thought 
using a morphology where I make words out of fragments of words from 
a dozen or so languages.
  From my side of the table, I see Faulkner’s novel as a highly aestheti-
cized version of reality. Like all serious writers of narrative fiction, he 
uses for his own aesthetic purposes whatever bricks he wants from the 
world, and his product, the result, is built with aesthetic purposes in 
mind and in no way imitates or reflects reality.
PcH: I’m not ascribing neurobiology to characters. I’m simply accepting the 
standard cognitive view that simulation and emotional response do not 
suddenly change in some radical way with fiction. Since you mention 
Faulkner, we might return again to the passage from The Sound and the 
Fury. We can see from the start that it combines perceptual and linguistic 
responses. The first note sounding should probably be understood pri-
marily as a perception accompanied by an implicit anticipation of further 
notes. This anticipation does not require language since we find the same 
sort of anticipation in nonhuman animals. Similarly, the attribution of 
serenity to the bell should probably be understood as a tacit emotional 
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attribution that is largely language independent. Later in the passage, 
“and he” signals a shift in memory or imagination that is presumably 
not linguistic, but merely presented as linguistic for the reader. In con-
trast with these nonverbal experiences, the following statement from 
Mr. Compson (“we must just stay awake,” and so on) is almost certainly 
subvocalized. In other words, it is almost certainly encoded in the sen-
sory-motor system and rendered linear in inner speech. Indeed, that is 
probably the case for the entire following dialogue between Quentin and 
his father, even parts that are imagined rather than remembered. Finally, 
Quentin’s reflections on “the cool eternal dark” and the “vivid dead smell 
of perfume” may suggest internal thought that is in some way linguistic, 
yet not subvocalized.
  Thus this brief passage points to different sorts of internal experi-
ence. All are similarly represented in externalized form. However, there 
are indications that some are nonlinguistic; others are subvocalized, thus 
linear; and, perhaps, still others are (in Chomsky’s terms) produced by 
the language faculty but not interfaced with the sensory-motor system in 
subvocalization.
FlA: I see more clearly now what you are getting at, Patrick. Yes, Faulkner 
describes a whole series of what we could call internal mental processes 
that are written in such a way that they are made to imitate internal men-
tal states and activities. He also describes events taking place externally, 
outside the mind. So we see in this passage a mixture of internalism and 
externalism—but I wonder if we should add to this that whatever is con-
sidered the internal mechanisms of the mind of the protagonist and that 
which is written outside of his mind is written by Faulkner. He deliber-
ately aims to make an artifact that can create the aesthetic effect on the 
readers of identifying processes in what they are reading that are some-
what akin (or similar) to mental processes with which they are familiar.
  We derive a certain aesthetic pleasure in finding our way around 
Mexico City as it was in the 1950s when we read Carlos Fuentes’s 1958 
novel La region mas Transparente (Where the Air Is Clear) for the first 
time. There is a specific pleasure in recognizing features of a city you 
might know well. This probably happened to the first readers of Ulysses. 
This is something deliberately sought by Joyce and Fuentes. It is their aes-
thetic aim at that moment and concerning those specific passages in their 
writing. But we also derive an intense aesthetic pleasure in the descrip-
tion of Paris when a giant arrives in the city in order to study at the Sor-
bonne and suddenly feels the urge to pee and does so and floods half the 
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city and drowns all sorts of people and animals that are accounted for in 
an encyclopedic way.
  In other words, Rabelais’ Paris is no less fictional than Joyce’s Dublin 
and Fuentes’s Mexico City. Just because in one case the author adheres to 
the aesthetic of the grotesque and in the other cases we see the adherence 
to the aesthetic of realism does not mean all aren’t equally constructs. 
They are not in any way reproductions or simulacra or imitations of 
anything.
PcH: We seem to be disagreeing here, though that may be a matter of what you 
mean by “imitation.” In my view, simulation may be more or less con-
strained by real-world principles, though it is never wholly discontinuous 
with those principles. Moreover, our response to fictional simulation is 
not isolated from our response to the real world. Take a film. A charac-
ter expresses sorrow by weeping (the actor mimics weeping). A viewer’s 
aesthetic response to that is connected with mirroring—and mirroring 
operates on real-world principles connecting grief with weeping.
  It might be worth thinking a little more about the Faulkner pas-
sage. We might ask if it really makes sense to say that there is internal 
speech that is not subvocalized. Clearly, there is something like nonsub-
vocalized thought (e.g., perception followed by expectation). Moreover, 
there is evidence that encoding a memory in (external) speech alters the 
memory (see Anderson, “Incidental” 208–9). This seems to suggest that 
speech encoding is not automatic and that we can remember events—
thus presumably think about them—without thereby using speech, 
internal or external. But none of this tells us whether there is linguistic, 
nonsubvocalized speech.
  To consider this issue, we might do something reminiscent of 
Vygotsky and turn the question around and ask to what extent inner 
speech is social. More precisely, we might ask to what extent inner speech 
is tacitly directed to an addressee. Speaking for myself, it certainly seems 
that a lot of my own internal speech is “dialogic” in the sense of being ori-
ented toward someone. Indeed, when compared with characters in works 
by Joyce, Woolf, or Faulkner, it seems that far more of my own internal 
speech is directed toward an addressee—perhaps almost all of it.4
  Of course, this hardly resolves things. It may simply return us to the 
issue of whether only a part of internal speech is subvocalized. It may 
simply be that internal dialogic speech is subvocalized and that subvocal-
ized speech is more salient than nonsubvocalized inner speech.
 4. For further discussion of these topics, see chapter 9 of Hogan, Ulysses.
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  On the other hand, stressing dialogue even in inner speech has some 
potentially significant consequences in assessing Chomskyan grammati-
cal theory. For example, a central issue in Chomskyan analysis concerns 
putative “silent” items (formerly called “traces”; see Surányi, “Principles” 
669). Consider, again, the sentence “Who did Quimby say ate the last 
Twinkie?” In a standard generative analysis, there are two instances 
of “who” in the sentence—one is spoken and the other is not. The first 
appears at the beginning of the sentence. The second appears between 
“say” and “ate.” This has many consequences that are widely discussed 
in the technical literature. In the sort of purely interior model adopted 
by Chomsky, the silent copy results from grammatical operations that 
serve to move “who” from an initial position between “say” and “ate” 
(what is referred to as “wh-movement” in linguistics literature). But it 
can be argued that at least many of the data are adequately explained 
by placing such questions in the context of dialogue, where there is an 
implicit answer.5 The “silent copy” is then not the result of some past, 
wholly interior movement. Rather, it is the result of a tacitly anticipated 
response to the question (e.g., “Quimby said that bastard Waldo ate the 
last Twinkie!”). (Not all traces appear in questions. But the point here is 
not to solve every grammatical problem in a single paragraph. Rather, the 
point is to suggest possible avenues of inquiry that may be promising but 
have not been explored.6)
  This is related to another issue. In conversation, we continually 
engage in self-monitoring, “taking account of the listener’s perspective” 
(Ingram 346; see also 25). This self-monitoring is based on a continual 
tacit simulation of another person’s understanding, thus our tacit simula-
tion of his or her likely response. This fits with the idea that an implicit 
dialogic response could account for wh-movement. But that link suggests 
that some apparent grammatical constraints are at least in part a function 
of monitoring audience-directed speech, including subvocalized speech. 
This, in turn, may lead us to an extreme “dialogic” account of inner 
speech. In apparently diametric opposition to the Chomskyan view, this 
would posit that, in most cases, our internal monologue is tacitly dia-
logue, that it involves a degree of self-monitoring, some tacit orientation 
to an addressee, even if the “speaker” is not self-consciously aware of 
it. (Actually, things are more complicated, since internal dialogue is not 
actual dialogue. Even if all our inner speech is dialogic in this sense, the 
primary operation of speech may well be internal, thus more a matter of 
thought than actual communication.)
 5. See Hogan, On Interpretation 76.
 6. See Hogan, On Interpretation 77. 
64  •  c H A P t e r  2
  In connection with this, it is worth remarking that self-monitoring 
arises in recursively embedded simulations, both in ordinary life and in 
fiction. An author not only simulates a reader. He or she simulates char-
acters. Part of that character simulation involves embedding a simulation 
of a character simulating other characters and monitoring himself or her-
self in relation to those other characters.
  Here we might turn once more to the Faulkner passage. If we com-
bine extreme dialogism with recursive embedding, we might expect all 
or almost all linguistic components of the passage to involve audience 
address and self-monitoring. I should say that I am not actually propos-
ing the extreme dialogic view. I am merely suggesting it as a possibility to 
be considered, along with Chomsky’s account and intermediate options. 
In this context, we still need to separate out perceptual and attentional 
concerns, since these would be a matter of the author self-monitoring 
and adjusting for the reader. However, when we come upon a clearly lin-
guistic passage that does not seem to be oriented to an addressee, we 
might question whether there is an addressee tacitly simulated. Note that, 
as the word “tacitly” suggests, this is not something that would neces-
sarily be known to the author. The author would proceed with his or her 
simulation in the ordinary way, without necessarily having any metacog-
nitive awareness of what precise contents or processes were involved.
  In the case of Faulkner, there is a striking change with “that’s it.” 
That does not seem to me to be oriented to an addressee. Rather, it is a 
statement that is used as a spontaneous exclamation of realization. Such 
ejaculatory utterances probably escape self-monitoring all the time in 
ordinary conversation. But what follows is different. Quentin thinks, “if 
people could only change one another forever that way.” Before, I took 
this as, roughly, an expression of Quentin’s true inner thought. But, in 
light of what follows, it makes at least as much sense to read it as an ini-
tial statement tacitly addressed to his father. In that context, Quentin’s 
realization is not so much a matter of what he really believes. It is not a 
moment of self-discovery. It is, rather, a moment when Quentin realizes 
just what he should have said in his conversation with his father. It is, 
in that sense, oriented to a recipient—thus it is, for example, potentially 
just as unreliable, though unreliability is something we do not ordinarily 
associate with interior monologue.
FlA: You are right to mention Vygotsky, Patrick. He drew important theo-
retical conclusions from his observation of children; that they naturally 
accompany their activities with verbal (and song) expression. I know this 
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firsthand, of course, watching Corina play with dolls or draw or put away 
her toys or clothes: all kinds of sounds, narratives, ascriptions of thought, 
and so on, accompany her play and activities. It is a universal trait. It is 
a type of dress rehearsal for the normal regular use of language in older 
children and adults. That is, it is a dress rehearsal of language as a tool for 
communication. Just like Chomsky is a good example of radical internal-
ism, Vygotsky is an excellent example of externalism.
  I am not sure the use of both works. It is convincing to the extent 
that we cannot observe the thought processes taking place in newborn 
babies—before they are able to give linguistic shape to their thoughts. It 
would seem that at a certain point in time, age two or so, when they begin 
to speak, they use external manifestations of language such as those that 
Corina uses when she plays with her dolls.
  Indeed, Alison Gopnik and others have devised ways to infer the 
mental processes even of newborns, by, for example, the amount of time 
their eyesight is fixed on something that is considered novel way before 
they can utter sentences or even words.
  I wonder, too, about thinking in dialogue with an implicit addressee. 
When I am thinking, I am not in dialogue with someone. I am not doing 
what, say, Corina does when she’s playing. Sometimes I am not even sure 
what language I am using when I think. Thinking can be enjoyable and 
also a painful activity. It can be to enter a labyrinth where I get lost and 
find it difficult to focus and whatever I focus on is not what I want to 
focus on. It can be painful in the sense of it being a difficult activity.
  In any case, whether thinking is dialogical or not or whether it implies 
the implicit evocation of an addressee or not, the fact remains that think-
ing in narrative fiction is a construct. I am interested in fiction for the 
aesthetic construction of a character like Raskolnikov’s capacity to reason 
and other mental processes.
  In generative grammar the description of language and its functioning 
uses concepts and operations that refer to processes that we are not nor-
mally aware of. They are concepts and processes discovered by science. 
There is the law of gravity. You have to be someone schooled in the con-
cepts to be able to talk about the law of gravity and concept implied in 
the law of gravity. When I walk or ride my bike, I know nothing about the 
law of gravity, yet I still walk and use my bike. It is the same with use of 
language. I use my language, but I am not aware of hidden concepts and 
mechanisms/rules of operation of the faculty of language.
  Like all regularities, all laws of nature, all scientific discoveries and 
facts explained by science, we seldom know or are familiar with or are 
66  •  c H A P t e r  2
aware of the theories behind these sciences. Science is almost by defini-
tion a science of that which is not immediately perceptible. It is hypoth-
eses, theories, and concepts that explain the functioning of reality that is 
not immediately and directly perceptible.
ConneCtionism
PcH: Before going on, a brief terminological point is perhaps worth making, 
primarily for the benefit of readers. “Externalism” technically refers to 
the view that meaning must involve nonpsychological elements. For 
example, suppose the meaning of “water” in my mental lexicon is “stuff 
like this” (as I point to the clear liquid that is coming out of my tap). Then 
“water” means whatever that stuff is. Since that stuff is H2O, then water 
is H2O. But it does not matter if anyone knows the chemical composition 
of water. That is still what water is, and thus it is what “water” means. 
(On externalism, see Deutsch and citations.) This makes meaning in part 
contingent on nonpsychological facts. I think this is a mistaken view. But, 
whatever one thinks, it is different from the view I am presenting. In the 
view I have just suggested, monologue is oriented toward an addressee, 
even when it is all going on subvocally (i.e., without utterance). Thus the 
meaning is still all “internal” in the internalist versus externalist sense.
  I want to stress this because the ideas are so often mixed up. There 
is a common view that externalism and social orientation—and even 
dialogue—all go together. A recent example is Alan Palmer. He in effect 
takes up the old conduit metaphor (see Reddy) that some sort of mean-
ing enters into signals and then the recipient of the signals takes out the 
meaning. This is presumably what makes “much of our thought . . . vis-
ible” (197, italics in the original) rather than merely open to inference. 
This visibility is, it would seem, what supposedly allows “intermental 
thought,” as posited by Palmer. Palmer associates this intermental thought 
with philosophical externalism, dialogism, and many other things. The 
basic premise of Palmer’s view does not seem at all plausible to me. In 
fact, it seems to be an instance of the common cognitive bias—the “illu-
sion of transparency” (see Keysar and Barr 158–63)—that leads people 
to view communicative meanings as obvious, even when they are opaque 
or highly ambiguous. Palmer’s expansion of this tendency does have a 
noble lineage. It is basically an idealist view, reminiscent of Hegel. The 
key point, however, is that it goes well beyond philosophical externalism, 
which simply makes meaning contingent on certain physical facts.
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  Clearly, there is much more to say about generativism, internalism, 
and externalism. However, given constraints of space, we might at this 
point turn to another important approach to language and the mind, 
connectionism—also called parallel distributed processing (PDP) or neu-
ral network theory—one of the major alternatives to generativism.7 Con-
nectionism understands cognitive processes to be based on a simplified 
architecture of the same general sort that we find in the brain. Thus there 
are neuronlike units, which have various degrees of activation and which 
are connected to one another with excitatory or inhibitory links in vari-
ous degrees of strength. Cognitive processes are understood entirely in 
terms of circuits of activation. These processes operate in parallel with 
one another, and their constituents are distributed across different units.
  For example, in a connectionist account of an emotional response to 
an event, we might find something of the following sort. A number of dif-
ferent, distributed “probes” would produce different degrees of activation 
in a number of different memories. These would in turn have connec-
tions with one another and with different emotion systems. The emotion 
systems might have inhibitory or excitatory relations with one another. 
The final state of the system would involve some activated memories and 
some emotional response. Suppose, for instance, that Smith has a series 
of memories bearing on his parents’ home. Entering that home just after 
the death of a parent will trigger an array of different memories. Some 
of these memories will be stronger (i.e., have a higher activation level) 
than others. Some will be happy; others will be angry; still others (such 
as the memory of the recent death) will be sad. In other words, different 
memories will activate different emotion systems. These systems are not 
mutually compatible, so that they are likely to have inhibitory effects on 
one another. The result may be that Jones experiences shifts among the 
emotions—sadness for a moment, joy in recollection that displaces the 
sadness, grief that then returns, and so on. These waves of feeling may be 
understood as the network-based operation of different patterns of acti-
vation and inhibition producing different (ephemeral) mnemonic and 
emotional configurations.
FlA: I see the attraction to the way connectionism works according to 1/0 
algorithms. It is a sequential model (sequenced in parallel, which gives 
it much more computational power), and there is an analogy between 
 7. For an introduction to connectionism, see Hogan, Cognitive Science 48–58; for fuller 
treatments, see Dawson and McLeod, Plunkett, and Rolls.
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this procedure and the way written and even spoken language appears—
always spatially sequential and linear, beginning from left to right or 
from right to left in written form. It stretches in space and it stretches in 
time in a linear way. Even orally, language works sequentially, one word 
after another after another. And it always takes place in a linear time pat-
tern. Therefore, there is a strong analogy with language with the way con-
nectionism works.
  In the connectionist view, every operation in the mind/brain is a con-
nectionist operation—one that follows computer-like algorithms. Today’s 
multi-core computers all have the capacity for parallel and simultane-
ously working circuits and algorithms that allow for much more pow-
erful computing power. This was anticipated by those doing work on 
connectionist approaches. They considered that the fastest computers 
were in the day clumsy compared with the mind/brain and posited the 
working in parallel of multiple programs.
  Connectionism is a theory of mind that tries to describe (more than 
explain) all mental phenomena in terms of these sort of algorithms. Of 
course, the hardware of all these programs, the algorithm, is always mate-
rial, the brain’s neurons—and all neurons function the way the computer 
functions: open and closed, 0 and 1, neuron active or not active. Emo-
tions, thoughts, language usage—everything mental—in this connection-
ist view comes down to the operation of neurons in terms of binaries: 
open/closed, active/inactive, and so on.
  Chomskyan generativism is not a general theory of mind. It is a the-
ory of the language faculty and not the workings of the whole mind. 
Chomsky’s aim since the 1950s has been to determine what language 
is. How can we speak scientifically about language? How can we speak 
about language that is shapeless and chaotic? How can we study language 
if we do not first determine what language is? How do we determine the 
cartography? How do we build the tools to explore this cartography?
  Chomsky is first and foremost a linguist. His linguistics includes a 
theory of mind in which mind/brain is formed by a series of modules. 
There is a language faculty module, as well as other modules that inter-
face with the language faculty module: 1) the sensory-motor interface; 
2) the conceptual-intentional interface. But he does not say that besides 
these modules that he believes really exist in the context of scientific work 
there is also a module for bike riding or for baking cakes or for making 
chairs, and so on. He has a theory of what makes the mind/brain, but he 
does not have a theory that applies universally to all human activities.
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  Connectionism, on the other hand, wants to tell us that everything we 
do, feel, all that is happening in the mind/brain, is connectionist. Once 
we adopt the model of mind/brain as functioning like a computer, then 
all has to function exactly the same way. I understand well that connec-
tionists and those in the field of statistical language parsing argue that 
with sophisticated statistical tools and sufficiently large corpora one 
can actually approximate the generative capacity of phrase structure gram-
mars. However, I am with Chomsky in that I would say that these results 
are not abstract enough to say something meaningful about the language 
faculty. In this sense, I am not sure we can compare generativism and con-
nectionism. They do not seem to function at the same explanatory level. 
The way I see it, we might return to the main question: what is the prob-
lem, and how do I solve it?
  With respect to the Faulkner passage, what is the problem we are try-
ing to solve with these tools or the mixture of these tools? Do we want to 
find a one-to-one correspondence between computation theory on the 
one hand and linguistic theory on the other hand in narrative fiction? 
Do we want to solve one very particularized problem in a small part of 
Faulkner’s text—a small drop in the whole ocean of narrative fiction? Do 
we want to see if by solving this problem we will be able to better grasp 
how narrative fiction works?
  The elegant analysis of Faulkner that you provide is a patient, percep-
tive, careful close reading of the paragraph. And I see how a generativist 
approach can be useful as a model that seeks to get at foundations. In my 
experience, however, a one-to-one mapping of a linguistic formulation 
(generativist or connectionist) onto a theory of literature has not led me 
very far.
PcH: Evidently, I was not clear. My intention was to say that we should not 
simply apply a technical linguistic theory to narrative, assuming that 
the structures, processes, and contents of language define the structures, 
processes, and contents of narrative. Indeed, I intended to oppose that 
directly. So there was no question of the reading of Faulkner being “gen-
erativist.” Rather, the task I proposed was drawing on general features of 
cognition for general narrative principles and on specific linguistic fea-
tures for linguistic aspects of narrative. Moreover, this should go in both 
directions, with literature contributing to our analysis of cognition and 
language as well as the reverse. The preceding analyses of Faulkner take 
up the issues of linguistic internality, seeking to explore its nature and 
70  •  c H A P t e r  2
varieties, considering, for example, whether there is a difference between 
subvocalized and nonsubvocalized or addressee-oriented and nonad-
dressee-oriented interior verbal thought.
  Returning to the theories we have been discussing, I would note that 
although connectionist and generative accounts are considered diamet-
rically opposed, they need not be. Specifically, generative accounts are 
commonly understood to involve rule-based processing of single objects 
in serial operations. For example, we have an initial version of a sentence, 
which is then subjected to merge operations (see Surányi, “Merge”). 
Needless to say, one need not accept this particular account of a rule-
based system. However, it seems clear that we will need to be able to treat 
cognitive phenomena in both ways. Specifically, something like a PDP 
approach almost certainly has to be the case since, as far as we know, 
the brain provides the substrate for all cognitive operations, and neu-
rons appear to operate in a parallel and distributed fashion. On the other 
hand, it seems clear that languages do follow rules, and we would lose 
important generalizations if we excluded rule-based processing from our 
account. For example, we need to be able to account for English plural 
formation by some sort of neural network. But at the same time we need 
to recognize that regular plurals are formed by adding “əz” to sibilants 
(bush/bushes), “z” to voiced nonsibilants, and “s” to unvoiced nonsib-
ilants. In other words, plural formation conforms to a rule. Abandon-
ing such generalizations would be comparable to abandoning the laws of 
physics in order to give a more fine-grained account of the particulars of 
causal processes.
  On the other hand, it does seem to be the case that thinking in terms 
of serial, rule-governed processes orients our attention and inferences 
differently than thinking in terms of PDP systems does. Moreover, it 
appears that one or the other orientation is more appropriate for any 
given type of cognitive process. Specifically, we may think of cognitive 
processing generally as involving two strata. There is an initial gener-
ation that is relatively spontaneous. This is then modified when some 
trigger (usually associated with anterior cingulate cortex; see Ito and col-
leagues 199) indicates some problem or task conflict—for example, a 
discrepancy between our aims in speaking and the apparent or simu-
lated understanding of an addressee. The initial generation has a more 
clearly parallel and distributed character. In contrast, the task-specific 
modulation involved in self-correction has a more clearly serial and 
localized operation. In this sense, it makes sense to take up a PDP model 
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in considering the former and a serial model in addressing the latter 
(even though, ultimately, the two should be mutually translatable).
  Here we might return again to Faulkner. Note that the spontaneous, 
PDP-based production would range over everything from memories 
to emotions to beliefs to details of phrasing. Only a limited part of this 
would be affected by monitoring and correction. Here, we might begin 
with a hypothesis. As we know, Quentin is about to commit suicide. But 
he hardly ever indicates this directly. If it is correct that suicide is an over-
arching concern for him (and how could it fail to be?), we would expect 
it to have widespread consequences in his internal speech, ranging from 
memories to word choice. However, we might simultaneously conjecture 
that he could locally suppress direct thoughts of suicide, perhaps as part 
of orientation to an implicit addressee. (See Anderson, “Motivated,” on 
the suppression of thoughts in a cognitive context.)
  Considered in light of a PDP model, Quentin’s speech does indeed 
seem pervaded by thoughts of his suicide, though these thoughts are 
also disfigured by localized suppressions. First, we have a number of 
images that suggest partial activation from Quentin’s simulation of his 
death at the bottom of the water. There may be a hint of this in “unhur-
ried silence.” There is almost certainly an element of it in the waterlike 
“swirling” image that gives way to “cool eternal dark.” The first and third 
images may indicate an imaging of death as peace, as a release from 
the mental torment that Quentin experiences when thinking about his 
sister’s relations with other men. Indeed, the dark of the seafloor con-
trasts strikingly with Quentin’s imaging of his sister’s sexual activities, 
an imaging that occurs “against red eyelids.” This analysis fits with the 
allusion to the Gadarene swine—possessed by demons, the swine free 
themselves from the pains of madness by plunging into the water. The 
suffering of the swine is bound up with the sexual nature of Quentin’s 
torment—not because of the original story, but because of Quen-
tin’s own addition (unsurprising from a PDP account) that the swine 
“coupled.”
FlA: Now I see more clearly where you are going with this line of thinking, 
Patrick. I do consider that an understanding of the general features of 
cognition can and do enrich our understanding of the making and con-
suming of fiction. Here I would only add that I’m not sure that at the 
level of its formulation a connectionist view of the mind would be useful. 
The connectionist approach assumes a rigorous sequential functioning of 
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0/1, 0/1 binaries. Another way to think of it is when machine-assisted 
translation (the Internet has plenty of these) seeks a one-to-one cor-
respondence or transportation of syntax pattern A into syntax pattern 
B. Yet, even with its hugely massive computational capacity in terms 
of memory, speed, and analogy formation that seeks correspondences 
that are as close as possible, the translations end up being grab bags of 
phrases, literally. What I am trying to say is that connectionism might be 
useful in computer theory, but its overreaching generalization of com-
puters as an explanation of the functioning of the mind/brain gener-
ally and in its work to make narrative fiction specifically doesn’t seem to 
work. The generativist model taken at a certain level of abstraction does 
seem to move us closer to a clearer understanding of the mind/brain’s 
making and consuming of narrative fiction and to an identification of 
the tools we might use to explore this.
Cognitive linguistiCs and emBodied Cognition
PcH: Before concluding, we should probably turn to the approach to language 
that has been most influential in cognitive literary study—cognitive lin-
guistics. Specifically, it would be worthwhile to consider the value and 
limits of a recent approach that has given rise to great enthusiasm in a 
number of fields—so-called embodied cognition.
  Unfortunately, “embodied cognition” is used in at least three distinct 
senses. The first is simply the idea that the brain is the substrate of cogni-
tion. For clarity, we might refer to this as “materialism.” Basically every-
one in cognitive science today agrees on this point. Thus, everyone in the 
discussion believes in embodied cognition in this sense.
  The second sense of “embodied cognition” refers to the guidance of 
cognition by bodily reactions that are not, so to speak, ratiocinative. For 
clarity, we might refer to this as “bodily cognition.” A prominent example 
of this is found in mirroring responses, when motor routines are par-
tially activated by observing someone else engage in a certain intentional 
action or express a certain emotion through facial gestures. At least in 
part, our mirroring—not some process of self-conscious, logical infer-
ence—guides our understanding of someone else’s intentions or feelings. 
This sense of embodied cognition also includes what Damasio refers to 
as “somatic marking,” our use of bodily emotional responses to guide our 
evaluation of a situation. Cases would include our avoidance of certain 
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sorts of risk to which we have an emotional aversion, even when we do 
not self-consciously recognize that there is a risk (see Bechara, Damasio, 
Tranel, and Damasio). Other researchers have isolated similar phenom-
ena under different labels, such as “misattribution.” For example, in one 
well-known case, test subjects experienced physiological arousal due to 
test conditions but attributed this arousal to the alluring qualities of an 
interviewer (see Oatley, Keltner, and Jenkins 23, 24). In these cases, the 
test subjects presumably think that they are making a judgment about 
the interviewer, when they are being led by their own bodily responses, 
which have a different source. Damasio’s “somatic markers” and misattri-
bution seem to be cases of a more general tendency in human behavior. 
Specifically, we are driven to act by motivation (or emotion) systems. 
Part of that motivation involves the isolation of causes and targets of feel-
ing. We tend to assume that we just know these causes and targets. But 
that is not the case. Rather, we isolate causes and targets fallibly. In the 
words of Gerald Clore and Andrew Ortony, “People tend to experience 
their affective feelings as reactions to whatever happens to be in focus at 
the time” (27). Bodily cognition seems to me the most valuable sense of 
“embodied cognition.”
  The third sense of embodied cognition is the one that is specific to cog-
nitive linguistics. In this usage, our semantics are ultimately derived from 
our bodily orientation in and engagement with the world. We might call 
this “body-based cognitive modeling.” The basic idea here is that most 
of our thought is highly metaphorical. Thus we “grasp” concepts; we 
“move along the path” of life, and so on. But if most of what we think is 
metaphorical, there is presumably something on which that metaphori-
cal thought is “based.” In the view of Lakoff, Johnson, and others, that 
“basis” is the body. This does not mean simply that the metaphors derive 
from experience (e.g., perception). Rather, it means that the fundamen-
tal organization of thought uses our bodily orientation in the world as a 
model. (For brief, accessible, and positive treatments of embodied cogni-
tion in this sense, see Gibbs, and Ingram 374–79.)
FlA: I agree with you in that there are at least three different meanings of the 
term “embodied cognition.” I think there is a fourth meaning that we 
find in the work of Chileans Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela 
and their disciples, who have been quite influential in France and Latin 
America: that all cognition is literally enclosed within the body—not only 
in the sense that the body—the brain—is the site of cognition but in the 
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sense that the body as a whole (including the brain once again) deter-
mines what is known and can be known as well as the shape of what we 
know. In this sense it is a pretty solipsistic variant of idealism.
  It is quite evident that cognition is located in the brain and that 
when we talk about any mind processes we are talking about the mind/
brain. So materialism is quite valid, even though I must say there are 
also variants of materialism that fall short of giving a general explana-
tion for what they purport to explain. Paul and Patricia Churchland 
posit a connectionist theory of mind to be radically materialist, yet I 
consider their approach to be much more akin to what certain philoso-
phers call mechanical materialism (or mechanistic materialism or rough 
materialism).
  In the second sense, cognitive responses are also material reactions 
to material realities. In fact, you have in the case of Damasio a theory of 
emotions (like the one developed by William James) that proposes that 
something like fear is just the phenomenological manifestation (appear-
ance) of temporally previous alterations, modifications, that have taken 
place in the body. So we first have the alterations in the body, and then 
those alterations appear as fear, love, and so forth.
  To all this it is imperative to add the fact that the nervous system 
extends beyond the brain and connects with the automatic nervous sys-
tem functioning (sympathetic and parasympathetic) of the body.
  The third, and most idealistic, sense of embodied cognition is both a 
highly speculative series of proposals and an idealist worldview: not only 
our language but also our interactions with the world are determined 
by the “metaphors we live by”—to use the title of one of Lakoff ’s books. 
(See also Lakoff ’s Don’t Think of an Elephant! and Whose Freedom?) 
Even from a strictly logical point of view, if all language is metaphorical, 
then there is no such thing as metaphor. It is like saying that the total-
ity of the universe is gray, which entails that neither gray nor any of the 
other colors exists. If all is gray, we would not know that it is gray because 
we only know that something is gray because there is green, blue, red, 
and so on. If all is metaphorical, then nothing is metaphorical.
  So this third sense of embodied cognition is essentially an ideological 
construct; it has no real basis in reality. This is why it has made absolutely 
no contribution to the science of language; no scientist worth his or her 
salt is a cognitive linguist.
PcH: Since the third sense of “embodied cognition” has generated some follow-
ing in literary study, it perhaps bears further scrutiny. It seems clear that 
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our thought is often guided by metaphorical structures and that these 
metaphors do often have some basis in our sense of our bodily being in 
the world. However, one might question the extent to which our thought 
is guided by metaphors and the degree to which our metaphors derive 
from body-based cognitive models.
  Support for body-based cognitive modeling comes from several 
sources. The most obvious is the existence of consistent patterns in meta-
phor. For example, many metaphors have a “source/path/goal” format—
as in “I am not making adequate progress in my job.” However, empirical 
research suggests that such metaphors are not ubiquitous and that we do 
not invariably follow the apparent metaphorical resonances of such (par-
tially concealed) metaphors even when we do use them. For example, 
corpus linguistic analysis reported by Gerard Steen suggests that only 
a small minority of lexical units are metaphorical (13.5 percent in the 
corpora studied) and that almost all of these metaphors (99 percent) are 
conventional and thus frequently interpreted as categorization. In short, 
the great majority of speech is not metaphorical, and “a lot of metaphor 
may not be processed metaphorically” (220).
  In keeping with Steen’s point about processing, the consistency of 
ordinary usage is paired with vast inconsistencies in such usage. For 
example, suppose we are really guided in our thought about a career by 
the source/path/goal metaphor. This would seem to have a number of 
consequences. For example, it seems that one should not be able to take 
a vacation, since one does not typically take a vacation from a journey. 
Also, “going back to where one began” should entail loss of time, money, 
and advancement in one’s journey. But we often say things like, “I have 
taken a lot of different paths in my career. Now I am going to take a vaca-
tion from theory and go back where I started, to modernism. I think that 
is where my greatest career success is to be found.” In its various parts, a 
statement of this sort repeatedly draws on a source/path/goal metaphor. 
But it keeps changing the way in which the target (the speaker’s career) 
is mapped onto the metaphorical source (source/path/goal). The result is 
that the metaphor is simply not guiding the way we understand the target 
domain. It is our separate understanding of the target (i.e., the career) 
that leads to the repeated remappings. In short, our understanding of the 
target guides our use of the metaphor, not the reverse.
  A second source of evidence for body-based cognitive modeling 
emerges from the body model. There is fMRI research suggesting that 
word meanings are stored in sensory-motor areas. Thus tool words acti-
vate motor areas; animal words activate visual areas, and so on. In fact, 
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as Ingram explains, the fMRI data are actually much less straightforward 
than this indicates: “Nouns of high imageability . . . may be expected to 
have more of a posterior (temporal-occipital) locus of representation in 
the brain, and verbs (‘action words’), more of an anterior (frontal) repre-
sentation. However, conflicting findings have been reported in the imag-
ing literature” (215; see also 216–19 and 233–35). Nonetheless, there is 
some reason to believe that meanings are connected with relevant sen-
sory-motor cortex. For example, Eysenck cites research that “category 
knowledge about color, motion, and shape is processed in different 
regions of the brain, typically in areas close to those associated with pro-
cessing those kinds of information in visual perception” (124). But this 
only suggests a certain connection between experience and meaning. It 
has no consequences for bodily modeling. Indeed, it is not even clear just 
what the data entail for the relation between experience and meaning. A 
standard view of semantic memory is that it is built up out of episodic 
memories (see Baddeley 11), but it becomes increasingly abstract, with 
particularity fading. For example, we see a lot of cows (pictures of cows, 
etc.). These are initially stored as episodic memories—largely visual (and 
partially aural) memories, for those of us who are not dairy farmers. 
But our semantic memories somehow involve a prototype-like averaging 
across these instances. If this is in fact the case, then we might expect, 
for example, semantic memory for visual objects (such as animals) to 
appear in visual areas associated with visual memories. However, this 
does not tell us that the semantic memories retain their episodic quality. 
Such a retaining of episodic quality seems to be the only way in which 
they might bear on “embodiment.”
  Finally, embodied cognitive modeling draws evidence from effects of 
the metaphorical senses of terms. For example, one might argue (in line 
with the preceding comments on semantic memory) that a word such 
as “grasp” simply does not have a metaphorical meaning when we say “I 
couldn’t grasp what he was saying.” In contrast, Raymond Gibbs claims 
that “the physical meanings of certain metaphorically used words, like 
grasp . . . are recruited during the on-line construction of metaphorical 
meanings” (273). However, it seems unlikely that physical meanings are 
recruited for interpretation as Gibbs maintains. Again, research reported 
by Steen suggests that this is not likely to be the case. Neurological analy-
ses discussed by Lisa Aziz-Zadeh and Damasio also indicate that this is 
improbable.
  At the same time, it is almost certainly true that physical meanings of 
“grasp” are at least briefly activated even with “grasp what he was saying.” 
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(This would seem to account for some of the findings noted by Gibbs.) 
That activation probably does have some effects. For example, in some 
cases the activation may have emotional or associative consequences. 
Once some item is activated, we would expect it to have some conse-
quences, for simple connectionist reasons. However, it does not appear 
likely that the effects are a function of modeling. There might be small 
biases introduced into thought by the partial activation of some circuit 
associated with physical grasping. But it does not follow that our thought 
about the target is organized and oriented by a physical grasp model. In 
addition, the activation here is not a function of metaphorical connec-
tions anyway. It has been well established for a long time that our minds 
activate various meanings of a word, including those that are contextu-
ally inappropriate (see Ingram 211 and citations). Thus, if I say “I rowed 
my boat to the bank,” the word “bank” will briefly activate both “side of a 
river” and “place to keep money.” This does not mean that “place to keep 
money” is in any sense a model for our understanding of the side of a 
river.
  It seems that many effects attributed to body-based modeling are bet-
ter understood as the result of bodily cognition. For example, research 
by Aziz-Zadeh, Stephen Wilson, Giacomo Rizzolatti, and Marco Iaco-
boni found “a clear congruence . . . between effector-specific activations 
of visually presented actions and of actions described by literal phrases” 
(1818). Findings of this sort are sometimes taken to support body-based 
modeling. But they seem much more in line with bodily cognition, 
as these researchers themselves indicate in their discussion of mirror 
neurons. Moreover, it is crucial that the congruence here was for literal 
phrases. In this research, “evidence for congruent somatotopic organi-
zation of semantic representations for metaphorical sentences in either 
hemisphere was not found” (38).
FlA: While I tend to keep at arm’s length the embodied cognition approach, 
it is an undeniable fact that we grow our biology (brain, body, and all) 
within the social. It follows that with this we grow our capacity for cre-
ativity as socio-biologically grown organisms.
PcH: In connection with these senses of embodied cognition, the passage 
from Faulkner seems to evidence considerable bodily cognition, but 
its body-based modeling is much more limited. There are, of course, 
anthropomorphic characterizations of the bell and even the silence. But 
even that seems to have more to do with the misattribution of bodily 
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experience than with drawing on models of bodily orientation. Thus 
the “tranquil” and “unhurried” qualities of the scene seem to reflect the 
sense that Quentin has when imagining himself at the bottom of the sea 
in the “cool eternal dark.” Similarly, the hate that he attributes to Benjy 
is almost necessarily derived from mirroring (since Benjy has no means 
of verbally communicating hate). Finally, the “secret surges” are almost 
certainly his own feelings attributed to the salient object of his imagina-
tion—his sister and her lover.
FlA: A truly scientific theory of narrative fiction cannot be the sum of differ-
ent theories or different hypotheses originating in all series of sciences 
or philosophies of mind or ideological constructions. A true science of 
narrative fiction cannot be the eclectic sum of debris taken from various 
disciplinary dustbins.
  I think we should go back to the basics: what is our problem, and how 
do we solve it? The Russian formalists got it right: our task is to delimit 
the territory and develop the tools that will allow us to explore this 
territory. In delimiting the territory they made the important discovery 
of story and discourse. In my view, our task would be to rise to the chal-
lenges they posed.
PcH: Well, that nicely leads to the topic of our next conversation.
Frederick luis AldAmA: I have noticed that perhaps today with the use (and 
application) of cognitive neuroscience we have yet another approach to 
literature as document. Whereas in the past it might have been as his-
torical or sociopolitical document, now it is as document for other pur-
poses—or other sciences. As always, whether it is a New Historicist 
approach, a cultural studies approach, or even a strictly literary interpre-
tation approach, there appears to be a confusion yet again of the fictional 
with operations that govern reality—the mind/brain or external world.
  I think keeping the author-text-reader triadic model in the forefront 
of our work is absolutely necessary for the scientific study of narrative fic-
tion. Otherwise, we begin to talk about characters as real human beings 
or themes, events, and so on, as if they are real—and not the creation of 
the author in the constituting or building of a blueprint with very specific 
aesthetic goals in mind. That is, authored products that cohere as a blue-
print and that have a unified effect on the reader.
PAtrick colm HogAn: As you noted in the preceding discussion, we seem to 
disagree on the degree to which there is a gulf between fiction making 
and ordinary cognitive processes that engage the real world. You seem 
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to wish to make a very sharp division there, somewhat insulating fiction 
as a strategic complex of aesthetic effects. In contrast, I see fiction as the 
result of ordinary processes of simulation—a connection initially made 
by Keith Oatley (“Why”). In other words, from my perspective, fiction 
making is exactly the same sort of thing as the activity of imagining what 
will happen if a person asks his or her boss for a raise. The same sorts of 
constraints relating to theory-of-mind presuppositions and the like are 
in effect.
  We might think of the issue in the following terms. Fictions usually 
have both emotional and thematic purposes. The emotional purposes 
have to do with producing certain trajectories of affective response in 
readers. Note that the readers are in the real world, and the emotions they 
experience have evolved to deal with the real world. Thus it would be 
strange if they responded emotionally to, say, depictions of attachment 
that have nothing to do with the real world. For example, the opening of 
À la recherche du temps perdu has Marcel recalling the excruciating anxi-
ety he felt when separated from his mother at bedtime. There are many 
affecting elements of this recollection. One of the most touching con-
cerns his “only consolation,” namely his mother coming up to kiss him 
goodnight. But “this goodnight lasted such a little time, she redescended 
so quickly, that the moment [he] heard her coming up” with “the light 
sound of her garden dress in blue muslin,” his sorrow would surge again 
(21, my translation). Note particularly how Proust’s phrasing suggests 
both a type of event repeated nightly in his childhood and also the par-
ticularity of a single memory, marked by the blue muslin garden dress. 
You are right about the separation of fact and fiction in that we should 
not assume that this is a detailed record of Proust’s own experience. But 
would we really expect readers to be moved by this depiction (as I am) if 
it bore no relation to real attachment vulnerabilities, to common real-life 
patterns of anxiety, security, attentional orientation, and other matters?
  The same point applies even more clearly to theme. A theme is pre-
cisely a means of connecting the fictional world with the real world. It 
is not clear that Proust is making any sort of thematic statement with 
Marcel’s reminiscences about insomnia. But, if we turn to Tagore or to 
Harriet Beecher Stowe, we find a similar focus on attachment vulnerabil-
ity with clear thematic implications. Take Tagore’s story “Exercise-Book.” 
In that story, a young girl is married and sent to her in-laws. She has 
one source of consolation in her loneliness—the possibility of develop-
ing her thoughts and creative impulses in a notebook. These thoughts 
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and impulses prominently involve reflections on attachment loss, includ-
ing reflections addressed to others. In a particularly affecting moment, 
she writes in her notebook a sentence that surely reflects the feelings of 
many young girls in her position. At home, she used to irritate her older 
brother. Now, separated from him when she is still a child, she writes, 
“Dādā [older brother], I beg you, take me home again just once—I prom-
ise not to annoy you” (143). This thematic commentary on child mar-
riage is possible precisely because of the continuity between the fictional 
world and the real world.
  This is closely related to the points I was making before about inte-
rior monologue versus what I referred to as “interior dialogue.” When 
we simulate situations in ordinary life, we may simulate them with or 
without speech. If I simulate driving via a different route to work, I do 
so more or less visually. I do not formulate the simulation to myself in 
words. When I simulate speech, I most often do so in some context where 
I would be speaking—thus in relation to some simulated addressee. 
For instance, after I received some comments from you on our discus-
sions, I went around the house doing ordinary things but responding 
to you in my mind. My “interior monologue” was not directed to me; 
it was directed toward a simulated Frederick. Indeed, it was much the 
same as what I am doing right now, since I am typing out a response to 
a comment you e-mailed to me. Note that the preceding sentence shows 
a second sort of simulation—my simulation of a reader. After all, you, 
Frederick, know that we are conducting our conversation in writing. I 
provided the information for the simulated “overhearer” of our conversa-
tion, a “side participant” as Richard Gerrig and Deborah Prentice would 
say. (As this indicates, “interior dialogue” as I understand it is different 
from the multi person imagination discussed by Thomas Scheff in rela-
tion to Virginia Woolf.)
  In this way, I at least to some extent accept the view that a literary 
work can serve as a document for the study of, say, emotion. Of course, 
we cannot merely accept a novel or poem uncritically and assume that 
its status and significance as data are transparent. But that is true for 
experimental research as well. Indeed, one of the great problems with 
empirical research in literature and related areas is that researchers start 
out with a hypothesis and simply interpret the data in a confirmatory 
manner, ignoring alternative hypotheses that the research may support 
equally well. The initial hypothesis guides the interpretation of the data 
and makes it appear that the meaning of the results is self-evident.
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  Indeed, I would like to briefly defend the idea that literary texts are 
documents for historical and cultural studies as well. This idea derives 
in part from critical discourse analysis and related developments, such 
as New Historicism. As you know, I feel that the particular approaches 
of these schools are often misguided. But there is a fundamental insight 
there that should not be lost. Our complexes of semantic associations 
are formed in part by social interactions, including mass media. These 
complexes partially guide our inferences and our affective responses. 
This gives rise to certain patterns across individual ideas and attitudes. 
Put differently, all our neural networks are to some extent unique. How-
ever, long-term social dynamics as well as short-term conditions will 
tend to partially align those networks. That alignment manifests itself 
in what Foucault and others refer to as discourses or, in another termi-
nology, problematics. Thus there are patterns to the way that European 
Americans think about African Americans. The patterns are not simply 
governed by the facts (e.g., that, on average, African Americans tend to 
have darker skin than European Americans). These alignments are com-
monly intensified by institutions that, as Foucault puts it, govern who 
“may enter into discourse on a specific subject.” Institutions permit such 
participation because the persons in question have “satisfied certain con-
ditions” (224). Thus such social processes as publication selection tend to 
enhance spontaneous convergence of ideas and attitudes. The result of all 
this is that public speech and writing are very likely to manifest patterns 
of uniformity in the discourse of a particular time and place. For this 
reason, it can be very productive, indeed very important, to read literary 
works as cultural documents.
  That said, I should add immediately that I fully endorse caution 
regarding the “documentary tendency,” as we might call it. Despite their 
opposition to the idea of a consistent world picture (see, for example, 
Veeser xii–xiii), New Historicists and other writers in cultural studies 
often tend to assume that discourses are more uniform and more endur-
ing than they in fact are—otherwise, they would not be so ready to draw 
connections between small details of Shakespeare’s plays and small 
details found elsewhere in Renaissance texts (e.g., regarding some colo-
nial action or some medical idea). They also tacitly assume that domi-
nant discourses are more motivationally consequential. There are usually 
many discourses at any given time—and there are many partially incon-
sistent ideas and attitudes held by any individual and manifest in any 
given text. To some extent, we choose our discourses to fit our motiva-
tions rather than the reverse.
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deFinitions
FlA: I appreciate this further elucidation, Patrick. The documentary tendency 
in the analysis of fiction is so much the air we breathe in English depart-
ment hallways that it is difficult to see it for what it is. To forestall any 
potential slips, perhaps a solid definition of narrative is in order. H. Por-
ter Abbott’s definition is simple, capacious, and sufficiently precise for 
our purpose here. Abbott says that “narrative is the representation of 
an event or a series of events” (13). And he explains that “the difference 
between events and their representation is the difference between story 
(the event or sequence of events) and narrative discourse (how the story 
is conveyed)” (15).
  I would place at the center of narrative fiction what I call the “gen-
erative operator of discourse” that gives shape to the story. I prefer this 
definition. The generative operator as applied to story is also formal. The 
advantage of my definition is that from the start in the definition itself 
I am positing a very powerfully generative mechanism: discourse as an 
operator that shapes and transforms the story.
  Authors select their narrative devices, such as focalization or free 
indirect discourse, and so forth, for specific purposes within the narrative 
and more largely to satisfy the aesthetic aims that the author has set him- 
or herself. What is interesting is that all the devices analyzed by Gérard 
Genette, Gerald Prince, Dorrit Cohn, and Seymour Chatman, among 
others, are inscribed within the very general category of discourse; they 
would all agree that these procedures belong to the domain of discourse. 
What I add with my definition of narrative fiction is the understanding 
that the properties of this very large domain we call discourse are gen-
erative properties. Discourse generates all those fictional signposts (free 
indirect discourse, discordant narration, psychonarration, and the like) 
that Cohn so cogently identifies.
  That is, whatever we situate within the domain of discourse necessar-
ily belongs to the domain of narrative fiction—and only to that domain. 
We do not find phenomena of focalization or free indirect discourse in 
the essays published by Scientific American or in handbooks on zoology, 
biology, and so on. Even if there is a story told, if that story is not given 
shape according to aesthetic goals—if the story is not submitted to this 
generative operator of discourse—that story is not fictional. And this is 
true even if that story is a lie. Even if something like Truman Capote’s In 
Cold Blood (1966) is marketed as a true account, it remains a novel. It is 
as if we were saying that Madame Bovary (1856) is equivalent to a true-
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crime story just because it is based on a fait divers that really happened. 
Nobody would say that, even though some do suggest as much of In Cold 
Blood because Capote’s declarations to the press made it murky. Capote 
isn’t alone here, of course. I think readily of Gabriel García Márquez, 
who also made a mess of it when he said that magical realism is the 
everyday realism experienced by people in Columbia.
  The moment you tell a true-life story using fictional means, the story 
ceases being a simple objective story about what actually happened out 
there. It becomes fictionalized because the use of fictional means auto-
matically transforms, modifies, the true-life story.
  Let me explain another way: the story can be a series of events that 
actually happened. The fait divers that Flaubert read actually happened. 
From the point of view of narrative theory, whether the story is true or 
not is immaterial. The author’s starting point can be a fait divers or a 
story written by Edgar Allan Poe. The fictionality or nonfictionality of the 
prime matter is irrelevant. What automatically fictionalizes the story—
whatever its origin, fictional or real, reality or fiction—is the application 
to that story of the operational generative device of discourse.
  No matter Capote’s declarations to the media of the factualness of 
In Cold Blood, the moment Capote uses discourse devices in the telling 
of the story, he automatically fictionalizes the story. The same with Flau-
bert. The moment he applies the discourse operator to the fait divers in 
the making of Madame Bovary it becomes fiction. Concerning the recent 
phenomena of docudramas, whether they like it or not, docudramas are 
fictions based on real-life events. The second the discourse operator is 
present, it is fiction.
PcH: I think we probably disagree on this. First, just to clarify what we are 
speaking about, we need to draw a further distinction. Discourse com-
prises narration and emplotment. Emplotment concerns the order, dura-
tion, and construal of story events. For example, suppose I tell you how 
I was detained by security at the airport after a scan found “an anomaly 
in the groin area” (as the guard delicately put it). I may begin by saying 
“Fortunately, they released me in time to catch my flight,” or I may delay 
conveying that information until the end. I am guessing you would not 
say that any manipulation of emplotment—thus any change from chron-
ological order—constitutes fictionalization.
  So, it seems, then, that you are speaking of narration only. Now, we 
need to consider necessary versus sufficient conditions. Suppose you and 
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I are talking about what would have happened if Lalita and I had been 
hired at Ohio State. I might say that we would have bought a house near 
yours so that we could come over and improve our volleyball proficiency. 
That would be told in my ordinary narrational voice, but it would still be 
a fiction. So I think you are not saying that a shift in narrator is a nec-
essary condition for something being fiction. Of course, you might say 
that the very fact that I am speaking counterfactually makes the speaker 
(the volleyball-playing “I”) into someone other than the real me. But that 
makes the change in narrator dependent on the fictional status of the 
story. Thus it would still not mean that the narrative voice was the con-
trolling factor in that case.
  So, this leaves the possibility that manipulation of narrative voice is a 
sufficient but not necessary condition for fiction. My view is almost the 
precise opposite of this. My inclination is to say that all communication 
involves something like the creation of a narrative voice. The main dif-
ference between fiction and factual speech or (especially) writing is that 
we tend to adopt a fairly uniform voice in the latter but have much more 
leeway in the former. The uniform voice is largely a function of discourse 
constraints, including institutional constraints. Thus, suppose I actually 
speak a decidedly Scottish form of English. Even if that is my spontane-
ous way of speaking, I still will not adopt it in an academic article. In con-
trast, when writing a story, I might use my spontaneous speech patterns. 
In this case, then, the manipulation of a narrative voice is much clearer in 
the academic article.
tHe domain oF narrative (i): Contextualism
FlA: There have been various attempts to develop what is called a contextualist 
or postclassical narratology: feminist, ethnic, cognitive historicist, and so 
on. When talking about context we are actually talking about adding to 
a strict science of narrative fiction whatever perspective the scholar con-
siders necessary.
  So what happens is that scholars assume that the science of narrative 
fiction does not have its own exclusive and proper domain, its own proper 
exclusive field of study. I wonder if all this contextualism is a winding 
back of the clock to before the formalists, to a point in time when it was 
said that the study of narrative fiction is not a science, not a clearly delim-
ited domain of study. Rather, it includes everything and anything.
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PcH: This is related to the issue of so-called political correctness. As you know, 
I share your impatience with many aspects of this, and we go into this 
topic more in chapter 5. There seem to be three issues here. One concerns 
the validity of the contextualist approaches. Another concerns the valid-
ity of the scientific approach. The third concerns the institutional and 
professional structures that underlie the relations between the two—this 
is what bears on “political correctness.”
  I want to focus on the final point. I think we would both agree with 
Gerald Graff that the issue here is not so much politics as pseudopoli-
tics or a sort of political rhetoric that usually has little or no bearing on 
the actual conditions of people’s lives. It is, rather, a form of bad faith, in 
roughly the Sartrean sense (see Sartre 87ff.).
  To put the matter crudely, the structure of the profession requires that 
we argue in favor of intellectual positions that afford us greater publica-
tion opportunities. So, you and I do not only have intellectual commit-
ments to cognitive study. We also have class commitments, commitments 
based on our position in political economy. Specifically, as cognitivism 
becomes more widely accepted, we are more likely to have our writings 
accepted for publication and thus receive merit raises in our institutions, 
as well as other benefits. Indeed, the structure of the system is such that 
one almost necessarily has to adopt some intellectual identity category in 
order to advance oneself. There are many ways in which I am as close to 
Foucault as I am to Damasio. I certainly have agreements and disagree-
ments with both. Indeed, I am no less dissatisfied with much cognitive 
literary criticism than I am with much cultural study. But, as a matter of 
institutional fact, my “allies” are in cognitive study. No Foucaultian will 
invite me to be a plenary speaker at a conference; few would agree that a 
book of mine should even be published.
  Everyone is in this position (though, of course, the categories vary). 
But it simply will not do if we all go around speaking of alliances. Rather, 
discourse practices constrain justifications for our action and argument. 
Specifically, there must be some degree of nonegoistic merit claimed by 
our arguments. There seem to be two commonly accepted forms of merit. 
One is validity. The other is productivity. Productivity may be further 
subdivided into prudential and normative (either ethical or political). 
So, there are basically three forms of argument available to us. The first is 
that our claims are true (while those of our opponents are not). The sec-
ond and third are that our practices have benefits. The benefits may be a 
matter of practical success, or they may be a matter of normative (ethical 
or political) improvement.
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  You and I are in complete agreement, I believe, that validity should 
be the fundamental argument. If nothing else, it should at least qualify 
claims of improvement. In other words, suppose we are going to justify 
everyone adopting deconstruction because it undermines patriarchy. 
Then we should at least have a basic concern with whether or not decon-
structive claims really do undermine patriarchy.
  On the other hand, I think we would agree also that “truth” is (as 
Foucauldians and others have stressed) widely invoked as a way of justi-
fying political oppression or other sorts of prudential or normative harm. 
Thus it is important to be aware of the political implications of claims, the 
degree to which arguments and analyses conform to standard discursive 
structures or dominant ideologies, and so on. In other words, we do wish 
to privilege arguments based on validity. But we would not want to sim-
ply assume the good faith of writers who invoke truth—or the bad faith 
of writers who invoke norms.
  More concretely, since the 1960s, literary studies has developed in 
such a way as to require that faculty publish more. This has intensified 
the institutional pressure to strategically advance one’s alliances. In keep-
ing with this, there has been an increased political awareness that is in 
part both sincere and important, the result of the great popular move-
ments of the 1960s. At the same time, this political awareness gave partic-
ular salience to political norms as legitimation principles. Thus there was, 
for many years, a strong tendency for literary critics and theorists to sup-
port their schools of thought by claims about political benefits. In some 
cases, these claims were at least partially true—as in the expansion of the 
canon to include women and nonwhite authors and the expansion of the 
faculty to include women, nonwhites, gays, and lesbians. But there was 
also a certain amount of bad faith in all this—not because the individuals 
involved were sinister but because the institutional structure leads to dis-
cursive constraints that foster bad faith. Thus there have been legitimate 
complaints about the valuing of normative justifications over justifica-
tions based in validity (e.g., in valuing deconstruction on the grounds 
that it is antipatriarchal rather than because it rests on a plausible seman-
tic theory). At the same time, the opponents of such normative argu-
ments have their own institutional positions, self-interests, class interests, 
and thus bad faith. Indeed, the very idea of “political correctness” is a 
way of dismissing both the valid and invalid aspects of the normative (or 
contextual) approach.
  So, what does all this point to? It seems to point to a situation in 
which what we really want to do is reduce discursive constraints as much 
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as possible. The valuable parts of the contextual approach—the parts that 
seek to open the field to greater diversity—try to do just that. But the 
problematic parts do just the opposite. They try to stifle opposition, by 
what is often little more than name-calling (even if the names are fancy, 
such as “logophallocentrism”).
  There is another aspect to this problem that is more psychological 
than political. Humans seem to have a broad tendency to feel that their 
own behavior or preference is legitimate only if everyone does exactly the 
same thing. Thus we seem to want everyone to do the same sort of liter-
ary theory, to share the same literary canon, or—to take a particular irri-
tation of mine—to teach in the same way. (Evidently, wide-ranging class 
discussion is what we are all supposed to do—with, of course, no con-
sideration of what methods seem to produce greater learning.) Thus it 
appears that we need social institutions that foster different approaches—
here, scientific as well as contextual approaches to narrative. At the same 
time, we need to have a personal sense that our own approach need not 
be shared by everyone.
tHe domain oF narrative (ii): style
FlA: Nicely put, Patrick. I’m certainly not going to stand in the way of any-
body’s source of pleasure (contextualist or otherwise). There are many 
branches to harvest fruit from here.
  I happen to take my pleasure in a research program focused on get-
ting at foundations—the roots, if you will. While we go at this differently, 
in our works we seek to push more and more at determining the contours 
of a research program that will allow for a foundational understanding of 
narrative fiction.
  With this in mind let me turn to a concept I bring up in chapter 1. 
Here I mention the narrative as blueprint. Let me go into a little more 
detail here about what I mean. All novels, short stories, films, comic 
books, and the like are made according to recipes, algorithms, or blue-
prints made up of such ingredients. The concept of the blueprint aims 
not only to capture all the ingredients that make up a given narrative fic-
tion—from technical devices and structures the author employs to plots, 
events, and character dialogue and action—but also to convey the sense 
that all these elements that make up the respective narrative fiction are 
put there by the creator (or creators, in the case of films and comic books) 
o n  m At t e r s  o F  n A r r At i V e  F i c t i o n  •  89
who seeks to produce a work in which all the elements cohere and 
achieve a unity of effect in relation to the audience.
  Creators of narrative fictions discipline their emotion and cognitive 
systems in the skillful creating of the blueprint (imagination plus the 
purposeful use of technique) so as to engage an ideal audience that the 
creator assumes shares basic sensory, emotive, and cognitive faculties.
  Here and elsewhere I use the term “will to style” as a shorthand to 
identify the degree of presence of willfulness in the creator’s use of tech-
nique and imagination and his or her responsibility to subject matter in 
the crafting of the blueprint. Of course, this “will to style” varies greatly 
from product to product.
PcH: Style is, of course, a key issue in verbal art, Frederick. Here, I would dis-
tinguish verbal art from fiction. The key feature of verbal art does not 
seem to me a matter of truth claims. In a very traditional way, I would 
tie the definition of fiction to truth claims, not narration. Specifically, 
I would say that a work is fictional to the degree that it is presented as 
not claiming its verbal or visual depictions to be true. Thus a historical 
fiction would be fictional in certain respects and nonfictional in other 
respects. (There is a separate issue of whether the nonfictional aspects 
are accurate or not.) By this definition, a wide range of narratives are to 
some extent fictional and to some extent nonfictional. A more definitive 
division may be made in the following way. The default value of a work 
of nonfiction is truth. In other words, any given statement in a work of 
nonfiction should be assumed to have claims to truth unless there is clear 
indication to the contrary. In fiction, this default does not hold. (Note 
that this does not mean that there is a presumption of falsity. The case of 
historical fiction shows this clearly.)
  In contrast, I would say that verbal art is a form of speech or writing 
in which there is an increase in the possible relevance of all aspects of the 
utterance to emotional or thematic purposes. This is where narration and 
emplotment enter, as well as style. Aspects of story order and construal, 
aspects of projected narrative voice, aspects of phrasing (including even 
sound patterns)—these enter into ordinary communication but only in 
limited and peripheral ways. For example, as to style, we might try to wit-
tily make a rhyme in telling something; conversely, in writing a scholarly 
essay, we might try to avoid a potentially comic sequence of alliterating 
words. But we typically do not spend much time on these aspects of writ-
ing or speech if we are not engaged in producing verbal art.
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  Verbal art, then, may be defined by this intensified concentration of 
relevance. Note that this means that there will be a gradient of verbal art 
just as there is a gradient of fictionality. Moreover, the two will not be 
unrelated. We are clearly more free to manipulate plot, narrative voice, 
even style, if we are not constrained by a default presumption of factual-
ity. For example, people generally speak rather unpoetically. If I am con-
strained to report people’s actual dialogue, I am not free to manipulate 
the style of that dialogue toward aesthetic ends. On the other hand, it is 
clear that history or biography can be written with more or less attention 
to style.
FlA: I like your formulation of verbal art as an “intensified concentration of 
relevance,” Patrick. I agree that this can be shaped by aesthetic or nonaes-
thetic goals. In many ways, it is our capacity to intensify any elements of 
our language (narrative fiction, poetry, or that article in Scientific Ameri-
can) that ultimately led the Russian formalists into dead ends. There was 
nothing special about the language in poetry that would mark it as defin-
itively different from that of everyday usage.
  I know we cover the topic of linguistic approaches extensively in 
chapter 2, but it is worth mentioning the following. With the exception of 
some forms of poetry, in almost all forms of literature, language is actu-
ally immaterial. Just like we say story as such is immaterial—we do not 
care if it is based on a true story or one by Poe; what matters is that it is a 
matter to be shaped and transformed by discourse. David Malouf ’s Ran-
som (2009) and Zachery Mason’s The Lost Books of the Odyssey (2007) 
both pick up stories in the Iliad and spin new stories. Ninety percent of 
what Borges wrote was based on this principle—he takes from anywhere, 
including his own expository essays, and applies this generative operator 
of discourse and creates something completely new.
  Dostoyevsky wrote in Russian. I cannot read him in the language in 
which he wrote. All that I know about his novels, all that I have enjoyed, 
all that has given me an aesthetic satisfaction in Dostoyevsky’s work, has 
no relation to the Russian language. There are many authors in Latin 
America and Spain who know not a single word in English. Yet they 
experience the full impact of writers like Dos Passos, Hemingway, and 
Faulkner. García Márquez, for example, does not know much English. 
He has read all these authors in Spanish. He says that if it weren’t for this 
handful of authors, he would not have been able to shape his fictions the 
way he has.
  Besides the enormous confusion of what we mean by linguistics and 
its use in the analysis of narrative fiction and then the enormous con-
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fusion of what we mean by the level of generality or level of abstraction 
at which we enter into linguistics as a science and confusion between 
theoretical and applied—as we discuss in chapter 2—there is the confu-
sion that directly concerns the place of language as such, first, within the 
empirical experience of narrative fiction, and second, and most impor-
tantly, within a scientific theory of narrative fiction.
  I am proposing that the two pillars of narrative fiction are story and 
discourse. The language in which the narrative fiction is conveyed is a 
secondary consideration. From this point of view, it seems to be a misdi-
rected effort to try to explain at a foundational level narrative fiction in 
terms of language, language use, and language study.
  What is really important is all that is inside the toolbox of discourse—
Cohn’s signposts of fictionality, Prince’s narrator–narratee constructions, 
the different instruments of analysis identified by Genette such as fre-
quency, mode, and duration.
PcH: There are two separate issues here. The first concerns the bearing of lin-
guistics on aspects of a literary work that are not directly linguistic. The 
other concerns the importance of language generally in fiction.
  As to the former, the relevance of linguistic theory to narrative study 
depends on the generalizability of features of the theory outside of lan-
guage. The point of Structuralist generalization is not that language 
proper is everything. Rather, the point is that social systems have the 
same structure as language. Thus, to take standard examples, we might 
find that the meaning of myths is a function of binary oppositions or 
that the production of dreams is organized by axes of substitution and 
concatenation. The problem with Structuralism, I think, was not that it 
gives language per se too much importance. In fact, Structuralist analyses 
often ignore language. Rather, the problem is that it both overgeneralizes 
the applicability of language structure to other fields and begins with a 
wholly inadequate account of language structure.
  In fact, I find the same problem with Genette. In Affective Narratol-
ogy, I consider time differently from Genette. This is because I do not 
begin by assuming that the temporal organization of narrative is funda-
mentally a function of linguistic tense or aspect. Of course, in Genette’s 
case, the basic distinctions of order and duration are valid and important. 
(I am less sure about frequency.) The problem here is primarily that they 
do not exhaust important features of narrative time.
  As I suggest in chapter 2, I do believe that some aspects of linguistic 
theory have promise for literary study—if we are careful about what is 
likely to generalize. Thus some features of linguistic processing isolated 
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in psycholinguistics are likely to be common to other forms of cognitive 
processing. For instance, if our language processes are well represented 
by principles with parameters, it seems likely that principles with param-
eters will turn up elsewhere. Similarly, some group dynamical features 
isolated by sociolinguistics are likely to be shared by other forms of social 
interaction.
  As to language and narrative, here too we need to make some distinc-
tions. The first is a distinction between the literary work and its narrative. 
It is true that the majority of what we consider a work’s narrative will be 
preserved across changes in language or even medium (e.g., from prose 
to film). But that is a sort of trivial point. It merely says something about 
the way we use the word “narrative.” We use it to refer primarily to story 
and secondarily to discourse, particularly emplotment. We tend to count 
language as bearing on narrative only insofar as it changes key features 
of the story. In short, the relative irrelevance of language to “narrative” 
is mostly definitional. (Actually, I myself think that the language makes 
a big difference to the story. But that does not seem to be the standard 
operational view.)
  The more consequential question, then, concerns the importance of 
language to literary works. But once it is phrased like this, the banality 
of the basic answer becomes obvious. The basic answer is, of course—it 
depends on the work. Sometimes people try to make generalizations, and 
those can be approximately valid. For example, it is generally the case 
that the language is more important to poetry than to prose fiction. But 
even then one has to make case-by-case decisions.
  You bring up translation, and that points to another set of issues. 
Here, we need to consider what is important about the language of the 
source work and the degree to which those features may be transferred 
to the language of the target work (that is, the translation). It is a com-
monplace to remark that one nontransferable feature is sound. That is 
already a problem. The problem is intensified when sound is brought into 
relation with other features. For example, we may be able to imitate the 
sound pattern of a passage or convey the sense. But we typically can-
not do both together. Moreover, the problem goes well beyond sound. 
It turns up with the complexes of semantic associations that happen to 
have accrued to a particular word or phrase, what the Sanskrit aestheti-
cians called dhvani, or suggestion. This becomes particularly important 
when that cloud of associations is connected with a particular complex 
of feelings, or a rasa. For example, in Premchand’s Godān, there is a very 
moving scene in which the main characters, Hori and Dhaniya, are faced 
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with the woman whom their son has impregnated. She has come to their 
house, and Hori has said he will throw her out. However, she appeals to 
him, pathetically throwing herself at his feet. In Hindi there are three 
forms of “you”—formal, informal, and intimate. The girl addresses Hori 
with the intimate form, thereby conveying the sense that she is like his 
daughter. When Hori, moved by her entreaty, calls her “betī” and says 
that this is “tera ghar” (152), this conveys a tenderness that is missing 
in the English equivalents—“daughter” (as a form of address) and “your 
house” (using the intimate “you”). We probably would not say that these 
points in the language are crucial to the narrative—simply because of the 
way we use the word “narrative.” However, they are, to my mind, crucial 
to the work.
FlA: Of course, language is the prime matter, say, of narrative fiction; in film 
it would be visual images and auditory sounds, and in comics it would 
be a combination of the verbal and the visual. We can choose to pick at 
the branches of the infinite number of iterations of language in narrative 
fiction, or we can move toward that work in biolinguistics that offers a 
high level of generality that can potentially shed light on an equally high 
level of generality in a formulation of narrative fiction making and con-
suming. The generative operator of discourse offers such a level of gen-
erality. It is here that we can better understand the work of Cohn aimed 
at identifying the signposts of fictionality—all these signposts are the 
devices used by what I am calling the generative operator of discourse. 
They are indications of the fact that no matter the origin or nature of the 
story, the moment it is fictionalized, it makes use of devices such as free 
indirect discourse or psychonarration.
  Discourse is the generative operator that generates an infinite num-
ber of stories when applied to the story or historical structure. This is so 
because this operator is constantly giving shape and acting on the story 
element and giving it a potentially infinite number of shapes.
  The story of an adulterous woman is the story of Emma Bovary 
and also of Anna Karenina—yet they are totally different novels. Why? 
Because of the shaping activity of the artists—their decision to situate 
their novels within a specific time and place and to tell their story using 
different sorts of human interactions. Flaubert’s choice, for example, to 
have Emma doing the proverbial beast with two backs in the carriage 
with Léon all while enveloping her within a particular social fabric makes 
this a perfectly individualized story that is different from all others, 
including Anna Karenina (1873–77).
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PcH: These are certainly significant—and complicated—issues. You are 
undoubtedly right that discourse manipulation is often an important fac-
tor, though your examples may not be perfectly well chosen to illustrate 
that. It may make more sense to consider, say, Jane Eyre (1847) and Wide 
Sargasso Sea (1966). One difference between these two works is a change 
in narrator and thus an element of discourse. On the other hand, as I 
have already said, I am not sure that discourse has the “operator” func-
tion you see it as having. Indeed, I see the definition of a narrator itself as 
a simulative operation. The point is particularly clear in the cases of these 
novels where we are dealing with character narrators.
CHaraCter
FlA: “Why do we care about literary characters?” Blakey Vermeule has asked 
recently, as have many others before her. Fictional characters are simply 
speaking constructs. So in the domain of character analysis and story 
analysis, everything is man-made, so to speak; it is artificial. They are not 
domains of discovery. They are domains of artifice. We only care about 
characters, when we do care, when the author has succeeded in creating 
the characters in sufficiently clear-cut and at the same time schematic 
and complex ways.
  I just watched Robert Rodriguez’s Roadracers (1994). The protagonist 
Dude Dudley (David Arquette) makes certain extreme, menacing facial 
expressions at the end of the film—and not at the beginning. Rodriguez’s 
choice of lens exaggerates the expressions further, giving them a kind 
of cartoon effect. The decisions here as well as those relating to how the 
characters interact and the choice of actors and costumes (identifiable 
good guy and bad guy) all give the story its shape. Rodriguez chooses to 
give his characters schematic shape by painting them with huge brush-
strokes and endowing them with cut-and-dried personality traits. He 
omits all of the complexity of human beings. All we know about Dude 
is that he wants to get out of town, and that’s all we need to know for the 
film to work. But we can say the same of more complex characters, too. 
What do I know about Raskolnikov? I know he has a desire to kill the 
pawnbroker and use the money he plans on stealing from her to pay his 
rent and finish his studies. I know that he feels affection and falls in love 
with the fallen Sonia. But what do I really know of all the motivations, 
psychological traits of Raskolnikov—or an Anna Karenina or an Emma 
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Bovary? In actuality, I know very little about their psychological makeup 
as compared to any human being in our real everyday life.
  This is what art is. The awe-producing activity of the verbal artist is 
precisely that he or she is able to select those psychological traits that are 
most relevant to the development of the story and that will reverberate in 
our memory long after we turn the last page.
  Everyday life functioning of the brain is messy, complicated, and 
mixed. It is shapeless in every way, except in its functions governed by 
laws of nature (physics, biology, etc.). Art by definition is shape. The main 
activity of the artist, therefore, is the giving of shape to his or her cho-
sen object. It is a shape-giving activity triggered and guided by aesthetic 
goals. All human work is teleological; it is guided by aims or goals. The 
carpenter’s goals are to manufacture tables and chairs. The artist’s goals 
are to create aesthetic artifacts. The artist aims at creating certain emo-
tional and cognitive, affective and rational responses or reactions to the 
products of her work. Those reactions are generally described as being 
aesthetic.
  Let us take the example of Madame Bovary. Flaubert reads in the 
section of the newspaper concerning crimes (“la section fait divers”) 
about an adulterous woman who kills herself. That’s the story: a married 
woman has sex with men other than her husband, gets herself into debt, 
and commits suicide. If our fiction capacity were reduced to the faculty 
of inventing stories, then the novel Madame Bovary, no matter how much 
the author stretched sentences, would tell a very simple story, with very 
little complexity. What turns this story into a work of fiction and a work 
of art is the discourse, the injection inside the story of shape. In this case, 
the story triggers a whole series of faculties in Flaubert’s mind, and he 
chooses to talk about the psychology of Charles, Léon, Rodolphe, Mon-
sieur Homais, Emma—all in a very selective way: he ascribes to Léon 
such-and-such definitional psychological traits and the different traits 
to Rodolphe, allowing us to distinguish one from the other. When each 
of their names appears it triggers in our mind a cluster of psychologi-
cal traits associated with each of the lovers. Once the traits are selected 
respective to the characters, the time and place of the story, and the cen-
tral theme, then Flaubert decides how this will be conveyed through lan-
guage. All the choices give shape to the fiction.
  Art is by definition giving shape to something. Except for the sunset 
and all other iterations of the sublime, all aesthetic objects are necessar-
ily shapes. There is no shapeless art. (In this sense, I am rather skeptical 
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about conceptual art—to me it is not art.) Art is the deliberate, painstak-
ing, detailed conferring of shape to matter—to a material reality.
  The thematics, the scenery, passage of time—all this is shape. And all 
this shaping is built into the story by the generative operator of discourse. 
What attracts us to characters and what attracts us to narrative fiction is 
not the story per se. It might be true that the number of stories that can 
be told amounts to a handful or so, but because of the generative prop-
erty of narrative fiction we have an infinite number of iterations.
  The generative operator of discourse in this sense works in parallel to 
the generative capacity in language that turns the building blocks of lan-
guage into a potentially infinite number of applications of language that 
are totally different, one from the other.
  When we read a novel (even those that are poorly constructed), we 
know the character in ways that we could never know a person in real 
life. This is so, of course, because an author selects each and all of the psy-
chological traits ascribed to the character. And when an author chooses 
to include an enumerable list of psychological traits they will always be 
a finite. It could be one or ten or one hundred traits, yet we still perceive 
them as separate because of their particular form, their particular shape, 
and their particular function within the story as a whole. With respect to 
a human being this is impossible. We never have the impression that we 
have a full 360-degree view of anybody’s character or that we perceive a 
unified whole made out of a finite list of psychological traits and func-
tions. Even the most boring, elementary-seeming person is a source of 
surprise. The only way a character may surprise a reader is if the author 
decides that this character will behave or react in what would seem a sur-
prising, unforeseen way—and this for all eternity.
  Real-life human psychology (unlimited) has nothing to do with nar-
rative fiction psychology, where there is always a selection of psycho-
logical traits made according to aesthetic goals, traits that guide the 
application of a whole series of narrative devices.
  So when scholars of literature talk about characters as if they were 
real-life human beings, they seem to be way off the mark. Dostoyevsky 
decides what psychological traits to assign to Sonia, the father, and so 
forth. Hemingway decides what is shown and not shown, what is under-
neath the water level of the iceberg. Authors decide how the reader is to 
fill gaps through the application of all their mental faculties—by infer-
ring, calculating probabilities, using causal reasoning, plus many other 
capacities that also concern the emotion system. Authors decide what 
they will show and not show in the motivations and interactions among 
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characters. In the hands of creators of narrative fiction, there are a seem-
ingly limitless number of ways conferring such shape.
  Whatever is in the story concerning characters and many other 
aspects, the author has put it in there. It is the product of the author’s “will 
to style”—that will to achieve certain aesthetic goals through specific 
means. The author chooses everything inside the narrative fiction: the 
degree of complexity of mental operations and relationships of the char-
acters and the number of elements from social institutions that interface 
with the political, sociological, economic, historical, and so on.
  Narrative fiction is infinitely more shaped than reality, with its lack 
of aesthetic boundaries. Since I am not a character in a narrative fiction, 
that is, since I am a real-life person, I am strictly the product of an acci-
dent. Born to Luis Aldama and Charlotte Ann Robles-Castillo Aldama, 
I could have been born years later in 1984 and in Columbus, Ohio. The 
fact is, our lives are almost totally shapeless. The little shape they have 
originates in the fact that we are part of nature. We are socio-neurobi-
ological and historical organisms. On this basis, we give our lives shape 
according to circumstances, by behaving in ways A, B, C in response to 
this accident, by reacting to situations A, B, C, where both the circum-
stances and the reactions to them are not predetermined or preordained.
  All is trial and error in real everyday existence. All is predetermined 
in narrative fiction, including that which occurs by accident. For it is 
the artist who decides what to keep and what to delete in his work, even 
those items that appeared unplanned, unforeseen, unwilled in the text. 
Even in such cases, it is up to the writer to decide if those items will be 
shaped into the global and final version of the work. The author will 
decide where those fortuitous items will be placed, how specifically they 
will be shaped, and how they will fit organically in the whole.
  This is common sense, but it is also in the evidence provided by 
authors themselves. There are so many written testimonials of authors 
working through how they shaped novels, expressing surprise that people 
could think otherwise.1 If we take a quick look at Dostoyevsky’s journals 
on the writing of his novels, we can see how the most dazzling scenes in 
The Brothers Karamazov (1880), Demons (1872), and Crime and Punish-
ment were scenes that he worked through very carefully to achieve a unity 
of effect. The same can be seen with Flaubert or with Philip Roth. There 
is not an event, phrase, a word even, that is not the product of creators’ 
 1. See Aldama’s Spilling the Beans in Chicanolandia and the interviews in Aldama’s Your 
Brain on Latino Comics.
98  •  c H A P t e r  3
shape-giving activity, an activity guided and motored by aesthetic goals 
and aspirations.
  There is no mystery here. There is no ontological conflation here.
PcH: This is interesting. We seem to be poles apart here. You feel that we know 
less about characters than about real people. My view is that we know 
far more—though obviously there are exceptions in each direction. For 
example, you say that we do not know much about Raskolnikov except 
that he wants to murder an old woman and use the money. In fact, how-
ever, we know all sorts of things about him. We know how he goes about 
planning the murder, what philosophical issues arise for him, what his 
emotions and reflections are at the time of the murder and just after (e.g., 
“Suddenly he wanted to abandon everything”; then “He was even begin-
ning to laugh at himself,” but this is cut short by a sudden imagination 
“that the old woman was still alive” [84]), and so on. We have hundreds of 
pages that reliably tell us what he is thinking and feeling. We know vastly 
more about him than we know about any actual murderer. Moreover, we 
know it far more reliably. The same point holds for Emma Bovary.
  The issue you are pointing to is, I think, somewhat different—and 
different in the cases of Rodriguez and Dostoevsky or Flaubert. Specifi-
cally, in real life, particularly when treating other people, we tend to be 
very reductive in our accounts of motivation. We recognize that we our-
selves respond in complex ways to changing conditions. But we tend 
to seek simple, character-based explanations for other people’s behavior 
(see Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, and Thagard 222–24). The tendency is 
almost certainly enhanced with out-group members, since we tend to 
view out-groups “as relatively less complex, less variable, and less indi-
viduated” (Duckitt 81). Murderers would almost certainly define an out-
group for most of us. When thinking about murderers, we want some 
straightforward explanation for their behavior. The usual explanation 
is that they want money. So we reduce everything that goes on with a 
murderer to some simple formula, most often a standardized explana-
tion. (Part of a standard discourse on criminality, to return to Foucault.) 
We do this not because we know more about the murderer, but precisely 
because we know so much less—and we know it less reliably. Moreover, 
our information is less salient; thus we can dismiss complications more 
readily. The point of knowing more and knowing better is precisely that 
it makes simplifying and reductive explanations less plausible. That is 
why you are completely right to cite Raskolnikov’s interest in the money. 
It is entirely clear that this is an inadequate explanation—particularly 
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given what happens afterward. So the case is very well chosen. However, 
it is well chosen in such a way as to show that we know Raskolnikov too 
well to attribute such simple motives to him—not that we know him too 
little.
tHe domain oF narrative (iii): 
disCourse, seleCtion, and segmentation
FlA: I see your point, Patrick. I would put the emphasis on the author’s or art-
ist’s willful selecting of details (more or less) to create a highly aestheti-
cized effect of the mind as well as that of time and space. The moment 
time and space are fictionalized, they cease having the properties of time 
and space identified by physics. Take for instance Cortázar’s short story 
“The Continuity of Parks,” in which the “real” space of the character-as-
reader collapses into the “fictional” space of the novel he’s reading—a 
novel that concerns a jealous lover about to kill a man reading a novel. 
As the story comes to a close we realize that within the diegesis the char-
acter-as-reader and the lover of the novel being read suddenly share the 
same ontological space.
  This interpenetration of fictional world with real world is a physi-
cal impossibility. Under any theory of physics, quantum mechanics or 
otherwise, there is no way that these two ontological levels can coincide: 
the level of a fictional character in a story interpenetrating the level of 
another fictional character that is presented or posited as being a real-
life reader. When reading a novel or watching a movie, those characters 
do not obey the laws of nature; the laws of nature themselves become 
fictionalized.
  Whether it is in a more economic and artificial way, as in a Rodriguez 
film, or in a more sophisticated way, as in Cortázar’s story, or whether it 
is the use of natural locations, as in the film Deliverance (1972), where 
all takes place out there in nature, this way or in any other way, time and 
space do not follow the laws of physics; they follow the narrative conven-
tions and the aesthetic goals fixed by the author (director, etc.). Imag-
ine all the events taking place in a story that happen over days or years 
that have to take place during the screening time of a film. No matter 
how “realistic” the locations are, those locations are always fragments 
of a space. Space contracts or expands according to the director’s needs 
and aesthetic goals. This could be a simple car chase that’s depicted or 
the space depicted in Deliverance—it is not a continuous space; it is 
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constantly cut (fragmented) again and again according to the needs and 
aesthetic goals of the creator.
  There are many devices put to use to operate on space. In cinema 
we have editing, but we also have the way the camera focuses (close-up, 
medium, and long shots, etc.) on the characters and landscapes and the 
different lenses (wide angle, telescopic, etc.). Space is constantly manipu-
lated by all sorts of narrative devices in all the media, including novels, 
short stories, comic books, and so on.
  And, we can consider many fictions that emphasize the manipulation 
of time in otherwise ontologically impossible ways. Think of Alejo Car-
pentier’s story “Viaje a la semilla” (“Journey Back to the Source,” 1944) 
and Martin Amis’s Time’s Arrow (1991), where time moves in reverse. 
Whether space or time or both, physical reality has a completely different 
ontological existence in narrative fiction.
  Even in the most so-called realist films or novels, the shape-confer-
ring properties of discourse necessarily bestow on the fiction an artificial 
temporal and spatial order and dimension. So, necessarily, the moment 
the time and space ingredients of the story become part of the diege-
sis, they are no longer the real time and space, the time and space gov-
erned by the laws of physics. The moment time and space are subject to 
the operation of discourse, they necessarily become fictional time and 
space—in all instances, even the most realistic instances.
  Authors shape time and space in an infinite number of ways. They 
can slow down and accelerate the story through a whole series of devices 
related to the “order in narrative.” These devices concern centrally the 
dimension of time. It is the generative operator of discourse that allows 
for disjunction between the time of the story and the time of the nar-
rative. This differs from physical time that we can and do segment but 
in regular ways. In narrative fiction we have time that is segmented and 
more complexly organized and that is potentially infinitely variable. 
Through a narrative an author can condense one phrase in ten years or 
expand twenty-four hours to fill out five hundred pages as in the case 
of Ulysses. A narrative could even spend the same amount of pages nar-
rating the biography of a character before that character is born, as with 
Sterne’s Tristram Shandy (1759). Then there is the organizing of the space 
of the story whereby the authors can use different devices, such as the 
choice of point of view, for instance, that is always necessarily situated 
somewhere.
PcH: We seem to be moving along somewhat parallel tracks here. You say, “It is 
all about discourse” and I say, “It is all about simulation”—or, at least, the 
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particularization of any imagined trajectory is all about simulation. In 
addition, you keep returning to the fiction–nonfiction axis, which seems 
to me much less significant.
  First, I should set aside one issue. I disagree with the view that sec-
ond-person narratives are addresses to the real reader. In my view, they 
are references to a simulated reader within some level of the storyworld, 
with only very limited exceptions that are highly context-specific. For 
example, a lyric poem from Li Ch’ing-chao to her husband will incor-
porate the real “you” as addressee when it is sent to her husband but 
not otherwise. In contrast, Calvino’s Se una notte d’inverno un viaggia-
tore . . . is not addressing any reader. Indeed, the point should be obvious. 
The “you” in the novel is doing things that roughly correspond to what 
is being done by the real reader. But it is clear in most cases that this is 
only because reading a book tends to have some recurring features. The 
details differ greatly. Anyone who is at home alone has no “others” to 
address (as Calvino’s text assumes); for anyone who is in a library, there 
is no issue of a television (which figures in Calvino); and so on. The point 
is even obtrusive when Calvino details the bookshop with its delightful 
book categories—wholly irrelevant for a bookshop but quite familiar to 
avid readers (such as “Books That, If You Had More Lives to Live, Cer-
tainly These Too You Would Willingly Read, But Unfortunately The Days 
You Have To Live Are Only What They Are” [5, my translation]). Thus, 
I would rather say that there is a feeling of paradox or impossibility pro-
duced by such works. But it is not because there is some sort of crossing 
into the space of the reader or sharing of ontological space.
  On the other hand, I of course agree that a fictional storyworld need 
not follow the same spatial and temporal principles as the real world. But, 
again, this does not seem to me a matter of discourse. Discourse reorder-
ing or changes in duration are continuous with our fragmentary memo-
ries, our ordinary (nonliterary and nonfictional) storytelling, and other 
facets of ordinary life. (In this way, I hold fully to Monika Fludernik’s 
general advocacy of a natural narratology, a narratology that sees prac-
tices of narrative verbal art in relation to those of ordinary life.) More sig-
nificantly, small parametric changes are precisely what define processes 
of counterfactual simulation. Yes, it is true that we feel free to vary some 
aspects of the world in fiction that we do not ordinarily vary in everyday 
speech. But counterfactual simulation is precisely the process of isolating 
one or two parameters and saying, “If only q were not the case, then I cer-
tainly would have gotten that job” (or whatever). The same point holds 
for hypothetical simulation, as in “Well, I still have a chance of getting 
that job if p happens.” That sort of simulation is precisely what is involved 
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when an author imagines that, say, the murderer in a story is “the reader” 
(a simulated agent, not me or you).
FlA: I like that we are running on parallel tracks, Patrick. It’s certainly help-
ing sharpen my thoughts on how narrative fiction works. On this score, 
I would like to continue along this track of segmentivity. I have come 
across theoretical work that I believe is very fruitful. It is centered on the 
concept of segmentivity and in the characterization of poetry according 
to the principle of segmentivity. Brian McHale discusses this in “Begin-
ning to Think about Narrative in Poetry,” where he brings to the fore this 
potentially powerful characterization as found in Rachel Blau DuPlessis’s 
1996 published “Manifests.” We have with DuPlessis’s characterization 
and McHale’s astute application of “segmentivity” a powerful new tool 
for understanding how segmentation works to give shape and meaning 
to poetry. DuPlessis argues that poetry as a genre “is just selected words 
arranged by segmentation on various scales” and that it “is the creation of 
meaningful sequence by the negotiation of gap (line break, stanza break, 
page space)” (51). Following these general characterizations of poetry as 
a genre, DuPlessis offers a more specific definition:
Poetry is the kind of writing that is articulated in sequenced, gapped 
lines and whose meanings are created by occurring in bounded 
units precisely chosen, units operating in relation to chosen pause or 
silence. (51)
 The poet’s willful use of space design (segmentation) whereby he or she 
jumps from one line to the next (and from one stanza to another) can 
emphasize last and first words of each line in ways that generate a seman-
tic significance and energetic charge. Such a will to segment can some-
times even lead the poet to slice words up for kinetic force.2 
  I would add that segmentation might also prove a powerful tool in 
understanding narrative fiction. I am thinking of not only the paragraph 
and chapter breaks in novels but also the segmentation that gives shape 
and meaning in comic book (panels) and film (editing techniques). I 
think it might be a productive heuristic that we can refine, eventually 
make airtight, and then apply to all variety of narrative fictions.
PcH: That makes sense. As cognitive scientists have noted, our minds orga-
nize the world in part by selecting information, breaking it into units for 
 2. See Aldama’s Formal Matters in Contemporary Latino Poetry.
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processing, and bringing those units into structural relations with one 
another. One key unit in literature is the poetic line, presumably guided 
by the structure of working memory.3
  I am a little uncomfortable with the metaphor of a “tool.” Tools make 
products, and that is, of course, what we do in producing interpretations. 
We craft commodities that we then put up on an academic market for 
sale. Something is a valuable tool insofar as it facilitates such productiv-
ity. But that is an unfortunate aspect of the political economy of our pro-
fession, as I am sure you would agree. In consequence, I would rather ask 
if something is a valuable part of an adequate description of the object 
being studied and if it contributes to a plausible explanation of the rel-
evant phenomena.
FlA: Point taken. I do think “tool” is a useful shorthand for describing all those 
devices available to authors—and we’re constantly discovering new tools 
for the toolbox—as generative devices of discourse that shape the story. 
Let us move on to a more foundational question—that of literature as 
part of culture making. Culture is a composite of the material and intel-
lectual products and their interpretation. This aggregate or global defini-
tion of culture as being all material products (socks, food, buildings) of 
human activity plus all intellectual products (narratology, Bayesian prob-
ability, or, E = mc2?, etc.) comes with an attribution of meaning, signifi-
cance, or importance and interpretation. Culture is always material and 
constantly submitted to interpretations. And cultural products are distin-
guishable because of their capacity to generate meaning, meaning in the 
most general and nontechnical, as opposed to the mathematical and logi-
cal, sense of the word. Cultural products are also systematically assigned 
a significance—a degree of importance. If I am a religious zealot, then I 
will say that the most important values concern religion. There is a scale 
of values that changes among different people. And among different peo-
ple, certain scales of values coincide—all those who are zealots can be put 
in one group, others who are not fanatical in another, and so on and so 
forth—and the parts of groups can overlap.
  It is quite useful to have an approach that understands that culture is 
the unity of material, intellectual, and interpretive activities. Within this 
sense of culture we find also that worldviews are born and given shape. A 
worldview is never independent of the material or intellectual culture in 
which it is born and develops.
 3. See Frederick Turner and chapter 1 of Hogan, The Mind. 
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  There is a material reality of culture. The material culture of the 
nineteenth century includes trains, but this same material culture does 
not include jets and transatlantic flights, and the material culture of the 
Renaissance does not include the telephone or telegraph. Renaissance 
humanists thus wrote letters in Latin (the common language) to com-
municate with scholars in Turkey, Italy, and Spain. Intellectual culture 
one way or another has to accommodate itself to the realities of material 
culture.
  This said, an important part of intellectual culture is science. Science 
will allow the development of many technologies, including the railroad 
and jet plane. So there is a mutual or a reciprocal relationship between 
material culture and intellectual culture. Intellectual culture finds its 
foundations and building blocks in material culture, but at the same time 
intellectual culture develops material culture as it itself develops.
  There is a constant interaction and constant mutual feeding between 
material and intellectual culture. This mutual and constant feeding is part 
of what we call progress. (All those that reject the concept of progress 
and say that it is a European-biased, Enlightenment concept, etc., there-
fore deny the interaction between intellectual and material culture and 
condemn society to stagnation.) And there is a constant interpretation of 
both material and intellectual culture. For instance, we have science and 
also the philosophy of science; we have art and we have aesthetics; we 
have morals and we have ethics. Philosophy of science, aesthetics, and 
ethics are all interpretations of their respective material matter.
  Quite often interpretations are made according to general world-
views. In this sense, a worldview would be an archinterpretation. If one 
has a religious worldview, obviously the ethics will have to correspond to 
this worldview. One’s ethics cannot accept, for instance, adultery, and so 
forth. (I know you do a lot with this and categorial and practical identity.) 
The same goes for aesthetics. If my worldview objects to sex and nudity, 
well, then I will not tolerate them in a film, novel, painting, and so on.
  This is true of all the arts. My acceptance or rejection of art is subject 
to my aesthetic opinions or judgments, and these are subject to my gen-
eral worldview. This applies to all intellectual culture. We have these three 
categories—material culture, intellectual culture, and the interpretation 
of both. And we have many different sorts of disciplines devoted to the 
activity of interpretation: ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of science—all of 
these are specialized fields that engage in the interpretation of material 
and intellectual culture.
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narrative and PolitiCs
PcH: You are raising many significant and substantial issues in these reflec-
tions. Let me select two for comment. First, let us think a little about zeal-
ots and religion. It is common to conflate them, but I think it is not quite 
correct. One can be a nationalist zealot or a revolutionary zealot with no 
less deleterious consequences (e.g., massacres of “the enemy”). Of course, 
sometimes people say that, in these cases, nationalism or revolution has 
become a religion. In one way, that is reasonable, but the result is that 
“religion” means something very general.
  My main complaint, however, about identifying zealotry with reli-
gion can be framed in terms of the distinction you mention that I make 
between categorial and practical identity. Practical identity is one’s activi-
ties and competences as they are engaged with the activities and com-
petences of other people in society. Categorial identity comprises what 
one takes to be definitive labels for one’s essence, labels for the sets that 
define who one is. It is well established that we form in-groups and out-
groups, and thus categorial identity divisions, very easily. Even in con-
texts where they are temporary, such divisions can have very striking 
consequences. For example, they lead us to judge members of the in-
group more favorably, to prefer the relative superiority of the in-group 
over absolute higher benefits for everyone, and so on (see Duckitt 68–69). 
These consequences are quite disturbing.4
  Now, returning to religion, we might distinguish two issues. One is, 
say, devout Marianism or a strong devotion to, for example, the Goddess 
Durga. Another is a strong commitment to seeing oneself as essentially 
Hindu or Catholic. The former is part of one’s practical identity. The lat-
ter is part of one’s categorial identity. The two may co-occur. But they are 
largely irrelevant to one another. The sort of zealotry to which you rightly 
object seems to be bound up not with the devotion but with the catego-
rial identification. That categorial identification can be found in nation-
alism, in ethnicity, in sex and gender, in sexual preference—in anything 
that can be an identity category. Whether one has feelings of devotion to 
a nonmaterial entity or not is largely irrelevant to this.
  The second point I would like to comment on is the issue of progress. 
I completely agree that it is silly—well, worse than silly—to claim that the 
 4. In Understanding Nationalism, I outline some criteria for just when and how a label 
can become a categorial identity—for example, why “American” or “male” is a likely identity 
category for me but “Connecticut resident” or “wearer of glasses” is not.
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idea of progress is Eurocentric. Indeed, I am inclined to say that there 
is a broad human tendency toward evaluative alignment across diverse 
events. This leads to two common forms of practical emplotment (espe-
cially emplotment of our individual lives or group histories). Roughly, 
these are “things are getting better” and “things are getting worse.” 
Although such emplotments can be quite accurate, they can also be very 
distortive.
  As you know, there is a strain of cognitive linguistics that tends to 
view our understanding of the world as guided by conceptual meta-
phors. Our arguments are confrontational because we use the concep-
tual metaphor of war to think about argument. For reasons discussed in 
chapter 2, this is a highly problematic view. There are undoubtedly some 
ways in which thinking about war or alluding to war enhances opposi-
tional tendencies in argument. But we can choose other metaphors, such 
as “working together to solve a problem.” In particular cases, there are 
undoubtedly reasons why we begin talking in terms of war. For exam-
ple, if I say “Smith attacked my position,” I have probably chosen the 
word “attacked” because I feel attacked. I probably did not start out feel-
ing that we were working together to find a common solution, only to 
have my response changed by the happenstance of a cognitive metaphor. 
This, I think, is the value of Mark Turner’s and Gilles Fauconnier’s idea 
of conceptual integration or blending (see, for example, Fauconnier and 
Turner). It acknowledges that cognitive metaphors do not simply cre-
ate our responses to targets. Rather, features of the metaphors are to a 
great extent selected by the “target” of the metaphor (e.g., argument in 
the case of “argument is war”). The same point holds, perhaps even more 
clearly, for the work of Amos Tversky and Andrew Ortony on metaphor 
as feature transfer and feature salience. As Ortony notes, a metaphor 
may function solely to make apparent some features of the target that we 
already knew quite well.
  On the other hand, I am inclined to say that there are some ways in 
which our thought is often guided by very large structures. One of these, 
I believe, is something like an assumption of consistency of trending. It 
may seem that this is a transfer from physical motion and thus a form of 
conceptual metaphor. However, I believe that the pattern is more gen-
eral. It is not just that things that are falling tend to keep falling. It is 
also that things that are getting old tend to keep getting old. Children 
who are growing tend to keep growing. I suspect that directional trend-
ing is highly abstract, perhaps akin to number, and that we are similarly 
genetically predisposed toward it. (On number, the reader may wish to 
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consult Dehaene.) This cognitive tendency is exacerbated by a separate 
emotional propensity toward “mood-congruent processing” (see Oatley, 
Best 201 and Bower 389), our tendency to think happy thoughts when 
happy and sad thoughts when sad. In combination, these tend to produce 
telic and lapsarian emplotments—that is, “Things are getting better and 
better” and “Things are getting worse and worse,” respectively. In fact, I 
think these are arguably the two most important forms of emplotment 
for our ordinary lives. Moreover, they tend to be self-fulfilling in that 
lapsarian emplotment tends to discourage efforts at improving one’s con-
ditions, while telic emplotments tend to give one confidence.
  Now, back to the issue of progress. I entirely agree that we can iso-
late limited sorts of progress. Even so, however, we should avoid telic 
emplotments. Telic emplotments have two characteristics that I believe 
we should reject: 1) they tend to be absolute and encompassing; in other 
words, they tend to characterize everything as improving and as doing so 
consistently; and 2) in keeping with this, they tend to underestimate the 
value of the past.
  So, I definitely agree that science makes progress. Theories gener-
ally improve. However, this does not mean that everything associated 
with science improves. Put simply, an improvement in theories does not 
entail an improvement in human well-being. Of course, there are some 
science-based improvements in well-being. The clearest cases of this 
are in medicine. On the other hand, improvements in science have also 
brought vastly destructive weapons systems and potentially catastrophic 
climate change. Moreover, the absolutist quality of science means that 
many promising scientific theories are forgotten—although they may be 
recovered at a later date.
WorldvieW and ideology
FlA: You tread cautiously here, and rightfully so, Patrick. The way I see it, as 
the social tissue rips more and more under the strain of an increasingly 
demented, violent global capitalism, the more we will need to wrap “sci-
entific inquiry” in scare quotes. I’m still optimistic. There is still room for 
us to point our students in the direction of learning in the humanities 
that doesn’t lead to solipsistic dead ends. We can lead them to genera-
tive research programs in the sciences—their findings and methods of 
inquiry. We can still indicate what the options carry in terms of content 
and in terms of their application. Hence the importance of knowing the 
108  •  c H A P t e r  3
facts discovered by science, as well as how all sciences proceed in their 
explorations of reality.
  That said, let me continue with my thread: interpretation and world-
view. Interpretation is done under the general umbrella of a worldview. 
A worldview boils down to all those rules—system of rules—that will be 
normative in your interpretive activities; that is, they will be acting as 
rules in our interpretive activity; they are intellectual choices that will 
function as norms within our interpretive activity. So a religious world-
view that excludes chance and affirms that everything that happens to the 
individual is preordained will function as a norm in the interpretative 
activity of the person who holds such a worldview.
  Quite generally interpretive activities are realized or take place under 
the guidance of norms that constitute (or conform to) what we call a 
worldview. Some have a philosophically idealist worldview, others a 
materialist; some have an atheist and others a religious worldview.
  In narrative fiction, a specific domain of aesthetic activity, an author 
creates a work of art according to aesthetic goals and aesthetic aims, and 
these goals and aims are ruled so to speak by the specific worldview of 
the artist concerned. However, an artist’s worldview does not necessarily 
determine his or her aesthetic aims. For example, some scholars consider 
Balzac’s novels to be politically reactionary because politically he consid-
ered himself in general terms to be a monarchist and not a republican. 
But what we find in his novels is very different. His careful detailing of all 
walks of life—the squalor and sordidness of a capitalist society—and the 
creation of all variety of situations and relationships between his char-
acters creates a rich, whole world. That is, the image that is generated 
and the fictional world that is created is not a hymn to monarchy. I do 
not turn the last page of Le père Goriot (1835) and think “We need a 
monarchy.”
  My point is that an author can have a worldview that is opposite to his 
or her aesthetic goals. For instance, Balzac’s aesthetic goals were to invent 
characters in situations and relations among characters that would repre-
sent what in Balzac’s time and in his mind were called “social types”: the 
miser, the stock-market speculator, the good grandfather, the bad child, 
peasant, and so on. He called the totality of his work his “la comédie 
humaine”—narrative fictions that covered all sorts of types that are found 
in society. This aesthetic goal together with the aesthetic means that we 
call realism in fact clashed with the goals of his personal worldview. Bal-
zac’s aesthetic aims had such a central importance in his everyday life 
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that he couldn’t do away with them. They overruled his personal inter-
pretive worldview aims. Every time he sat down to write, it was his will to 
style that overpowered him.
  We also have the figure of Mario Vargas Llosa, who has maintained 
a very clear sense of himself as a writer free to explore any and all things 
under the sun—and beyond. He has written many political articles, and 
he campaigned to be president of Peru in 1990. But he is acutely aware 
of the dangers awaiting any writer of fiction who starts believing that fic-
tion has the powers that in fact pertain only to politics. In a 1991 inter-
view with Susannah Hunnewell and Ricardo Augusto Setti for the Paris 
Review, he sums this up nicely: “I think it is important that writers par-
ticipate, make judgments, and intervene, but also that they not let poli-
tics invade and destroy the literary sphere, the writers’ creative domain. 
When that happens, it kills the writer, making him nothing more than 
a propagandist” (http://www.theparisreview.org/interviews/2280/the- 
art-of-fiction-no-120-mario-vargas-llosa).
  Many books by Vargas Llosa deal directly or indirectly with politics. 
But he keeps his political beliefs at arm’s length in his attempt at writing 
the total (ideal, inaccessible) novel. It is this totalizing and nonsenti-
mental approach to fiction making, already posited in his twenties, that 
led him to a great payoff. The publication of his first book in 1959, the 
short story collection titled Los jefes (titled The Cubs and Other Stories 
in the 1979 English translation), along with the 1963 publication of La 
ciudad y los perros in 1963 (titled Time of the Hero in the 1966 English 
translation) earned Vargas Llosa a whirlwind of laudatory praise; the lat-
ter publication earned him the prestigious Premio de la Crítica Española 
award.
  In contrast to Vargas Llosa with his admonition to keep separate 
political leanings and activities as a citizen from fiction writing, we have 
the figure of John Dos Passos. At a certain moment in life, his fanati-
cal rejection of communism (he erroneously conflated communism with 
the Stalinist, counterrevolutionary bureaucracy) and zealous, hawkish 
procapitalism penetrated his aesthetic through and through. The radical 
change in his worldview led to the abandonment of many of his aesthetic 
motivations and goals. Unable to keep at bay his fervent procapital-
ist worldview, he wrote Brazil on the Move (1963)—a tourist guide that 
doubles as a reactionary eulogy to capitalism in the form of a Brazil-
ian tobacco company—and followed this critical and mainstream failure 
with Century’s Ebb (1970)—an equally dull, throwaway product.
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PcH: You are getting at something very important here, though I would put it 
somewhat differently. First, I initially balked at your references to world-
view. I am not sure I believe that people generally have worldviews. But 
as you have developed your idea, I see that there is more convergence 
between our positions than I initially assumed.
  Here is the model I would use. We all have attitudes, preferences, 
and the like. Some of these are stable, while others vary circumstantially. 
The configuration of such feelings is not necessarily consistent across 
time—or even at a given time, as the experience of ambivalence attests. 
These attitudes and so forth have many sources, but their consequential 
operation is largely in subcortical emotion/motivation systems. We also 
have various complexes of ideas, expectations, beliefs, and so on. Like the 
emotional preferences, these may be enduring or contingent and they 
need not be consistent, even at one time. These largely bear on prefrontal 
cognitive systems. Both emotional and cognitive systems have conscious 
or explicit and nonconscious or implicit components. The implicit com-
ponents are necessarily far more numerous than the conscious compo-
nents and far less open to self-conscious control.
  What you are calling “worldview” seems to me to fall largely under 
the category of explicit, enduring, cognitive features—thus, for example, 
self-conscious beliefs. I think we may diverge some on the importance 
of worldview understood in this way. (Of course, you might also sim-
ply reject construing “worldview” in this manner.) In my view, explicit, 
enduring, cognitive commitments play only a very limited role in our 
behavior. Specifically, our actions—in a very broad sense of undertakings, 
including interpretations—are initiated by largely contingent and par-
tially implicit motivations, then developed by largely contingent and par-
tially implicit cognitions. As we engage in actions, we sometimes become 
aware of contradictions with explicit beliefs, long-term goals, or other 
self-conscious commitments. That is the point at which worldview enters. 
At that point, we need to either change our behavior to make it consis-
tent with the explicit beliefs, and so forth, or we need to reinterpret the 
beliefs to make them consistent with the behavior, or we need to some-
how keep the explicit beliefs out of our minds. By this account, worldview 
often has no bearing on behavior, and, when it does have bearing, it is 
more equivocal and ambiguous than we are usually inclined to believe.
  Of course, worldview—or ideological commitments—may have a 
very significant impact on what one says and how one judges others. 
When Jones’s own behavior is at issue, then the key factors are Jones’s 
implicit motivations and cognitions. But when Jones sees Smith doing 
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something, then the crucial factors for Jones are likely to be Jones’s 
explicit cognitions. In other words, if Jones has a strong commitment to 
some religious or political ideology, there is some likelihood that he will 
apply explicit standards more rigorously to Smith than to himself. Thus 
this model predicts that there should be some tendency toward at least 
apparent hypocrisy on the part of all of us.
  Now, let us return once more to simulation. When an author engages 
in simulation, he or she will proceed predominantly through implicit 
motivations and cognitions. Self-conscious worldview or ideology will 
tend to enter only at points where some contradiction becomes salient. 
That is why, as Lukács famously argues, Balzac is not confined to his class 
ideology. Specifically, citing Engels, he praises “the correct and profound 
reflection of reality which rose above Balzac’s own individual and class 
prejudices” (“Marx” 138). In the terms I have been using—which con-
tradict some of the implications suggested by “reflection of reality”—
Balzac’s simulation is relatively unaffected by his explicit cognitions and 
affiliations.
  This also indicates why it is often problematic when authors fol-
low through on some self-conscious political program in their writing. 
In fact, I would say that the problem is general and applies not only to 
the incorporation of a political view but also to systematic incorpora-
tions of an ethical view or a psychology (e.g., psychoanalysis—or current 
neuroscience). Our self-conscious explanations tend to be much more 
unequivocal, much less motivationally and cognitively complex, than 
our simulations. The result is that “programmatic” works may become 
mechanical and simplistic.
  On the other hand, it can happen that an author’s comprehension 
of a theory is itself complex, so that it adds nuance to his or her simula-
tions rather than substituting for them. I believe that this at least some-
times happens with Brecht, for example, in his use of Marxist thought 
in, say, Die Maßnahme (The Measures Taken). Another case might be 
M.  F. Husain’s use of Sufism in Meenaxi. In both these cases, though, 
the self-conscious worldview or ideology enhances the insight and aes-
thetic effect of the work precisely insofar as it does not displace spontane-
ous simulation but rather expands the possibilities for such simulation. 
For example, Brecht illustrates the problems with canonical errors con-
demned in orthodox Marxism (e.g., voluntarism). But at the same time 
he simulates the complexities—thus insights and values—of the erring 
(voluntarist) revolutionary, as well as the problematically reductive judg-
ments and cruel actions of the party leaders.
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FlA: With this in mind, Fuentes enhances his narrative fiction (your simula-
tion) because of a conscious awareness of a worldview; the latter Dos 
Passos diminishes and turns mechanical his narrative fiction (your simu-
lation) because he fails to hold his worldview at arm’s length. I believe 
we’re on the same page here. Let me dig at something deeper: the domain 
of culture we call interpretation. As I mentioned, this domain possesses 
as a general umbrella a worldview from which interpretation derives or 
takes place; this worldview will inflect interpretation in one direction or 
another. At the same time, there is no determinism such that the world-
view will necessarily determine in fashions A, B, C, interpretations of W, 
Y, Z. There is no fatalism; there is not a necessary one-to-one correspon-
dence. Interpretations are guided and ruled in a more or less flexible way 
(depending on the individual) by a worldview.
  In the reading of fiction, this can lead to a conflict of interpretation 
of worldview between author and reader. An author sets aesthetic goals 
and means that he or she interprets as pertaining to his or her worldview 
(atheist), but it could happen that the reader fills in the blanks in the 
blueprint according to a religious worldview and so reads the work with 
an interpretive key of his or her religious worldview. Since there is total 
freedom in terms of the interpretive activity of the author and in setting 
goals and means, it could happen that the equivalent features of freedom 
in the reader lead to radically opposite interpretations based on contrast-
ing worldviews. This type of symptomatic reading happens all the time 
when I teach, by the way.
PcH: That certainly makes sense. Here, a set of distinctions might be useful. 
There is spontaneous, implicit interpretation—what hermeneuticians 
refer to as “understanding.” Then there is effortful, explicit interpreta-
tion—what hermeneuticians refer to as “explication.” Then there are the 
various conditions in which these interpretations occur—what herme-
neuticians refer to as “application.” When Jones tacitly reinterprets his 
religious beliefs (e.g., “Thou shalt not kill”) in relation to his emotional 
support for war, that is different from an undergraduate student being 
asked to come up with an explicit, effortful interpretation of Faulkner 
in a class, and that is in turn different from a graduate student or pro-
fessor trying to produce an interpretation of Faulkner that will get pub-
lished. You are probably right that worldview or ideology may enter in 
the second case (the student), given certain further conditions. The first 
case goes in the opposite direction, as discussed earlier. The third, profes-
sional case appears different from both, though it is likely to involve bad 
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faith. It seems all too often to concern not a worldview or ideology that 
the interpreter holds or tries to reinterpret. Rather, it manifests a set of 
imitative procedures that the interpreter imagines evaluators (e.g., jour-
nal referees) will judge positively.
etHiCs and emotion
FlA: You mention bad faith, reminding me to pick up the thread of ethics. 
Narrative fiction deals mostly with humans or humanlike entities and 
with their behavior and the circumstances in which they live and there-
fore relate to one another. That is, in general, almost as a rule (some peo-
ple consider it a universal rule with no exceptions, but I am not sure 
about this), stories are about humans, their circumstances, their behav-
ior, and their reciprocal relations. It is to this material that the generative 
operator of discourse is applied.
  So the many features of humans become fictionalized by the appli-
cation of this generative operator; they thereby cease being human and 
become creations, creatures, constructs. The same applies to circum-
stances, behavior, and relations. When this happens, we have fictive 
behavior, for instance, and therefore we have fictive morals; and we can 
have at an upper level fictive ethics. That is, in narrative fiction we have 
fictive rules applying to characters: good and bad behavior are the two 
categories, and at the upper level, fictive ethics has as its main ruling con-
cepts the concepts of good and bad—and, of course, the concept of pro-
hibition and punishment.
  Since in real life, real interactions between individuals are so impor-
tant, we have all kinds of rules governing this behavior—good versus bad 
manners, for example—and rules governing morals—thou shalt not X, 
Y, or Z. In real life, since we all live in a social setting and to be human is 
to be a social being (we cannot survive without social structure), morals 
and its interpretation (ethics) have a very relevant, very foregrounded 
important place.
  When all these ingredients are fictionalized by the generative opera-
tor of discourse in a story, we also centrally have in our narrative fic-
tion—in a very important way—fictionalized morals and a fictionalized 
ethics ascribed to our fictional characters.
  An important part of the work of the artist creating narrative fiction 
is to write in the diegesis (which is different from story; there are stories 
about real events—anecdotes, for instance—and we apply the operator 
114  •  c H A P t e r  3
of discourse to these real events). Within the diegesis the author creates 
characters and relationships, and a fictional morality rules the relation-
ships between characters. And, of course, the author creates all the other 
stuff of diegesis, such as setting, circumstances, and time and place.
PcH: On the issue of whether stories always concern agents—this is largely a 
matter of where one wants to draw the dividing line. In other words, it 
is definitional. A famous example is the exploding radiator, discussed 
by the philosopher Carl Hempel in the course of a consideration of laws 
and events in relation to the study of history. George Reisch comments 
that Hempel’s “explanation of the exploded radiator, after all, is a mini-
narrative: ‘Once upon a time, there was a radiator. Then, it got really cold 
and the radiator burst because it couldn’t withstand the pressure exerted 
by the freezing water it contained’” (19). So, is Hempel’s account of the 
exploding radiator a story? If we want, we can say it is—or not.
FlA: Perhaps this is where ethics and its necessary emotion correlates does 
allow for the definitional. The rules governing the relationship of charac-
ters—this could be your exploding radiator or a radiator hose or Cortá-
zar’s otherworldly creatures such as his cronopios and famas or anything 
with agency, intentionality, sense of causality, and movement—within the 
diegesis are also a fictive ethics. This strictly applies mutatis mutandis to 
emotions. An important part of our lives is emotion driven and ruled. 
The emotions are the air we breathe. They are a very important part of 
our relations with others, whether in the form of love and hate or indif-
ference and neglect (passive-aggressive forms of behavior).
  Emotions have such a central importance in the everyday lives of real 
people in real time and space that they naturally appear also as inspi-
rations for authors. All the emotions of the husband and the lovers of 
the real woman who committed suicide informed the making of the real 
story that Flaubert uses for Madame Bovary; when he submits this real 
story to the treatment of fiction, to the generative operator discourse, 
what happens is that a very important part of the work of the artist 
becomes finding ways to ascribe emotions to characters and finding ways 
and means to show these emotions so that the reader can recognize them 
as being reliable or credible or, one way or another, can recognize them as 
emotions.
  What I’d like to insist on is that emotions in narrative fiction are con-
structs. I deliberately decide that this character as my creation will fall in 
love with this other character or will hate this other character.
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  Emotions in fiction are fictional. The scientist who decides to study 
emotions scientifically in narrative fiction texts will necessarily do a very 
bad job. Whatever emotions are in the text are there because the author 
put them there; therefore, they are already known as emotions. They are a 
part of the prior knowledge of the author; they are part of the story that 
exists in advance of being submitted to the fictional, specifically genera-
tive discourse, procedures.
PcH: I would once again say that the emotions are simulated rather than con-
structed. That may be a simple preference in words. But “constructed” 
makes it sound as if the process is more self-conscious than simulation 
is. It also suggests a difference in process between one’s imagination of 
characters and one’s imagination of real people. I do not believe there is 
a difference, at least not a difference in kind. That is why I argue in What 
Literature Teaches Us About Emotion that studying emotions in narrative 
fiction should be part of affective science.
FlA: Patrick, I’m not sure I was clear. Indeed, I use constructed to underscore 
my understanding of narrative fiction to be a newly built object in the 
world that requires the conscious will and action of the creator in its 
making. Of course, many more authors than not (and we could say the 
same of musicians, architects, artists, and the like) are not willful cre-
ators. For every thousandth building we drive by every day, maybe only 
one stands out as having the presence of a will to style, say. I like that 
we leave this part of the conversation with a nod toward your book and 
more generally your work. I believe our work, while differently orien-
tated, offers options for pursuing research programs that aim to formu-
late a foundational study of narrative fiction specifically and aesthetics 
generally—the subject of our next section.
Frederick luis AldAmA: Before going into the specific discussions of litera-
ture, and the equal validity of interpretations, some general remarks are 
in order.
  First, even assuming the truth of the most radical ascriptions of a 
modal architecture of the brain, and even assuming that some areas 
of the brain are “dormant” while others are active in such and such a 
moment, I still believe that the brain is a unified whole. It is not a sum of 
separate and independent modules.
  The brain works as a unit. When I am contemplating a painting or 
reading a novel, it is not just a few areas of the brain that are engaged—
the language area for instance, while the whole limbic system is inactive. 
Rather, there is a constant interaction between the neocortex and the 
limbic system; and within the limbic system there are areas such as the 
hippocampus that fire more intensively. We activate the cognitive, the 
linguistic, the limbic system (emotion system), and the perception and 
memory systems when reading a novel or contemplating a painting.
  Second, all these neurobiological functions operate at the same time 
as meaning-conferring mechanisms. For instance, perception is not just 
the sensory grasp of external reality. Perception is a faculty that oper-
ates as a shape- and meaning-conferring mechanism. When I perceive an 
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object I do not just have a physiochemical reaction. In addition, my eye-
sight turns those sensorial inputs into perception by conferring shape, by 
isolating objects from each other.
  Perception is a shape-conferring neurobiological function. And, by 
the same token, because it confers shape, it also confers meaning. All 
aesthetic experience is about shape and meaning. There is no shapeless 
aesthetic experience; there is no meaningless aesthetic experience. This 
shape could be a house in architecture, movement in ballet, colors in a 
painting, and so forth. Shape and meaning come together in the act of 
perception. This is why we can easily say that perception is a shape- and 
meaning-conferring mechanism.
  Third, from a neurobiological point of view, the two main essential 
and perhaps, according to some scholars, the “only” senses involved in 
the aesthetic experience are vision and hearing. And that’s because the 
olfactory, the gustatory, and the tactile senses have a very low capacity—
perhaps a zero capacity—to confer shape. These senses are more remote 
from our most intense common experiences that are based on the visual 
and aural senses.
  This is not to say that one cannot train these senses to give shape to 
smell, taste, and touch. There are those who educate the olfactory sense 
and train it, so they can delimit the line between one odor and another in 
the making of perfume. And others train their taste buds to delimit the 
boundaries between different tastes to evaluate wine (origin, ingredients) 
and also to develop new combinations in the making of wine. Great chefs 
like my sister likewise have educated their tastes to be able to tell you the 
ingredients of food and even the respective amounts of the ingredients. 
In a much more occasional way, the tactile sense is used in contemporary 
forms of art in which the artist uses paints and collage devices to create 
a surface texture. In the making, artists use materials for the collage that 
feel right to their fingertips that they then apply to the surface of the can-
vas. The paint itself can also leap from the canvas, eliciting an aesthetic 
response from the audience that triggers that impulse to want to touch its 
surface with the fingertips. Sculpting, of course, while centrally a visual 
aesthetic experience in creation and reception, is also a tactile experience.
  Much contemporary poetry aims at creating an aesthetic experience 
through the simultaneous use of the shaping or the patterning of sounds 
in the poem and the visual presentation of the poem on the page. A poem 
can be read and enjoyed in terms of its sound patterns and simultane-
ously enjoyed visually, because those sound patterns are distributed in 
the form of a spiral. Urayoán Noel’s collection Hi-Density Politics (2010) 
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is an excellent example of contemporary Latino poetry that does this to 
great effect.
  Technical devices in filmic narrative fiction are also a form of seg-
mentivity charged with meaning because the cuts give specific shape to 
each sequence of frames. We also see this at work in comic books. In a 
much looser way, we see this in the distribution of the text in a short 
story or novel. In The Complete Western Stories of Elmore Leonard (2007), 
we see not only a careful use of crosscutting between one paragraph 
and another to increase the dynamism of the story but also a use of cut-
ting within a story that makes it seem as if we were encountering a new 
chapter within a given short story. That is, Leonard segments an already 
rather brief story by introducing a chapter heading within it. This cre-
ates a dynamic reading experience that actively involves our perception 
(visual experience) of the segmentation of the text.
aestHetiC Pleasure
PAtrick colm HogAn: You raise many interesting and significant issues here. 
For example, you suggest, if I understand correctly, that shape is a nec-
essary condition for aesthetic pleasure. The first question here would 
be—what constitutes shape? You seem to have in mind a figure in a fig-
ure–ground relation or something along those lines. That is, at least, what 
“shape” suggests. On the other hand, it seems that we can have beauti-
ful backgrounds, even such things as a beautiful sky or an aesthetically 
pleasing color.
  I think you are on to something here, but it might be worth backing 
up for a moment and considering other issues. First, there is the issue of 
sensory modality. We of course refer to visual art and visual scenes, as 
well as music and sounds, as beautiful. We probably do not refer to any 
touches as beautiful. But we do think of some textures as intrinsically 
pleasing. So I might remark that a piece of velvet has a lovely plushness, 
urging you to touch it also. The second point seems relevant because we 
often have a strong inclination to share aesthetic pleasures with friends. 
Note that the pleasure of touch in this case is not contingent on any 
further, nonaesthetic pleasures. More significantly, it is clear that the 
somatosensory cortex is involved in our aesthetic response to dance (see 
Calvo-Merino and colleagues). Thus it seems clear that the somatosen-
sory system has aesthetic properties as well. We do not typically refer to 
a beautiful smell, but we do refer to a “lovely bouquet,” which conveys 
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much the same idea. The difficulty with taste is that it is routinely bound 
up with hunger satisfaction. However, the system of taste preference is in 
fact distinct from that of hunger satisfaction. (We discuss this further in 
the next chapter.) Thus we do often undertake to experience taste plea-
sure apart from hunger satisfaction. Wine tasting, which you mention, 
is an obvious case. Moreover, taste serves as a recurring model for other 
modes of aesthetic pleasure. For example, the central concept in the San-
skrit aesthetic tradition is rasa, which “in its most literal sense means 
juice, taste, flavor.” In aesthetics, it is used “to express the flavor or mood 
which characterizes a play” or other work of art (Ingalls 15–16).
  So, we may disagree as to whether aesthetic experience is confined to 
particular sensory modalities. The question that arises here is whether all 
these cases are really instances of the same sort of thing. In other words, 
is aesthetic pleasure in wine tasting the same sort of thing as in read-
ing poetry, or are we simply being misled by some similarities in phras-
ing? Note that the same point holds for reading poetry versus looking at 
paintings or looking at landscapes or hearing music, and so on.
  There are several ways in which we could seek such continuity. These 
fall into two broad categories: continuities of beauty and continuities of 
aesthetic experience. Continuities in beauty would comprise recurring 
properties in the objects—for instance, shape, in your account. Conti-
nuities in aesthetic experience would comprise recurring properties in 
response; your reference to the experience of meaningfulness may be an 
instance of this.
  There are two obvious ways continuities in experience could occur 
neuropsychologically: cognitively and affectively. Cognitive aesthetic 
continuity would involve more abstract, amodal representations of aes-
thetic objects. For example, there appear to be neurons in the parietal 
cortex that code for number independent of modality (see Dehaene). 
If the same were true of aesthetic experience, that would provide evi-
dence of an amodal sense of beauty. Moreover, in that case, the existence 
or nonexistence of an olfactory sense of beauty would be an empirical, 
neurological question. Affective aesthetic continuity would be secured 
by some emotion system or complex of emotion systems that recur with 
different aesthetic experiences. Whether there is indeed such recurrence 
is likewise an empirical, neurological question.
  Again, we may alternatively wish to seek for aesthetic continuity in the 
objects themselves. Our neurology may or may not be the same for, say, 
beautiful music and beautiful painting. Either way, there may be proper-
ties shared by the objects themselves.
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  My inclination is to view “the aesthetic” as a complex, prototype-
based concept. We may isolate different elements that contribute to an 
account of something being aesthetic—both objective and experiential 
elements. The result is that some objects are better cases of the aesthetic 
than others. I do not necessarily mean that they are more beautiful. I 
mean that there are some objects that fulfill more of the criteria for being 
aesthetic. Indeed, given what I have just said, perhaps it would be more 
appropriate to say that some events, comprising an interaction of a sub-
ject and an object (or situation), satisfy more criteria for being aesthetic.
  Take, for a moment, the emotional part of aesthetic experience. The 
first thing that we would be likely to say about aesthetic feeling is that 
it must involve sustained interest. Thus it must to some degree activate 
attention systems. Moreover, in keeping with this, it must not be habitual. 
Habituation reduces attentional orientation (Frijda 318) and emotional 
responsiveness (LeDoux, Synaptic 138). This is, broadly, a point stressed 
by the Russian formalists, though in a very different theoretical context 
(see Shklovsky 741). It is also suggested by Kant (Critique of Judgement 
80).
  Beyond attentional engagement, we would expect some sort of reward 
involvement. This is not to say that there would be no aversive emotion. 
However, there must be some enjoyment for the experience to count as 
aesthetic pleasure, and there is neurological evidence that aesthetic pref-
erence is connected with reward systems. Thus Hideaki Kawabata and 
Semir Zeki ask what conditions are “implied by the existence of the phe-
nomenon of beauty (or its absence).” They conclude that “in esthetics, 
the answer  .  .  . must be an activation of the brain’s reward system with 
a certain intensity” (1704). Kawabata and Zeki are concerned primarily 
with visual art. Peter Vuust and Morten Kringelbach report research on 
the importance of the reward system in music. In his more general over-
view of aesthetic preference, Martin Skov points to the centrality of “the 
processing of reward” (280).
  Interest and pleasure may be necessary conditions for something to 
count as an aesthetic experience. I would add that an experience becomes 
more prototypical when other emotions are present as well. Of these, 
perhaps the most important and consequential is some form of attach-
ment feeling. We see this most obviously in judgments that one’s beloved 
is beautiful. It is a commonplace that one’s experience of one’s beloved is 
an aesthetic experience. In a well-known poem, Sappho writes about how 
different people give different accounts of what is most beautiful. But, in 
her view, it is “whatever one loves” (41). There is, in fact, neurological 
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support for this, though it has not been widely understood in aesthetic 
terms. Specifically, Nadal and colleagues point out that some research 
has “found lower preference ratings associated with decreased activity of 
the caudate nucleus” (388; see Vartanian and Goel). The point is impor-
tant because of our more general understanding of the caudate nucleus. 
Specifically, seeing the face of an attachment figure has been linked with 
“activity in the caudate, a deep brain structure associated with feelings 
of love” (Arsalidou and colleagues 47). The “caudate . . . has been associ-
ated with feelings of maternal and romantic love” (50). Similarly, in Jaime 
Villablanca’s account, “the specific function of the caudate nucleus is to 
control approach-attachment behavior,” including “romantic love” (95). 
This is why, for example, Proust can refer to Swann as being “in love” 
with the “little phrase” of Vinteuil’s sonata (255).
FlA: Yes, a willful shaping is a necessary condition for our interest and plea-
sure in the experience of the object as well as crucially in our meaning-
making operations. As we discussed, this can involve the syntactic shape 
or form of the phrase as well as segmentation and a myriad of other gen-
erative devices (or tools) . . .
PcH: That leads back to the issue of beauty or object properties. Here, there 
appear to be two different ways in which object properties bear on aes-
thetic events. Of course, neither is independent of subjective conditions. 
We need to encode the relevant properties and process them appropri-
ately. (To encode properties is to select them from the perceptual envi-
ronment, organize them into units, and bring them into structural 
relations with one another.) If we do not encode the properties they have 
no existence for us and thus no effect on us.
  The two types of properties I have in mind bear on, roughly, objects 
as such and complexes of objects—with “object” understood very broadly 
as any cognitive target. Alternatively, we might conceive of the differ-
ence as parallel to that between the ventral and dorsal streams of visual 
processing—that is to say, the “what” and “where” streams. As Robert 
Wurtz and Eric Kandel explain, “motion” is “mediated in large part by 
the dorsal pathway,” while “contours” are “mediated largely by the ventral 
pathway” (548). In connection with these divisions, one type of beauty 
concerns intrinsic properties and another concerns relations across 
objects, locations, or moments. (V. S. Ramachandran too sees the dorsal/
ventral division as important to differentiating aesthetic criteria, though 
his specification of those criteria is very different; see his chapter 8.)
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  Your idea of shape relates most obviously to the former variety. 
As you have phrased it, it seems perhaps related to Zeki’s idea that art 
seeks to isolate “the constant, lasting, essential and enduring features of 
objects, surfaces, faces, situations, and so on” (“Art” 4). Zeki relates this 
to the brain’s operation in isolating constancy in the context of continual 
change.
  Zeki cites many artists and many works of art for which this account 
initially appears fitting. However, I believe it is mistaken. For example, 
in citing artists’ explicit statements about art, Zeki seems to stress art-
ists who are reacting against impressionism, with its emphasis on the 
fleeting quality of experience. The rhetoric of these anti-impressionists 
accommodates Zeki’s hypothesis but for historically contingent reasons. 
Moreover, the history of perspective painting likewise seems to contra-
dict Zeki’s view. Of course, Zeki does treat artists such as Monet. But his 
interpretations are biased by his theoretical presumptions. For example, 
he takes Monet’s paintings of “the same scene in differing conditions” as 
evidence that Monet was “search[ing] for constancies” (Inner Vision 210). 
The more obvious interpretation is that he was searching for differences, 
the differences in the changing conditions that would be highlighted 
by the presupposed (thus not sought) constancy of the object (e.g., the 
Rouen Cathedral).
  On the other hand, I believe Zeki is on to something. Beauty is not 
so much what is constant, but, so to speak, what is “normal”—and the 
normal is, of course, related to the constant. Specifically, we may take a 
clue from research on facial beauty. Judgments of facial beauty seem to be 
governed by a principle of averaging, such that the most average face is 
the most beautiful face (Langlois and Roggman). The point, though not 
precisely predictable, is also not surprising in light of how our processes 
of categorization appear to work. Specifically, we seem to understand cat-
egories by reference to prototypes (see Rosch). Prototypes are, roughly, 
weighted averages across experiences. For example, we categorize faces as 
faces. We then form a prototype of a face by averaging across the differ-
ent faces that we see, probably with some degree of difference depending 
on how long we see a given face, how thoroughly we encode the features, 
and other factors. This averaging appears to be “weighted” in the sense 
that it will be slightly different from a statistical averaging, as a result of 
contrast with opposed categories. Thus our prototypical man may have 
more “masculine” features than the statistically average man, due to a 
contrast with “woman.”
A  s c i e n t i F i c  A P P r oAc H  to  A e s t H e t i c s  •  123
  The process of weighted averaging in itself might not lead us to expect 
that prototypes would activate some reward response. However, once the 
possibility is suggested, then the idea that it would occur for evolution-
ary reasons seems quite plausible. Steven Pinker points out that we prefer 
symmetrical faces and notes that this has reproductive benefits (484). 
The general idea seems completely correct. However, the case is too par-
ticular. Specifically, we would expect prototypical instances to generally 
be less potentially problematic (e.g., less likely to be diseased), whether 
we are speaking of animals or fruit or faces. Thus it seems unlikely that 
there is a specific adaptation for facial symmetry preference. Rather, it 
seems likely that there is an adaptation for seeking proximity of the tar-
get to the relevant prototype, whether that is the prototype of a face or 
the prototype of a carrot. This seems likely because prototypes would 
tend to eliminate risky deviations from normalcy across the board, for 
carrots as much as faces. Obviously, like any other evolutionary mecha-
nism, this means that it will often get things wrong and lead us to dispre-
fer something that would in fact be better for us. The point is merely that, 
on the whole, the mechanism should approximate the function of, say, 
avoiding disease or similar harms.
  At this point, the question arises as to whether facial beauty is really a 
matter of prototype approximation. It seems that it is. The point appears 
to be supported by studies bearing on the contrastive operation of proto-
types. Specifically, by a prototype account, we would expect judgments of 
female facial beauty to be enhanced by more distinctively female features 
and for judgments of male facial beauty to be enhanced by more distinc-
tively male features. In keeping with this, Russell reports research regard-
ing male/female luminance differences around the mouth and eyes. As 
Russell summarizes, “Female faces were found to be more attractive 
when . . . luminance difference was increased.” This is because “the lumi-
nance difference between the eyes and mouth and the rest of the face 
is naturally greater in women than men” (1093). Thus the preference 
is contrastive in the way that we would expect. Of course, we cannot 
simply assume that this is a matter of beauty, since sexual desire may 
be involved (see Franklin and Adams on the complexity of judgments 
regarding facial attractiveness). Moreover, Pinker’s suggestions about tes-
tosterone levels and gender differences in facial structure seem likely to 
have bearing here. But the preference is also consistent with the predic-
tions a prototype account would entail. Indeed, one would expect sex-
based prototype weighting for beauty and sexual attraction to interact 
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in relevant cases, just as attachment and sexual desire systems appear to 
interact in romantic love (see, for example, Shaver and Hazan 482).
  Here, then, one might ask if prototype-based aesthetic judgments are 
confined to faces. In fact, it seems well established that they extend well 
beyond faces. For example, Colin Martindale and Kathleen Moore pro-
vide considerable evidence that, for color, “more prototypical stimuli” 
are “strongly preferred over less prototypical stimuli” (670). There would 
presumably be some qualification for this relative to habituation. None-
theless, there is evidence that prototypes affect aesthetic preferences in 
such apparently habituation-prone areas as furniture choices (see Whit-
field and Slatter).
  In short, it seems that prototype approximation plays an important 
role in defining beauty and aesthetic pleasure. Even so, it is clear that 
prototypicality does not cover all cases. The other criterion for beauty 
seems to be (unexpected) patterning. Some neuroscientists stress the 
pattern-isolating function of the brain. Indeed, Gerald Edelman goes so 
far as to claim that the “primary mode” of thought is “pattern recogni-
tion” (103), that “brains operate prima facie not by logic but rather by 
pattern recognition” (58). This is presumably the result of evolution, with 
pattern recognition having adaptive benefits. In keeping with this, we 
might expect the isolation of patterns to yield endogenous rewards, thus 
motivating pattern-seeking behavior. This would explain some aspects 
of, for example, musical beauty in which we isolate sequential patterns 
and transformations of those patterns in thematic variations, key modu-
lations, and so on.
  It is worth pausing for a moment over the case of music. Vuust and 
Kringelbach present considerable evidence that pleasure in music is 
bound up with “anticipation/prediction” (256). Indeed, they directly 
link anticipation/prediction to reward-system engagement (256, 266). 
Vuust and Kringelbach stress the pleasure of getting the prediction right. 
Indeed, they see this as having adaptive consequences since an endog-
enous system “rewarding correct predictions” will “reinforce correct pre-
dictions of the future” (266). Unfortunately, this does not quite fit their 
own data. Specifically, they explain some of the most intense experiences 
of musical pleasure as resulting from “failure to predict future events” 
(262) and thus as involving “a violation of expectancies” (263). Clearly, 
expectancy is the isolation of some temporal pattern. It would seem that 
a violation of expectancies is simply a disruption of the pattern. How-
ever, it is likely that intense musical pleasure does not result from all 
violations of expectancies. Rather, it seems likely that it results from a 
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violation of expectancies that the listener can quickly accommodate into 
another pattern. The violation works against habituation. But the subse-
quent recognition of a pattern yields the reward.
  Indeed, this analysis fits their evolutionary model with only a slight 
alteration. Specifically, we would expect pleasure to result from getting 
a prediction right, as they say. But that pleasure should habituate with 
time. More importantly, if we have evolutionary reason to enjoy true pre-
dictions, we have, if anything, even greater evolutionary reason to learn 
new patterns. That is, after all, how we come to make (subsequent) pre-
dictions in the first place. Thus there should be reward involvement for 
learning a pattern after a false prediction.
  Beauty in literature appears to combine both patterns and proto-
types. Moreover, it does so at different levels. For example, we isolate 
patterns in speech rhythms (e.g., in poetry) and in imagery. The praise 
of the beloved’s beauty in love poetry involves prototype development. 
Emotion-system contributions enter here as well. For example, literature 
treating romantic love or parent–child relations—and thus a good deal of 
literature worldwide—is likely to activate emotional memories connected 
with attachment.
  In saying all this, I am leaving aside a complication: prototypes seem 
to come in different forms. Some are more governed by the “mean,” oth-
ers by a contrastive “limit.”1 Thus our prototypical diet food is not an 
average of diet foods, not even a weighted average. It is an extreme or 
limit case—the zero-calorie lettuce (Kahneman and Miller 143). But that 
too raises interesting questions concerning the degree to which the con-
trastive weighting of prototypes governs aesthetic preference. V. S. Ram-
achandran has maintained that beauty is bound up with the “peak-shift” 
effect. The peak shift occurs when an animal has been trained to respond 
differently to two distinct stimuli, say a 2" × 2" square and a 2" × 3" rect-
angle. Through training, the animal’s peak response is to the 2" × 3" rect-
angle. However, if faced with, say, a 2" × 4" rectangle, the animal’s peak 
response shifts to the new stimulus, which exaggerates the difference 
between the (unrewarded) square and the (rewarded) 2" × 3" rectangle. 
(Ramachandran discusses the point in detail in chapter 7 of The Tell-Tale 
Brain.)
  Ramachandran does not report whether there are limits to this, so it 
may or may not involve limit prototyping. Other cases cited by Ramach-
andran almost certainly are a matter of weighted averaging. For example, 
 1. See Hogan, Affective 190.
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Ramachandran suggests that the aesthetically ideal female form exagger-
ates distinctive female features. But there is presumably some point at 
which the figure’s waist becomes too slender and the breasts become too 
large (e.g., I doubt that people would judge a woman with a 60" bust and 
a 1" waist to have a singularly beautiful physique). Presumably, the same 
point would hold for male beauty. In any case, Ramachandran’s observa-
tions do suggest that there is a complex interaction between statistical 
averaging and contrastive weighting and that the best account of beauty 
would need to treat this.
sourCes oF aestHetiCs
FlA: You cover much territory here, Patrick. I like very much your clear 
explanation of interest and pleasure as they relate to the learning of new 
patterns. You mention love poetry. I would like to take us not so much 
exclusively in the direction of romance, but in that of human relation-
ships and subject-to-object relations more generally. In very broad out-
lines and with very broad brushstrokes we can distinguish within human 
behavior four kinds of relationships: 1) between humans and nature; 
2) between humans and the tools or instruments they create to modify 
nature; 3) between one human and other humans, between the human 
and his or her society; 4) between humans and nature and tools and 
other humans from an aesthetic point of view. It is important to make 
these seemingly artificial and general distinctions to begin to outline the 
scientific criteria for aesthetics.
  We have had a specific relationship with nature: it has been the source 
of the means of survival since our hunting and gathering days and before 
that, as paleoanthropologists have discovered, as essentially scaven-
gers. With the cutting of rock for spears and other tools (which enabled 
humans to kill animals themselves, thus eliminating the need to have to 
wait for another animal to finish eating its prey and then move in to get 
whatever remained) and then the ability to produce fire, the relationship 
to nature changes. So here we also have a relationship with the tools pro-
duced in the transformation of nature. Then we see the primitive origins 
of morals: the creation of rules that will govern the relationship between 
one human and other humans. This gives rise to ethics and to other 
forms of relational behavior such as magic and religion.
  Humans find, finally, beauty and ugliness in nature in the tools that 
they make and in the relationships among humans. This is what we call 
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the aesthetic relations; that is, relations based on these emotional reac-
tions we call beauty and ugliness.
  All these relations and their effects and consequences in terms of 
institutions and rule-governed social life—aesthetics, politics, laws, eth-
ics, altruism, protection of offspring, and so forth—form an increasing 
number of separate, independent domains. Nowadays, human relations 
in society that are the object of specific rules have given birth to things 
such as constitutions and courts (starting with a high court, followed by 
a series of other levels that specialize in different kinds of relations, labor, 
business, patent, etc.). We have a myriad of laws and law books and spe-
cialists in law. Then to ensure that the law is obeyed, besides the courts 
we have all kinds of specialized people who are trained to hurt, maim, 
detain, restrain, damage, attack other people (this is function of the 
police and army). Then we have specialized centers that detain people: 
jails, prisons, concentration camps, and so on.
  These are just a tiny example of the complex web of relations that 
have their origin in the Paleolithic. I could give many other examples of 
how these forms of human relationships have evolved and become more 
diverse and specialized.
  It is the same with aesthetic relations. It is likely that, for instance, 
the Paleolithic hunters making their weapons would have taken a certain 
pride in a work well done. That is, I would feel more satisfied with the 
result of work if my arrowheads were sturdy and at the same time lighter 
than other arrowheads and therefore perhaps could be shot farther away 
from the prey and have the same effect as heavier ones launched closer 
to the prey. This would give me a feeling of satisfaction. So, I would take 
an ever-increasing satisfaction in improving on the results of my work. 
My skill and virtuosity as well as the communicating of this to the next 
generation all inform my satisfaction in the making of an innovative 
arrowhead.
PcH: The human relations aspect here of course returns us to the issue of 
attachment. But I’d like to pick up on a different aspect of what you just 
mentioned—ethics. Ethics is relevant here for a number of reasons. 
I would like to focus a bit on one. We sometimes experience abstract 
objects as beautiful. Thus, for example, aspects of mathematics are beau-
tiful. An important case of this is, precisely, ethics. One of Kant’s most 
famous statements, made in a nonaesthetic context, is that the feeling 
of the sublime is inspired most profoundly by the starry sky above and 
the moral law within (Critique of Practical Reason 166). The starry sky 
128  •  c H A P t e r  4
points toward our material insignificance, he explains, while the moral 
law reveals our unbounded possibilities. In the case of mathematics, aes-
thetic feeling is at least in part a matter of unexpected pattern isolation. 
There is some element of that in the starry sky, and some element of 
prototype approximation too. But the applicability of these ideas to the 
night sky is less clear than to the blue sky of day. More significantly, it 
is not evident how these criteria might apply to the moral law. Admit-
tedly, there is some element of pattern isolation in Kant’s formulation 
of the abstract categorical imperative (“Act only on that maxim through 
which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal 
law” [Groundwork 88]) and the related practical imperative (“Act in such 
a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in 
the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same 
time as an end” [Groundwork 96]). There is a sort of patternlike beauty in 
seeing various small ethical preferences (not to kill, not to lie, and so on) 
as instances of a general principle that one should treat others as ends 
in themselves and never as mere means. But there is something more 
to Kant’s insight than this. Specifically, if this were all that is at issue, the 
sense of the beauty (or sublimity) of the moral law would be contingent 
on accepting Kant’s ethics.
  Perhaps one thing that is going on here is captured in the sublime/
beautiful distinction. In part, this is a distinction based on the compo-
nent of aversive emotion in the experience. If there is a strong element 
of aversive emotion (e.g., fear and sorrow in tragic works), then we are 
disinclined to refer to the object as “beautiful” and to feel more inclined 
to use another term. But this may also point us toward another emotional 
component of aesthetic experience—what the Sanskrit writers referred 
to as wonder (Ingalls 16). It would seem that feelings of attachment and 
wonder or awe are partially mutually enhancing and partially mutually 
inhibitory. A fascination with the object figures in both, but awe may 
involve withdrawal tendencies, whereas attachment involves approach 
tendencies. Perhaps we would wish to say that the same general prin-
ciples apply to both sorts of aesthetic experience, but that the proportion 
or relative intensity of attachment and/or awe guide the degree to which 
the experience is one of beauty or sublimity.
  This still does not wholly explain the relation to morality. One issue 
is the degree to which our awe is for instances of following the moral 
law rather than for the moral law itself. For example, there is something 
sublime in a martyr who allows himself or herself to be killed in order 
to avoid violating a moral principle—as when Tom allows himself to be 
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tortured to death rather than betray two escaped slaves in Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin. Even Kant’s abstract tragedy of the moral law is aesthetically reso-
nant because it suggests particular cases of moral failure, including the 
reader’s own, cases that are presumably stored in his or her emotional 
memory. They are also bound up with the reader’s simulation of Kant’s 
own despair, when he writes, “Morals began with the noblest attribute of 
human nature, the development and cultivation of which promised infi-
nite uses, and it ended in—fanaticism or superstition” (Critique of Practi-
cal Reason 167).
FlA: Importantly, Patrick, you bring to the discussion the sense of degrees of 
presence of enhancement and inhibition in the encounter of the object. I 
would like to push a little more in the direction of aesthetic relations and 
subject-to-object relationality. In talking about aesthetic relations and 
responses, we might consider how this grows from a satisfaction—a plea-
sure—in accomplishment. It is very likely that this satisfaction became 
one of the central ingredients of what we later on established as an aes-
thetic relation with the objects that we build, construct, manufacture.
  The moment that we humans became conscious of the fact that we 
derive not only a practical but an emotional satisfaction out of improving 
skills and innovating in manufacturing products such as the arrowhead, 
it is likely that we began to look at the products of our work with a certain 
amount of pride, to enter into a relationship of contemplation with the 
work—even if only fleetingly. These products were no longer just utilitar-
ian. They were also experienced as satisfying, pleasurable—beautiful.
  There are many other ingredients, including the neurobiological 
reactions of pleasure and even revulsion to certain kinds of food, which 
are also involved in the development of an aesthetic sense or an aes-
thetic relation with objects (objects of nature or the objects that we as 
humans manufacture). There are many factors involved in the develop-
ment of what we call our aesthetic relationship with objects and with 
other humans. But there is nothing mysterious in the development of 
our aesthetic sense of things.
PcH: I of course agree that there is nothing mysterious in this—or, rather, 
that there is only something mysterious to the extent that we do not yet 
understand these matters. As to the origins of aesthetics, you are cer-
tainly right that pride has some place here. But pride presumably gives 
rise to the production of beautiful artifacts only because humans already 
had a predisposition to experience pleasure in pattern isolation. That 
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enjoyment of pattern isolation is presumably what generated the deco-
rative carvings initially. Or, rather, there could have been many sources 
for the initial production of what are in effect doodles. But as soon as the 
doodler began to take up a receptive attitude toward the doodles, he or 
she was likely to begin organizing them into patterns. A receptive atti-
tude is simply looking at what one has done (or said) and considering 
it as an object, accessible to other people.2 This receptive attitude does 
not create aesthetic feeling. However, it does allow aesthetic feeling to be 
provoked by encoding certain possible patterns. This is likely to lead the 
doodler back to the design, now with greater interest in developing pat-
terns. It is, of course, possible that these designs had practical or magical 
associations as well. But, for our purposes, the aesthetic element is cru-
cial (even if it was secondary or tertiary for the original artists).
  As a doodler’s skill grew, his or her work would likely have provoked 
positive responses from others in his or her group. This would, as you say, 
give rise to pride. That pride would give further impetus to the produc-
tion of patterns. The point applies equally to sound patterns in poetry 
or to narrative structure in storytelling. But I would say that the pride 
merely adds another motivation to precedent aesthetic impulses.
FlA: Perhaps it is a sense of accomplishment or pride that leads to the con-
templative instant—a moment that opens us to the aesthetic, artifactual 
emotion. Let me take a step back in the history of aesthetics, aesthetic 
theory, and its institutions to clarify. We can trace the origins of our 
awareness of what we call beauty or ugliness to the dawn of time—but 
it is not until about the seventeenth century in Europe that our aesthetic 
relationship with objects becomes a separate, independent autonomous 
field of action. This is when objects shed entirely all kinds of utilitarian 
or nonaesthetic features. Although we find this autonomy of aesthetics in 
an incipient way in ancient Greece and ancient Rome in sculpture, music 
(partially), drama, literature, the aesthetic domain, while it was recog-
nized, was not yet institutionalized as a separate domain. We see the add-
ing of an aesthetic element to Greek architecture and ceramics (plates 
and pots with drawings) that are effectively utilitarian objects.
  While instances of an art-for-art’s-sake sensibility and theory 
appeared sporadically in earlier periods, it was only in the eighteenth 
century that it was institutionalized. Art for art’s sake explodes in the 
 2. In On Interpretation, I treat aesthetical intent in relation to this idea; in Narrative Dis-
course, I consider narratological implications of the idea.
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eighteenth century. This is the moment when huge museums are built 
and when art not only becomes art for art’s sake but becomes more and 
more universal. Countries like England and France begin to pillage arti-
facts from all over the world to bring to these huge museums objects that 
no longer fulfill any kind of utilitarian function or role. They play only 
the role of aesthetic artifact. Their sole role is to be contemplated and, 
being contemplated, to produce a sensation, a feeling of beauty.
  In art for art’s sake, we see the confirmation, the reaffirming of the 
aesthetic relationship with objects. The affirmation of this aesthetic rela-
tion that began in the Paleolithic makes this an autonomous domain. 
This is why museums are institutions specifically built to isolate objects, 
to render them devoid of any kind of utilitarian purpose. This allows for 
the contemplation of the objects as sources of beauty.
  This history is perhaps our living proof of the fact that the aesthetic 
is essentially a relation—a relation between an object and a subject or of 
a subject to an object. Beauty is not contained in the object itself. It is 
not contained in the subject (human) itself. Beauty is contained only and 
exclusively in the relationship between object and the subject. A paint-
ing by Picasso tucked away in a vault not seen by anybody is not a work 
of art. It is not an aesthetic object. That object is only an aesthetic object 
when it is contemplated by humans. Or let us say you are standing in a 
museum and the lights go out. The paintings cease at that moment to be 
aesthetic objects.
  What about literature, I ask? Perhaps it is easier to see the aesthetic 
relationship as a subject-to-object relationship in painting, but we see 
this also in novels. For the author’s blueprints to be works of art, there 
has to be a co-construction (gap filling and the like)—an establishing of a 
subject-to-object aesthetic relationship.
PcH: I think we largely agree here, except that I would make a terminologi-
cal distinction. As indicated earlier, I would say that an aesthetic event 
occurs only when there is a subjective aesthetic experience of a beautiful 
(or sublime) object. So, I would say that a painting in a vault may still be 
a beautiful or sublime object, but it is not part of an aesthetic event. This 
may seem to be a distinction without a difference. However, I think it 
does have some consequences. For one thing, in the co-creative account 
you present, it is not clear that we can actually assign properties to the 
work of art. Of course, even in my account, these need to be encodable 
properties. In other words, they need to be properties that could enter 
into an aesthetic event by affecting aesthetic experience. Nonetheless, 
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there is, I believe, a difference between speaking of the patterning of col-
ors or themes and variations, on the one hand, and the experience of 
attachment memories, on the other. In addition, this account allows at 
least some sorts of aesthetic criteria. For instance, it is often the case that 
Westerners new to Hindustani classical music hear the music as chaotic. 
In a co-creative view, it is difficult to say that this is mistaken. But, in my 
view, hearing, say, Rajan and Sajan Mishra’s performance of Rāga Lalit as 
chaotic shows a lack of encoding skill.
  As to the issue of history, there is certainly a change of some sort with 
the development of museums. But I do not think it is primarily a change 
in the degree to which works of art are contemplated. Rather, it seems 
that works of art have been contemplated since the beginning of time (as 
you indicate). Moreover, I do not believe that works of art cease having 
other functions—prominently religious functions. The issue is the degree 
to which works of art came to be located in particular economic systems 
and particular ideological systems. I would not interpret the colonial 
theft of art in aesthetic terms but in terms of market developments and 
ideological developments. For example, the influx of non-European art 
allowed Hegel to emplot the history of art in a way that placed “oriental” 
works at the earliest or most primitive stage, followed and superseded 
by Greek work, then Christian work. I do not by any means agree fully 
with Said’s rather all-encompassing view of orientalism. However, on this 
topic, an analysis in terms of orientalism—modified by more standard 
ideological critique—seems to be on the right track.
History and art
FlA: I find it extremely productive to my own sharp, black-and-white con-
trastive thinking to engage with your degrees of complexity, Patrick. 
You also highlight the historical contexts in which this aesthetic history 
takes place. The violent colonial enterprise and its pilfering of objects 
the world over is just that. What I would like to further clarify is that our 
current understanding of an aesthetic relationship is only very recent 
and was only able to mature at a moment of human history when the 
artistic or aesthetic domain becomes itself an autonomous, independent 
domain: the moment when art shed all purpose other than the aesthetic 
finality. Only in this moment could we begin to talk about the general 
features, characteristics, of aesthetics.
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  It is not for nothing that it was in the eighteenth century that the 
philosopher Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten wrote the first book with 
Aesthetics (1750) in the title—and this before Kant’s Critique of Judge-
ment (1790). In the early nineteenth century Hegel lectured on aesthetics 
in Heidelberg (1818) and in Berlin (the 1820s). A figure like Baumgarten 
could write a book on aesthetics only at the moment when human activ-
ity had created a separate domain for objects and their relationships with 
humans—what I have been calling the aesthetic relation.
  We can understand, therefore, why there can be a separate study of 
music: we can study its formal architecture from a compositional point of 
view, we can study it as a biological phenomenon in terms of production 
and reception from the point of view of acoustics, and we can study it as a 
cultural phenomenon. The fields of ethnomusicology and sociomusicol-
ogy more generally enable us to study music in the context of such and 
such political situation and even to talk about the politics of music, if so 
inclined, and we can also talk about the history of music.
  We can bring many disciplines to bear on the study of music. But 
from the present angle of approach, what is important for us are the traits 
that music and the human relation to music have in common with, for 
instance, narrative fiction, cinema, and so on.
  What they all have in common: they are all objects that have a very 
specific, special relationship with humans. They are products of human 
activity; but products that are identified and acquire a signification, a 
meaning (a sense) only in what I have been calling an aesthetic relation.
  This is what I am identifying as a unified aesthetics, the idea that no 
matter how different the objects are, and no matter how different the 
specific conditions are in which they were manufactured, what they all 
have in common is that they stand in an aesthetic relation with humans. 
Humans and these objects have a specific relation that is different from all 
other relations, be they political, economic, juridical, or what have you.
  What they all have in common, too, is that they can only be judged, 
appreciated, and understood on their own terms as aesthetic objects; that 
is, evaluated and understood in terms of universal categories such as the 
beautiful and the ugly or the tragic and the comic (as you point out in 
your work) and, I would add, the grotesque.
PcH: You are certainly right that the systematic study of aesthetics was likely 
to arise at a certain period. But I am not inclined to see this as primar-
ily a function of developments regarding art. I am inclined to see it as a 
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matter of developments regarding systematic study. There is something 
like a systematic study of art that seems to begin in the period you are 
discussing. But this is continuous with the systematic study of many 
other realms of experience. It is unsurprising that this would carry over 
to art. Moreover, the systematic study of, for example, literary art is not 
unique to the modern West. We find it, for example, over an extended 
period in the Sanskrit tradition.
  As to functionality, many people do speak of a dissociation of art 
from function in early modern Europe. There is some element of truth 
in this—but it is, I believe, an overstatement. First, art in the past was not 
simply bound to functionality. It is true that the production of plastic 
art was often commissioned in functional contexts (e.g., for temples). 
But it seems clear that it was often dissociated from those contexts in 
experience. Certainly literature quickly sloughed off any ritual function. 
On the other side, it is not entirely clear that the functionality of art has 
been abandoned in the modern period. It is true that works of art are 
less likely to be commissioned by churches. However, at least in liter-
ary study, we highly value the political functionality of works. Indeed, it 
seems that our professional imperatives bear much more fully on such 
functionality than on aesthetic autonomy.
FlA: I see your point, Patrick. What I’m trying to formulate is a unified vision 
of aesthetics that seeks to understand the relationship between subjects 
(humans) and the objects we manufacture. Here the objects are not to be 
understood as instances or exempla (they are not in any way documents) 
to be judged and interpreted in nonaesthetic terms (politics, economics, 
or whatever) but are rather to be judged on their own aesthetic terms first 
and foremost.
PcH: Well, works can have many different purposes and many different values. 
One work may have political implications that counterbalance perni-
cious tendencies in a given society—for example, a work might effec-
tively oppose the detention policies of the U.S. “War on Terror.” Even if 
we found the work to be aesthetically lacking, I think both of us would 
find this valuable. Of course, in evaluating a work’s politics, we are not 
evaluating it as an aesthetic object. That is important, since it does some-
times seem that our colleagues think good politics equals good aesthet-
ics, which is as silly as thinking that good blood sugar levels equal good 
cholesterol levels. Indeed, this seems to me to suggest the degree to which 
we have not left behind the functional conception of art. Even profes-
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sional literary critics seem often to feel that the main function of a work 
is in its contribution to some sort of worship.
FlA: This impulse to worship—to present hagiographies—certainly gets in the 
way of the work required for real criticism that sheds light on what works 
and what doesn’t work according to reasoned analysis. I think it worth 
repeating my position: the aesthetic is a relation. It is not a property of 
an object, nor a property of the subject. It is the encounter between the 
object and the subject, giving rise to the particular reaction we call aes-
thetic. This aesthetic response involves a state of intense attraction we 
call beauty or a state of intense rejection we call ugliness. This means that 
beauty and ugliness are not in the objects themselves. They are in the 
relation between object and subject.
  If there is an aesthetic module in the mind/brain, such a mod-
ule would necessarily have to interface with the sensory motor system 
(mentioned in chapter 2) because this object/subject aesthetic interface 
requires the use of the senses—necessarily. There is only an aesthetic act 
or reaction in the face of an object—an object that has to be perceived 
by the senses to be evaluated. When the lights go off at the gallery, the 
relationship between me and the painting ceases to exist. My senses fail 
to perceive as such, and therefore there is no aesthetic. With language we 
have an optional interface with the sensory motor system: sometimes it 
interfaces, most of the time it does not. It is an option.
PcH: Maybe it is not worth quibbling over, but I am not sure I agree about 
sense being a necessary condition, even for an aesthetic event (in my ter-
minology). I believe mere numerical ideas can be beautiful. On the other 
hand, I also believe that ideas always recruit images and I believe that 
emotional response is image-bound.3 Given the close interrelations of 
number and space (see Dehaene), one might reasonably expect that the 
images associated with number would have an important spatial aspect. 
Thus it may be the case that an aesthetic event is impossible without 
some involvement of sensory cortex.
FlA: As you point out, the aesthetic relation (what you call the aesthetic event) 
requires the involvement of all the senses. That said, there are ways of 
using the senses without using them. If the relation with the object ceases—
for one reason or another (lights going out while in a picture gallery)— 
 3. I discuss this in chapter 2 of What Literature Teaches Us About Emotion.
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the senses cease operating and the aesthetic relation disappears. But there 
are other ways in which the senses can stop functioning within an aes-
thetic relation. Instead of being aesthetic objects, they may fall into the 
general category of simple objects—objects as such. For instance, I have 
a painting by Modigliani on my wall. It has been there for years. I no 
longer stop to contemplate the painting. I am no longer absorbed by the 
painting. We have already discussed this as the phenomenon of habitua-
tion. This, too, can potentially destroy the aesthetic relation. The painting 
on my wall becomes an object just like the chair or floor or baseboards 
in my house.
  The way out of this habituation trap is what the Russian formal-
ists (Shklovsky in particular) identified as the device or mechanism of 
enstrangement. It is through this mechanism—a device that reorients our 
sense of an object, that we make it new, that we “make a stone feel stony” 
(6)—that the picture hanging on the wall becomes new; you talk of this 
in terms of interest. The picture hasn’t changed in content/substance, but 
my relation to it is renewed by this mechanism of enstrangement. This 
could be accomplished simply by moving the painting to another wall 
where I can spend time with it and contemplate it. Similarly, enstrange-
ment is at work in Marcel Duchamp’s readymades—his urinal housed in 
the museum, for instance.
  Enstrangement can also be the result of creating something new—a dif-
ferent sort or kind of object that will in its turn create a new kind of rela-
tionship with the subject, a new aesthetic relation with the subject. The 
modernist expression comes readily to mind: “Make it new.” Ceaseless 
search for the new (writing, music, painting, etc.) is precisely propelled 
by this aspiration of all artists to establish an aesthetic relationship with 
their audience, readers, listeners, and so on. As you state, we derive plea-
sure (reward) from this. Artists want to establish an aesthetic relation-
ship, and in this ambition to create aesthetic objects and relations, they 
are constantly fighting against habituation.
  García Márquez makes it new in One Hundred Years of Solitude 
(1967), and then the innovative device of magical realism becomes a 
mechanical application—a new form of habituation. The innovation that 
surprised and gave great satisfaction and pleasure to readers—that gave 
beauty—turned into a cookie cutter, a new form of habituation, from 
which boredom and the destruction of any aesthetic relation ensue. 
When I read Isabel Allende, I no longer feel like I am contemplating 
beauty. On the contrary, I feel bored. Roberto Bolaño puts it well: “Asked 
to choose between the frying pan and the fire, I choose Isabel Allende. 
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The glamour of her life as a South American in California, her imitations 
of García Márquez, her unquestionable courage, the way her writing 
ranges from the kitsch to the pathetic and reveals her as a kind of Latin 
American and politically correct version of the author of The Valley of the 
Dolls. [. . .] It won’t live long, like many sick people, but for now it is alive. 
And there is always the possibility of a miracle. Who knows?” (110).
PcH: I understand what you are getting at here. Of course, I too have had the 
sorts of experiences you describe. I have three comments. First, I want 
to go back to a fairly simple but revealing model of emotion. According 
to this model, we have spontaneous emotional impulses that are largely 
subcortical. They may be triggered by external or internal events—per-
ceptions, memories, and simulations. But we also have cortical moni-
toring and modulation of emotional impulses. Further, the monitoring 
affects the subcortical states through imaginative elaborations that pro-
voke emotional responses, through recruitment of emotional memories, 
and so on.
  Presumably, the same points apply to aesthetic response as to other 
sorts of emotion. If so, we would expect some part of our emotional 
response to be a function of prototype approximation, patterning, 
attachment, and so on. But we would also expect part of our emotional 
response to be governed by “judgment,” to use the Kantian term (rather 
loosely), and thus by modulatory, cortical processes. (For a more faithful 
integration of Kantian aesthetics and neuroscience, see Linda Palmer.)
  In this context, we might think a little more about the issue you raise 
regarding García Márquez and Allende. I do not want to take a stand on 
these particular writers. Rather, I wish to consider the general problem 
that you see as occurring in this case. Anyone who has spent time read-
ing a wide range of literary works has almost certainly had the experience 
of enjoying a novel that used a particular technique (say magical real-
ism), only to be disappointed in turning to a second novel using the same 
technique. However, I doubt that this is usually a case of habituation. In 
fact, it is often the precise opposite of habituation.
  The sort of response you are describing frequently occurs in cases in 
which the technique is rarely used. In other words, it frequently occurs 
when the technique is obtrusive and attracts our self-conscious atten-
tion. In those cases, we may or may not begin to experience spontaneous 
aesthetic enjoyment. However, if we do, there is a good chance that we 
will modulate our initial response by a judgment about the originality 
of the work—or, more precisely, a judgment of the degree to which the 
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work is derivative. Suppose that the difference in your response to Gar-
cía Márquez and to Allende is a matter of habituation. One result of this 
should be that you cannot reread Márquez, since the habituation should 
presumably inhibit your appreciation of his work a second time. Indeed, 
it should inhibit that appreciation more than it inhibits the apprecia-
tion of Allende. On the other hand, if your response is a matter of judg-
ment, then the negative judgment need not apply to Márquez but only to 
Allende—particularly if it is a judgment of derivativeness.
  An interesting result of this, which I discuss in Joyce, Milton, and 
the Theory of Influence, is that we are likely to become more accepting 
of a later work if many other people begin using the same technique. In 
other words, some literary technique may be pioneered by a particular 
writer. Suppose that writer has a single imitator, who takes up the tech-
nique. In that case, we are likely to judge the single imitator as derivative. 
But if the technique gives rise to an entire literary school or movement, 
then our criteria are likely to change. We may allow that there are several 
writers in the school who have merit. In a sense, we are able to respond 
spontaneously to individual authors using a technique once we have 
become habituated to the technique. Our inclination to modulate these 
responses diminishes with the decreased obtrusiveness of the technique.
  On the other hand, even this is complicated. Specifically, you men-
tion that, in your view, Allende is “mechanical.” We do sometimes have 
the sense that an author is not “creating” but is simply following a for-
mula. It is difficult to say precisely what constitutes this “mechanical” 
quality, though I think most dedicated readers have a sense of what it 
might be. Here are two possible components. The first is a relative pau-
city of simulation. Suppose the author is routinely following inferential 
principles in, say, understanding the minds of characters. We would 
expect this to produce characters who do not feel complex but rather 
appear “two dimensional.” This is because the nuances of human atti-
tudes and behavior are captured well in simulations. However, they are 
largely missing from general inferential principles. This is one reason 
why the portrayal of racial or other out-groups (e.g., blacks portrayed by 
a white author) are often unconvincing. Our tendency to think of out-
groups as relatively uniform (Duckitt 81) is related to inhibited simula-
tion and a greater inclination to infer mental states from generalizations. 
Parallel with this, when an author takes up a fashionable technique, it 
could very easily be that he or she ends up merely following the “rules” of 
the technique (e.g., magical realism) rather than successfully simulating 
the storyworld.
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  The idea of an author taking up a fashionable technique is related 
to the second likely fault here. That is, roughly, insincerity. If an author 
responds with sincere aesthetic enthusiasm to a new technique, that sug-
gests that he or she has simulated a precursor’s storyworlds and narra-
tions in ways that are deeply congruent with his or her own engagements. 
This provides a partial basis for subsequent simulations. It also means 
that the new author should be able to judge the success of his or her own 
work. It will be successful if, on rereading, it provokes the same sort of 
aesthetic feeling as the original work. For example, if Allende responds 
with genuine appreciation to García Márquez, then that experience pro-
vides a sort of touchstone for her own self-evaluation. In contrast, sup-
pose an author takes up a technique primarily because it has recently 
been successful in the book market, and thus is in demand by publish-
ers. This author probably does not have the sorts of internal processes 
that would allow him or her to simulate a new storyworld in accordance 
with that technique. Thus he or she will be more or less forced to self-
consciously craft some approximation to the technique. Moreover, this 
author will not be able to judge his or her own work intuitively, having no 
basis for comparison in a strong aesthetic response to the precursor.
FlA: Your thinking in complex conceptual overlaps and degrees raises impor-
tant points that take into account factors such as marketplace and tech-
nique, Patrick. I will keep these in mind (albeit bracketed) as I continue 
to formulate a unified aesthetics. I should point out that there are several 
categories of objects with which we establish an aesthetic relation. We 
have, for instance, nature and the way we sensorially experience nature. 
I can walk outside my house and effect an aesthetic relation with the 
trees, birds, light, and so forth. I can also go outside my house and not be 
moved by any of this. There is also the phenomenon of habituation.
  One of the strongest aesthetic relations we can have with nature is 
what the romantics called the sublime and to which you referred ear-
lier: the deep admiration and awe and pleasure that the contemplation of 
nature can cause. The romantic would mention the sight of Mont Blanc, 
and there is the famous Wanderer above the Sea of Fog (1818) of Caspar 
David Friedrich. Even if the concept of the sublime were only used in 
the context of nature, in a unified aesthetics there is and there can be an 
aesthetic effect of that which is not created by man in the contempla-
tion of something that is not man-made. We have an aesthetic relation-
ship with all sorts of manufactured objects, such as arrowheads, which 
I already mentioned, and also the cave paintings in Altamira, Spain, or 
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Lascaux, France—all these can be the object of an aesthetic relation that 
goes beyond or that is parallel to the utility relation we have with them.
  Then we have mass-produced industrial objects. In Italy we have com-
panies like Alessi, which designs very aesthetically appealing espresso 
makers and teapots, Vespa, which makes appealing scooters, and, of 
course, Ferrari, which creates more out-of-budget aesthetic objects. In 
the United States, we have Apple computers—beautiful to the sight and 
delightful to the touch and intuitively utilitarian. They all serve utilitarian 
needs, but at the same time, they could be and are the object of aesthetic 
contemplation. They produce a sense of beauty, joy, wonder in us—espe-
cially, for me at least, the Ferrari 612 Scaglietti.
  So we have two domains of objects: natural and man-made. There is, 
however, as I mentioned earlier, an additional domain that emerged in 
our earlier epochs, a domain of art-for-art’s-sake objects, objects intended 
to be used specifically and exclusively for aesthetic contemplation. This 
art is not meant to serve any other purpose than to establish an aesthetic 
relation. It is only during this explosion that art becomes planetary art—
there is no world literature, world music, and so on, before this time.
PcH: I think we may simply have to agree to disagree on the historical issue. Of 
course, there are changes in the degree to which different tendencies are 
prominent at different times. But I simply do not see Elizabethan drama 
(or eighteenth-century drama, or contemporary cinema) as more a pure 
aesthetics than, say, Sanskrit drama.
WHere is Beauty?
FlA: Fair enough, Patrick. Perhaps we can turn our discussion to a consid-
eration of two concepts used to describe an aesthetic relationality: the 
content and the application of beauty and ugliness. These two concepts 
are linked to other typological or classificatory concepts that apply most 
clearly in literature but also, even if in a less clear way, in the visual arts 
and other arts. The classificatory concepts linked to the concepts of 
beauty and ugliness are essentially genres: comedy, tragedy, and the gro-
tesque, and any number of combinations thereof.
  Contemplating Théodore Géricault’s Raft of the Medusa (1818–19) 
evokes a deep sense of tragedy—empathy for those on the raft and their 
ordeal—and at the same time the sense of the sublime, called up by the 
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all-powerful action of the sea. This sublime of nature can sometimes be 
felt in its representation. Of course, the painting essentially depicts a 
tragedy—and that’s the aesthetic feeling we get, the feeling of tragedy.
  When a figure like Hieronymus Bosch comes along and paints the 
Garden of Earthly Delight in the late fifteenth to early sixteenth century, 
he makes the aesthetic relation with the object so new that it takes centu-
ries for surrealists like Salvador Dalí, Leonora Carrington, and Remedios 
Varo to be able follow suit with the application of the grotesque in their 
paintings.
  These typological concepts that are important in aesthetics and aes-
thetic studies appear in a weaker way in the other art forms as well. We 
find the grotesque very clearly in the foundational and scandalous (in the 
day) Animal House (1978) as well as in Robert Rodriguez’s film mashups 
and Alan Ball’s HBO show True Blood (2010–)—all of which attempt to 
break the unaesthetic relation of habituation with the object by turning 
this object into something new and full of life.
PcH: As you know, I take a different view here. I use “comedy” in a fairly ordi-
nary way to refer to narratives in which the hero achieves his or her goal 
in the end. Conversely, I use “tragedy” to refer to narratives in which the 
hero’s goal achievement is rendered impossible. The goals themselves are 
defined by emotion systems. Thus the goals can differ by emotion system. 
For instance, the goal may be romantic union or social authority. More-
over, our empathic emotional engagement with the hero seeking this goal 
is a different sort of emotional engagement than what we experience with 
beauty.
FlA: Indeed, your work on emotions and the expression of prototype narra-
tives (the heroic, romantic, and sacrificial variants of tragicomedy) offers 
a serious and foundational research program. Nonetheless, I think it 
worth pursuing here a formulation of the concept of the grotesque.
  The grotesque certainly allows for all kinds of exaggeration and for 
the carnivalesque (carnivalism) generally. The grotesque allows for the 
breach of all kinds of social rules and norms and values, such as in a 
Rodriguez film like Machete (2010) or Planet Terror (2007), within an 
aesthetic relation in which beauty is found in the transgression of norms 
and in the rehabituation of our perception of the object. Thanks to this, 
we have arts in many fields that dynamite the social consensus concern-
ing, for instance, morals.
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PcH: Certainly the grotesque can be combined with tragedy and comedy, as 
can mirth or jealousy or anything else. The issue is how to understand the 
grotesque in terms of neurologically grounded emotion systems.
FlA: Yes, let me see if I can work to this—or rather, through this. Each and 
every work of literature, film, comic book, and so on, is a construct (your 
simulation). To review several points: The building blocks of these con-
structs are the bits and pieces taken from the real world and organized 
and given shape with aesthetic intentions on the basis of the story and 
discourse. (See chapter 3.) In narrative fiction, the end result or product 
is a blueprint that requires the active contribution of the reader for it to 
become a fully existing work of art.
  In all aesthetic relations, we have 1) a subject—the individual who 
creates the work of art; 2) the work of art itself that we can call the blue-
print; and 3) the agent who completes the blueprint. An aesthetic goal 
is always in view in the mind of author and reader, and because of this, 
evaluation is always taking place.
  All aesthetic relations necessitate an evaluation that establishes hier-
archies of value, whether the object is a toilet in a museum or a novel by 
García Márquez. When reading a novel, while we fill in gaps in the blue-
print, we are also constantly making value judgments. This can occur at 
the high level of analysis you bring to bear on authors such as Allende 
mentioned earlier.
  An evaluation of the aesthetic relation does not happen out of time 
and place. When Joyce published Dubliners (1914) or Portrait of the Art-
ist as a Young Man (1916) they were negatively reviewed and little read. 
Years later he found his readership—and this largely because of the con-
troversy surrounding the censoring of Ulysses in the United States and 
Britain that stirred many a reader’s curiosity. The same could be said of 
Nabokov. He was obscure even though he had written a lot; aficionados 
and some academics knew his work, but he did not become a house-
hold name till the scandal of Lolita (1955)—another book banned in 
the United States. (I’m offering a pattern, but your formulation, Patrick, 
could work just as well.)
  We are talking about an aesthetic relation. It is not that Lolita pos-
sesses these virtues of beauty or any other virtues in and of itself. Those 
virtues only appear and only exist in the reading of Lolita—in the filling 
in the gaps of the blueprint and in the global relation between reader and 
work of art produced by the artist. The first generation of readers of Lol-
ita and Ulysses did not ascribe to them aesthetic values such as beauty or 
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well-made artifact or job well done, but the next generation did. Stendhal 
famously said something like “I am not writing for my contemporary 
human beings. I am writing for the future generations.” Those today will 
not appreciate the work of art as those tomorrow.
  There can be the phenomenon of habituation that we already dis-
cussed. A reader of detective novels may know the genre so well that 
he or she stops being surprised. They no longer find novelty in the use 
of different devices. Therefore, the reader’s relationship with this kind 
of literature is no longer an aesthetic relation—a relation that may have 
existed before he or she accumulated a total understanding of this genre’s 
generative devices. Yet this hasn’t changed the object. What has changed 
is the reader’s relationship to those kinds of novels; what has changed is 
the reader’s aesthetic relation. And then there can be the phenomenon 
of blindness: the reader simply rejects the novel or poem or short story 
because it does not correspond to his or her expectations. In other cases, 
it might be that the reader does not have adequate knowledge of the liter-
ary devices used in the telling of a story and thus may reject the novel.
  Evaluation is necessarily integral to the aesthetic relation, because the 
aesthetic experience is all about contemplation, shape, and meaning. The 
work of art is contemplated and experienced as an aesthetic object on 
account of its shape and of its meaning, the shape and the meaning con-
ferred on it by the artist and perceived and contemplated by the viewer, 
listener, or reader, who is engaged in the act of contemplation by perceiv-
ing and appreciating shape and in their turn ascribing meaning to the 
object and its shape.
PcH: Interesting ideas. As you know, I do not view the work of art as a blue-
print. It is true that no one will experience emotion in response to a work 
without his or her own mental activation of, for example, emotional 
memories. However, I would be loath to call those emotional memories 
part of the work. In architectural terms, the literary work is not the blue-
print but the building. The building would be meaningless if no one ever 
used it. But I would hardly say that the building is just the blueprint for 
the building and the real building is what people do in it—or however 
this metaphor would work out.
  As to the history of reception, many issues enter here. These range 
from professional jealousy to degree of interpretive and simulative 
effort to cognitive accessibility. Professional jealousy is the sort of thing 
you refer to with Woolf, which is possible (I do not know much about 
Woolf ’s personal attitudes). Lack of cognitive accessibility is the excessive 
144  •  c H A P t e r  4
distance referred to by Jauss. For example, when interior monologue was 
introduced, readers did not have the processing techniques readily avail-
able to them that would facilitate understanding. By “degree of inter-
pretive and simulative effort,” I am referring to the fact that any complex 
piece of writing requires work. If we know nothing about the author, we 
are unlikely to want to invest much time in effortful interpretation and 
simulation. This is in part for the simple reason that we do not feel con-
fident that the work will result in an adequate reward. Once the work is 
established, however, we are more likely to risk the effort. Indeed, in that 
case, the precise opposite may occur. We may overvalue the work, decid-
ing that it was worth the effort, despite rather feeble results. The point 
applies not only to fiction but to literary theory.
FlA: Perhaps it is this lack of a work ethic, say, in reading something like 
Ulysses that prevents (blinds?) them from entering into an aesthetic rela-
tion with it? No matter how much I explain the aesthetic pleasure of 
Ulysses, my students just do not get it. They do not get why I am giggling 
when Bloom is in the outhouse, farting and pooping while contemplating 
life; they do not see the aesthetic virtuosity of the moment.
  I wonder, too, if the rejection of the aesthetic relation occurs most 
frequently with respect to works we classify under the grotesque, its main 
ingredients being the carnivalesque, an irreverent attitude, and the use 
of the ugly and the repulsive. Comedy and tragedy do not deliberately 
use the ugly and the repulsive as the aesthetic means to attain beauty in 
a strong aesthetic relationship with readers, but in the genre of the gro-
tesque, this is very common. This partly explains my attraction to Tex 
Avery cartoons and comic-book films such as those of Robert Rodriguez.
PcH: The scene in the outhouse does indeed have its own form of catharsis.
FlA: Now, perhaps, I can take a stab at your earlier injunction: to consider 
where the neurobiological fits into all this. Suzanne Nalbantian speaks of 
authors/artists as living people with mind/brains; she does not ascribe a 
neurobiology to a character in a novel or in a painting. She keeps these 
levels very distinct. She writes, “The integrative process of art is charac-
terized by ‘parsimony’—or the distillation of complex distributions of 
data to simple aesthetic patterns. The higher-level synthesis, involving 
mental selectionism, links reason and pleasure or sensation in the opera-
tions of the brain” (357). This describes well what happens when I have 
my own particular experience that belongs only to me in a specific time 
and place and how this experience can only be communicated to you 
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when the experiences are brought to a level of a gestalt. Moreover, what I 
communicate is not the “complex distributions of data” but is a reprocess-
ing of my experience. I distill and bring to the foreground the essential 
aspects of the experience. When I share with you my sense of a Rob-
ert Rodriguez film or a novel by Faulkner, I do not try to reproduce my 
idiosyncratic experience of every second of the movie or of the novel. I 
reproduce a distillation of the plot and of the aesthetic goals and means 
behind the creation of the work and its recreation in my mind.
  To put it otherwise, to make the aesthetic experience manageable and 
to go beyond idiosyncratic experience, we have to use the mental facul-
ties that allow us to transform this idiosyncratic experience into a series 
of aesthetic patterns or gestalts. To do this, I might use concepts such as 
the aesthetic concept of the tragic, comic, or, in the case of Rodriguez, 
the grotesque, for instance. Such a concept gives me a tool to analyze the 
relation I have with the film, novel, comic book, and so on.
PcH: It seems we diverge in our aesthetic judgments in some of these cases. 
As you know, when I speak of “universality,” I am not positing a univer-
sality of response. I am referring only to a universality of structure and 
processing.
FlA: Beauty is not in the eye of the beholder (subjectivist and idealist). And 
beauty is not inherent in the object (materialist). Beauty is in the relation 
between subject and object.
PcH: Again, this is primarily a matter of how one is using such terms as 
“beauty.”
FlA: Together with common everyday human thought and action, deep arche-
ological and other evidence indicates the presence of dualism as an ordi-
nary, normal approach to the world as a whole. The cave paintings in 
Altamira and Lascaux and anthropological understanding of customs 
such as the burial of the dead, for instance, corroborate the presence of 
dualistic thought long into our past.
  We can say that since the dawn of time, Homo sapiens has interpreted 
the world in dualistic terms. This approach and worldview became sys-
tematic through magic, religion, and philosophy—and of course, such a 
predominant worldview has to a certain extent permeated science.
  It is not unlikely that dualism has a basis in certain material functions 
of the mind/brain. For instance, the moment we are capable of under-
standing the functioning and application of the principle of causality 
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in the natural world, we are also probably able to apply the principle of 
counterfactual thinking. (We have talked at length about this already in 
chapter 1.) Thus, in seeing life end, we can also imagine life continu-
ing beyond life’s natural state. That is, I can conceive of life continuing 
beyond nature. This is no doubt the basis of dualism: in magic or magi-
cal thought, in theology, and very influentially in philosophy beginning 
with Plato.
  Essentially, the different theories that were developed from Aristotle 
on concerning the mind and its workings were essentially dualistic theo-
ries of mind. Only since the Renaissance and then the Enlightenment 
has dualism been seriously challenged. In the Renaissance this challenge 
ran parallel to the development of science (physics and biology), and in 
the Enlightenment it ran parallel in the struggle against religion and the 
ambition to apply the scientific method to all domains of life.
  Since the Renaissance, the forms of dualism most strongly depen-
dent on magic, theology, and anti-scientific outlooks of philosophy have 
lost ground. Just as we can say that in the last twenty-five years we have 
learned more about the functioning of the brain than we knew in all our 
prior history, we can also say that in this same period, science in general 
has achieved important victories over dualism and dualistic approaches 
to nature, including humans and their socio-neurobiological nature.
  This does not mean at all that dualism has been entirely surmounted. 
Not at all. The so-called mind/body problem, as it is more commonly 
known, is still discussed, examined, and tested in many serious ways 
without as yet achieving definitively satisfactory conclusions.
  The unitary approach to aesthetics that I propose here and my ambi-
tion to draw boundaries around a unified aesthetics is of course an aim 
and a methodology that inscribe themselves entirely within this unitary 
view of nature as a whole. I am not going to be a dualist in biology and a 
unitarian, say, in aesthetics.
PcH: You know my views on dualism. Put simply, the self is the (subjective) 
condition for all discourse about causality. As such, it cannot be part of 
that material causality. In quantum mechanical terms, it is always and 
necessarily outside the system being explained.
FlA: Let me offer a final—but not last by any means—word on aesthetics. 
From the unitary point of view, it is useful to refer to some scientific find-
ings in the field of neurobiology that concern the so-called plastic arts, 
music, and narrative fiction in its very diverse media and guises.
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  This research that connects aesthetics and the socio-neurobiological 
sciences is quite incipient. The findings are quite tentative. Still, there are 
a certain number of observations, hypotheses, and theories that have a 
more and more solid grounding.
  In philosophy, aesthetic theories—partial, limited formulations of 
which we find in Plato and Aristotle—are essentially dualistic, notwith-
standing Aristotle’s naturalistic realism. According to Plato, all aesthetic 
objects as well as all aesthetic concepts find their true reality or their tru-
est nature not in this world but in the world identified as the topos ura-
nus, where all that pertains to this world has its ideal counterpart. Of 
course, Aristotle was a materialist and did not go the idealistic route. 
Yet, he saw all artistic creation as an imitation—as a mimesis of the real 
world. Like its many other variants through history, this view posits that 
we have reflectors or mirrors that simulate the real world, so the world 
is in effect split in two. It is more naturalistic in explanation than Plato’s 
theory, but it is still dualistic.
  In a unified aesthetics, from the point of view of the aesthetic rela-
tion in which the aesthetic is not in the object nor in the subject but in 
the relation between the two, I identify the steps we follow in any creative 
activity. Beauty is not in the object, it is in the relation between the sub-
ject and object. Our distant ancestor who chips away at the rock to make 
an arrowhead experiences satisfaction in the making and improving of 
the arrowhead. This same ancestor contemplates the object and considers 
its beauty. In an act of contemplation, this ancestor would consider how 
well the arrowhead was made. In so doing, this ancestor modifies his or 
her relationship to the arrowhead because he or she considers it, even if 
for a moment, as an aesthetic object.
  With a poem, short story, novel, sculpture, or whatever, we do not 
create an imitation of reality but bring a new reality to the world. We 
bring to the world a new approach, a new relation to the new object made 
in the world. An object made to kill becomes an object of contemplation, 
even if fleetingly. As society develops, some become more and more spe-
cialized in the act of contemplation, in making objects with an aesthetic 
intention and contemplation at a distance.
  I already mentioned Shklovsky’s formulation of enstrangement—his 
making of “a stone feel stony” (6)—but let us not forget Bertolt Brecht’s 
small treatise on what he called his “epic theater.” The analysis he makes 
of this is precisely a discussion of the distance between the object and the 
subject required to establish an aesthetic relation: if the relation is too 
proximate or too close, then no aesthetic relation is established. I just 
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watched Rodriguez’s Spy Kids 3 (2003), a film in which he tries to make 
cinema work like video games and to force it into the aesthetic of video 
games. He thereby establishes a small distance (and at times no dis-
tance) between the one medium and the other and so ends up destroying 
the aesthetic relation. As an aesthetic object, the film is deeply flawed. I 
often visit the Wexner museum here at The Ohio State University. Occa-
sionally, I wonder what has happened to the paintings. They hang on 
the white walls, but the walls are so big they dwarf—even nearly make 
disappear—the art. This is why museography has become a key field in 
the adequate presentation of aesthetic objects. A bad museographer can 
doom a work of art—even an artist and his or her career.
PAtrick colm HogAn: I thought we might begin our final conversation with 
the issue of interpretation. In literary study, the idea of interpretation 
seems to have gotten rather badly convoluted in recent decades. It some-
times seems that the purpose of literary interpretation is to use whatever 
rhetorical technique will persuade a reader that a text should be read in 
what initially seems an entirely implausible way. I am exaggerating some, 
I know, but only some. There are presumably economic reasons for this. 
A new reading is, in effect, a “revolutionary new product” that obsolesces 
whatever brand you formerly had in your home.
Frederick luis AldAmA: I must forcefully state that I wholly agree with you 
here. In fact, among scholars in our field there is so much confusion that 
often the object itself of interpretation is not clearly identified. Often, 
too, we do not even know what the interpretive activity is addressing. We 
come across notions such as “discourse” (in the Foucauldian or the Chat-
manian sense?) or “text” (in the Derridean or the Jakobsonian sense?) 
and a whole multitude of other ideas that are supposed to be concepts 
used in enriching our understanding of the object of the interpretation. 
Most scholars working in the field of literature complicate enormously 
what they are doing and what interpretation means because they do not 
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clearly identify the field the instrument of interpretation is applied to. To 
make any progress in interpretative work, a lot of branches need to be cut 
and discarded.
on interPretation
PcH: Related to this is a strange belief that seems very common in literary dis-
cussions. This is the view that saying interpretations are equally valid is 
somehow “democratic.” I take it that a system is democratic if it allows 
everyone to voice and make a case for their views. A system is not made 
democratic by claiming that all views are right.
FlA: Unfortunately, Patrick, scholars and even universities as a whole are 
sometimes more interested in making money than in doing empirical 
research and seeking knowledge. This is the basis for the academic star 
system and the investing of seeming importance in what amounts to 
passing fads.
  It is the star system that often allows for this lack of responsibility 
toward the making of actual knowledge. It is this system that fosters the 
growing of the anything-goes approach with respect to interpretation. 
This has given the humanities—and in particular, the study of litera-
ture—a bad reputation in the eyes of colleagues in other departments. 
There is much hard work required in generative research programs in the 
sciences and humanities—those that may lead to a unified knowledge—
about us, the things we make, and the world we inhabit.
  Since scholars of literature have been given a free pass with this any-
thing-goes approach, those outside of the academy feel as if they too can 
give as adequate an interpretation as those who study literature profes-
sionally. This is possible because the term “interpretation” is used in an 
extremely vague way. Since all aesthetic acts and relations and experi-
ence are also experiences in which shape and meaning are present as 
necessary ingredients, then meaning always implies interpretation. We 
have to understand what a phrase means to appreciate its difference from 
another phrase. Since this is implicit in all our activities—not just in aes-
thetic production and reception—that means there are grounds for the 
idea that anybody out there can do literary interpretation and for dis-
missing those who get paid to do this.
  When the professional study of literature becomes more like the 
interpretation that happens while reading on the beach (for different 
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reasons, including foremost that one no longer cares about rigorous 
empirical research and knowledge seeking), then the line between pro-
fessional study and idiosyncratic reading blurs. This said, I remind myself 
of a moment earlier in our conversation when I mention that all are wel-
come to derive their pleasure from wherever they would like in their 
approach, method, and interest.
PcH: We’ll return to democracy and equality below. For the moment, we might 
consider the usual goals and conditions of interpretation in ordinary life. 
When you say something to me, I need to understand it. Understand-
ing your utterance means comprehending two things—its meaning and 
its purpose. So, suppose I ask when you will be able to read through our 
first version of this dialogue and you say, “Unfortunately, the book on 
Rodriguez is due at the end of this month.” In order to understand this 
utterance, I need to know, for example, what the book on Rodriguez is. 
Among other things, I have to know that you are writing a book on a par-
ticular filmmaker. It would obviously be different if you had borrowed a 
book on the filmmaker and simply had to return it to the library before 
the end of the month. I also need to understand why you are telling me 
this—presumably, it is to communicate that there will be a delay of a few 
weeks before you can get to this manuscript. These components of under-
standing (meanings and purposes) constitute the goals of interpretation.
  On the other hand, we do not engage in explicit articulation of all 
meanings and all purposes. For example, if the preceding were a real case, 
I would probably not engage in explicit interpretation at all. Your mean-
ing and purpose would not require this sort of explication. However, sup-
pose you send the manuscript to me and ask when I’ll be able to get to 
it and I respond, “Unfortunately, the Iron Man Marathon is at the end of 
the month.” You probably will not process this automatically. This may 
give rise to a quandary that leads to explicit interpretation. First, perhaps 
you are not familiar with Iron Man competitions. Second, at least for a 
moment, you may wonder if I am actually in training for such a com-
petition. Of course, the moment my frail, waifish figure appears before 
your mind’s eye, you will realize that I cannot possibly be preparing for 
anything so physically robust that it would contain the phrase “Iron Man” 
in it. But then the question may arise as to just what my purpose is in 
saying this. Am I indirectly chastising you for taking a few weeks with 
the manuscript? That seems uncharacteristically mean for such a charac-
teristically nice fellow. Perhaps I am making some sort of disappointing 
attempt at humor?
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FlA: As you so nicely lay out, the two components of understanding are mean-
ing and purpose. I would add to this binary a third component. Under-
standing also has shape as a component. (I mention this in our chapter 
on aesthetics.) As your example shows, the end could be me or you say-
ing, “I am just joking.” To perceive the humor, the sentence or series 
of sentences—the utterance—has to have a humorous shape. It has to 
have a material, discernible, specific shape that distinguishes the humor-
ous from the serious purpose or intention. What makes some explain-
ing relevant and even necessary? If you tell me “There is an Iron Man 
Marathon this week,” eventually I will understand the meaning and the 
purpose of this utterance if its relevance is made clear. The utterance by 
itself is not enough for me to understand its meaning and purpose. I do 
not know what an Iron Man Marathon is. I do not know the referent of 
this sentence. The purpose of communicating this to me is also obscure. 
To identify a correct meaning and purpose I need additional informa-
tion; otherwise I will interpret it by assigning a degree of relevance that 
gives it a meaning that may or may not coincide with the intent of your 
communication.
  If you asked “What Rodriguez book?” in reply to an email I sent, and 
I wrote back “And your mother, too,” you might interpret this in many 
different ways—you might conclude that either I have lost my marbles 
or maybe even that I mean by it a very insulting remark to the effect of 
“Take a hike, pal.” A neutral phrase like “And your mother, too” can be 
perceived differently if I ascribe to it the meaning “take a hike, pal.” There 
are many instances in which we use euphemisms or phrases shaped as 
neutral phrases that are nevertheless deeply insulting. Like the game of 
albures in Mexico there is the African American tradition of “the doz-
ens” (spectacularly done in Ellison’s 1952 published novel, Invisible Man, 
for instance). The winner of the dozens is the one who can hurl the 
most insulting phrase in an aesthetically appealing way. The winner of 
los albures is the one who can deploy the most coarse insults within the 
structure of a rhyme. So the presence of shape also plays an important 
role.
PcH: Your metaphor of shape is interesting. As you know, my view is that a 
humorous event has to do with processes that are characteristic of child-
hood.1 In the case of meaning, this would involve the overgeneration of 
 1. The full account is, of course, more complex than this suggests; see chapter 5 of Hogan, 
What Literature.
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contextually nonrelevant meanings, a right-hemisphere-based activity, 
related to children’s language processing.2 In addition to such overgen-
eration, mirth is enhanced (or perhaps simply not inhibited) when the 
resulting ambiguity is interpretable for each meaning. Thus a successful 
pun should allow for some discourse coherence in both senses. Take the 
joking title and author Life Under the Grandstands, by Seymour Butts. It 
does not really work with the authors Seymour Foot or Seymour Brain, 
though those work as jokes with the different titles Life as a Shoe Sales-
man and Life as a Neurosurgeon. This enhanced discourse coherence or 
increased semantic relevance is perhaps something gestured toward by 
your metaphor of shape.
  So, if we now turn to literature, we may draw some broad connec-
tions. First, when we interpret meaning, we might say that our aim is 
to construct the storyworld—the characters, events, motives, causal 
sequences, and so on. Obviously, meaning has to do with such matters as 
lexical items and syntax. But we might say that our most encompassing 
concern about meaning is getting the storyworld right. This “rightness,” 
I should note, involves getting the ambiguities right as well. For exam-
ple, if a detective novel does not make clear who the murderer is, then 
the uncertainty is part of the storyworld. Similarly, if the novel strongly 
suggests that Smith is the culprit but leaves hints that it might be Jones, 
then getting the storyworld right entails getting this ambiguity—prob-
ably Smith, but maybe Jones.
FlA: Yes, getting it right, as you put it, involves lexical and syntactic shaping as 
well as other ingredients ascribed to the work in its parts and as a whole. 
So what do we mean when we talk about meaning? Is the global mean-
ing of the short story or the novel a total sum of the meanings established 
and conveyed in each of the phrases or sentences that form its linguistic 
building blocks? Is it in the identification of theme or character or, as you 
put it, in the making clear who the murderer is, so to speak? Where is it 
located?
  Meaning is a very elusive concept. Every philosopher has his or her 
pet theory of “meaning.” After World War II, the most prestigious theo-
ries of meaning were formulated by the logical positivists, Wittgenstein, 
Searle, and Derrida. In Why the Humanities Matter I go more deeply into 
a discussion of their theories to determine which are true to the facts and 
 2. See Hogan, What Literature 147–48 and citations, particularly Chiarello and Beeman 
248, Beeman 272, Chiarello 145, and Kane 41 and 43.
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more scientifically acceptable. Here, however, I would like to continue 
to follow Chomsky’s formulation. For many years, Chomsky’s position 
was that it was located in syntax. Therefore, it was impossible to build a 
theory or science of semantics. That the task at hand was to build a scien-
tific theory of syntax. Once this work was accomplished, we would have 
a proper understanding of meaning. As you know, he left this position 
behind and developed the theory of minimalism to account for meaning.
  I’ll try to be as specific and clear as I can in the use and elucidation 
of the concept of meaning. Many have linked meaning to culture. I link 
meaning to truth. We need to know what the meaning of meaning is in 
order to submit the concept to empirical verification. If we do not get this 
right, then anything is meaning. We need to keep the discussion at a high 
level of generality but as precise as possible. Our conversation certainly 
aims to achieve this.
narrative PurPoses
PcH: A story may have many sorts of purposes (the second component of 
understanding). But two general types of purpose recur extensively. As 
noted earlier, authors most often aim to produce an emotional effect and/
or to convey some thematic concern. We may distinguish three sorts of 
emotional effects, related to different aspects of narrative. The first is story 
emotion. This is our emotional response to characters and events in the 
storyworld. It is the topic of most of my own work3—but I am far from 
alone in this. This topic has concerned literary theorists for thousands 
of years, as Aristotle’s discussion of fear and pity and the ancient Indic 
writers’ examination of rasa, or empathic and aesthetic emotion, suggests.
  The second sort of emotion is plot interest. “Plot” (as you obviously 
know) is the presentation of story information—its selection, ordering, 
and construal. This discourse-based manipulation of story information 
regulates what we know about the storyworld and when we know it. 
Such manipulation of course has effects on our story emotions. However, 
it also trains our attention on clues regarding information that is miss-
ing—thus our feeling of suspense about what is to come (as when the 
innocent little girl enters a room where we have just seen the villain plant 
a bomb) or our feeling of curiosity about what has already happened 
(as when the beloved crusty old ruffian turns up again after many years 
 3. For example, it is central to The Mind, Affective, and What Literature.
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but now with a peg leg and a marble eye). (See Meir Sternberg for a tech-
nical account of “suspense” and “curiosity.” Writing in a cognitive con-
text, Ed Tan has also stressed the development of interest.)
  The third sort of emotion is sometimes called “artifactual” (see Tan 
65, 82; his category of “fiction emotions” is parallel to what I am call-
ing “story emotions”). This is the aesthetic feeling that we experience in 
response to the work as a created object. This clearly includes aspects of 
story and discourse. It also prominently includes aspects of style.
FlA: You nicely keep separate the author-reader emotion and the artifactual, 
or, as I would call it, the aesthetic relation (which is constituted by the 
aim of the artist, the aesthetic product, and aesthetic reception). I think 
of an author like Dostoyevsky, who clearly wanted to convey a world-
view and within this worldview a political position concerning the Rus-
sia of his day. But if his purpose had only been to convey this content 
or message and to generate emotions in the reader, he could have writ-
ten pamphlets, using the most effective tools furnished by the discipline 
of rhetoric. The many sentences that fill out the Communist Manifesto 
(1848) are beautifully composed and display a very effective use of rheto-
ric. In Lincoln’s speech at Gettysburg we see the same careful rhetorical 
crafting of something that is not literature.
  Dostoevsky, Flaubert, Faulkner, Woolf, Hemingway, and Stein all had 
centrally in mind their artistic purpose. What they wanted to do was cre-
ate an artistic object, an object that would be aesthetically appealing. If 
their purpose had only been to generate emotions and convey themes, 
they would have worked along a different register, writing a rhetorically 
effective manifesto, speech, and so forth.
  Of course, the vast majority of novels out there today represent a very 
diminished “will to style,” but any author worth her salt intends to cre-
ate an aesthetic object with an aesthetic purpose. The author develops 
her thinking and carries out her activity in such a way that the aesthetic 
object will have an aesthetic purpose. As you mention, this is in the style.
PcH: In speaking of emotional purposes, I did have in mind a reader’s rela-
tion to the work itself—the storyworld, the discourse, the style. But both 
purposes of an utterance also concern a reader’s relation to the world 
outside the work, the world of real life. Authors wish to affect the reader’s 
understanding of and emotional response to that real world. Most often, 
that understanding and response concern either ethics or politics. We 
may refer to the particular understandings of and emotional responses to 
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the world as “themes.” Although not referred to in these terms, political 
themes have been at the forefront of professional interpretation in recent 
years.
FlA: Yes they have—and as you’ve pointed out so judiciously earlier, this can 
lead to opening and closings in our thinking, and has. I ask: what do 
we learn from narrative fiction in its most expansive sense—novels and 
short stories but also comic books, cartoons, films of all sorts, and much 
more? Do we learn anything about actual reality in the first few years of 
the twenty-first century from Rodriguez’s Spy Kids (2001)? Or, under the 
influence of the film, are our emotions set in motion to defend the cause 
of the exploitation of Fooglies (odd-looking transmogrified humans 
who speak backward)? I am talking about a successful aesthetic object in 
this film. We could also ask, what is the political purpose of the horror 
film Saw I (2004)? A few survive out of a group of young people abducted 
and slaughtered, and they manage to kill the sadistic killers. What does 
this film tell me about Iraq or Afghanistan, where there is also a lot of 
violence and torture?
  Put simply, and contrary to much literary criticism, I do not go to 
the cinema to learn history, sociology, politics, and so on. Most so-called 
period dramas, television shows, and films are very far from historical 
reality. What does the historically set Generation Kill (2008) that follows 
a marine Alpha team during the invasion of Iraq have to do with the inva-
sion of Iraq? What is compelling is its carefully orchestrated banality as 
a fictional blueprint. We do not confuse reality for fiction where fiction 
takes the upper hand.
tHe FunCtions oF CritiCism
PcH: Of course, you are completely right that we do not (usually) confuse 
reality with fiction as we are reading or watching the fiction. However, 
in general, we have very poor “source memory” (see Schacter 114–29) 
and thus very poor memory for the origin of memories—whether in fic-
tion or fact. Daniel Schacter discusses research showing that narratives 
explicitly identified as false are often remembered as part of an actual 
event (115). Following D. T. Gilbert, he explains that “it requires a good 
deal of effort . . . to muster the critical faculties to ‘unbelieve’ new infor-
mation” (117). Moreover, there is evidence that fictions alter even well-
established beliefs in retrospect. Prentice and Gerrig discuss how people 
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share a “tendency to allow any information, reliable or unreliable, to gain 
entry into their store of knowledge and to influence their beliefs about 
the world” (530). In keeping with this, “the mass-communication lit-
erature contains many findings of attitude change resulting from expo-
sure to fiction. For example, numerous studies have shown that media 
portrayals of sex-role and ethnic stereotypes affect children’s attitudes 
toward women and members of minority groups.” Indeed, “a single expo-
sure to a feature film produced significant attitude change (e.g., viewing 
The Birth of a Nation affected attitudes toward blacks)” (531). Thus it 
seems fairly clear that fiction does affect our understanding of the world. 
It also affects our emotional/motivational orientations.
  Returning to interpretation, we might say that interpretation of nar-
rative should have as its basic function the clarification of the storyworld 
(within the scope of its ambiguity), the elaboration of the emotional pur-
poses of the work (including story emotion, plot interest, and artifact 
emotion), and the explication of the moral and political implications of 
the work (as these extend to the understanding and evaluation of the 
real world). These functions of interpretation arise in particular condi-
tions, when we find our understanding of a work’s meaning or purposes 
in some degree baffled.
  But when is our understanding baffled? When do we have a sense that 
there is something that requires interpretation? This may occur sponta-
neously, of course. But it may also occur when we reflect on a work.
  This is a point at which criticism enters. Drawing on cognitive sci-
ence, we may say that criticism occurs with any practice that leads us to 
encode aspects of a literary work (film, work of art, or whatever) that we 
would not have encoded spontaneously. As I put it in Cognitive Science, 
Literature, and the Arts, encoding involves selection, segmentation, and 
structuration. In other words, it involves picking out aspects of an object 
(we can never experience all aspects of a work), organizing them into 
units, and integrating them into broader patterns. Thus criticism leads us 
to notice certain elements and relations in a work that we would not have 
noticed otherwise. As such, criticism is likely to give rise to interpretive 
questions.
  For example, many ordinary readers of Hamlet may not notice that 
Hamlet suggests that he is going to murder Rosencrantz and Guil-
denstern well before he claims to have learned that he himself is to be 
killed in England (see 3.4.207–9 and 5.2). Moreover, it is not clear that 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern were aware of Hamlet’s fate. Thus it is 
unclear that they were guilty of anything that might justify their murder 
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(even leaving aside procedural issues, such as a trial with right to 
respond). Finally, ordinary readers may hardly be aware that their death 
is announced only shortly after Horatio has expressed the hope that 
Hamlet’s spirit will go to heaven. This conjunction, combined with the 
suggestions of premeditated murder, makes it at least possible that Ham-
let’s death is a death of his soul as well—it raises the possibility that his 
soul is guided not by angels (as Horatio hopes) but by demons. We may 
say that the text invites us to interpret these points. But we will interpret 
them only once we have encoded them, and that may occur only follow-
ing criticism.
FlA: I see that what you call encoding, I call shaping. As I have proposed, I 
consider that all things cultural are prey for interpretation. That said, I 
know that we are focusing on literature here. And here you nicely iden-
tify how the interpretation can be focused at the level of the story and the 
domain of our bafflement. But before we even begin engaging in inter-
pretation we have to decide what the domain is in which we are going to 
apply our interpretive faculties. That is, I suggest we study first and fore-
most the shape-giving elements—the generative operator of discourse. A 
work of art is not defined by its content. A work is circumscribed by the 
way the artistic or formal devices, as you wish, are brought to bear on the 
subject matter.
  When I analyze a ballet, for instance, I ask what the main components 
of my analysis are. On the one hand, there is music, but this is a specific 
arrangement of sounds, so I study the specific shape given to one sound 
after another after another. That is, I study the arrangement of the com-
position. I study the body movement of the dancers—head, torso, legs, 
arms, and so on. That is, I analyze the organized movement of the danc-
ers. So my main focus of analysis is the formal movement: how one pos-
ture follows another, and so on. I select, segment, structure, to use your 
words.
  I do the same with all the other arts. For each novel that has been 
in one way or another intellectually, emotionally, aesthetically satisfying, 
what remains in my mind are the devices more than the details concern-
ing the story. This is so because art is essentially a conferring of shape to 
matter. In the case of narrative fiction, it is the conferring of shape to sub-
ject matter.
  In a theory of narrative fiction, when we consider fiction as a work 
of art, the starting point is the shape-giving tools. What are the shape-
conferring instruments used and applied to a subject matter?
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  We need to keep in mind that the shape-giving tools do not give 
shape to a separate (or preexisting) subject matter. Rather, the matter 
becomes an inseparable component to the shape-giving instruments. 
That is, matter and form make for an inseparable unit. We can separate 
them for pedagogical reasons, but as a work of art they constitute an 
organic whole. The Sound and the Fury shows this clearly. Faulkner has 
an image (the subject matter), and as he gives shape to this image, he is 
simultaneously creating and multiplying his subject matter. This image 
(soiled underpants) needs to be placed within the story: Who is seeing 
the soiled underpants? It is not the girl, so Faulkner invents the character 
of Benjy. And to flesh out Benjy, other characters are invented, including 
brothers Quentin and Jason and a sister, Caddy. All of this is given even 
greater shape with Faulkner’s use of focalization and other devices.
  The subject matter is a systematic expansion, and each element (item 
of the story) in the expansion that is added coheres within an artistic 
whole. So each decision Faulkner makes in the additions—the point of 
view that he adopts and the other formal mechanisms that he uses—he 
wants, to form a coherent, structured whole. Faulkner also has to take 
into account the limitations of the reader (memory, primarily) in order 
for the three parts of the novel to form an organic whole—and for it 
not to appear as the mechanical addition of three hermetically sealed 
sections. This is a decision pertaining to form, and this has storytell-
ing implications. That is, it has thematic implications. With the shift 
from first to third person, there is the possibility of investing the same 
characters of the first section with greater mental complexity. Formal 
procedures lead to the story matter, and when the story matter is more 
complicated, a need to look for other means for giving shape to the story 
matter arises.
  All the formal decisions have material implications. The nature of the 
story changes when the author changes the formal methods used for the 
storytelling. This is further proof of the unity of form and matter, mat-
ter and form. Bearing this in mind guards against one slipping into the 
trap of considering the work of art as a document, an instantiation of a 
political or moral position—as if we could separate form from matter 
and speak of the novel (or whatever narrative fiction we happen to be 
analyzing) as a pamphlet.
  In the Renaissance, painters invented perspective. This formal device 
was considered an important progress in the general domain of painting 
because, according to the aesthetics of the moment, perspective made 
painted reality more real. It increased the realism and therefore gave 
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realism as an aesthetic category a central place in painting. Realism using 
perspective became the expected way to paint. Then, at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, Braque and Picasso did away with realism, using 
a new device called cubism that made visible what is invisible in real-
ism, such as the showing of fronts and backs of heads simultaneously. 
They created a different form of realism that disconcerted viewers; view-
ers considered it ugly, flat, meaningless, and concluded that the artists 
had no idea what perspective was. In other words, the artist invents the 
device of the perspective, and this has consequences for the subject mat-
ter and also for what can be shown. The choice of devices in cubism, 
however, allows for different possibilities. The artist is no longer held 
accountable to the aesthetic rules of realism based on perspectivism and 
can instead follow a different aesthetic procedure and subject matter and 
therefore a completely different rule.
  Here again we have a unity of form and matter. In accomplished fic-
tion, we have this unity. We can see how in this unity of matter and form, 
form can secrete subject matter. It is as if the artist were a special kind of 
spider, a spider who wants to create something, and every time the spider 
makes a formal move, the result is a new shape and new content in the 
form of the web. What we have in the making of art is form that secretes 
matter—and matter, in its turn, directly influences the form.
  Whether we focus on painting or music or ballet or literature or 
comic books or film, among many other art forms, they are all activities 
that require a myriad of decisions on the part of the creators. And when 
an artist makes decisions concerning form this necessarily impacts the 
subject matter.
PcH: Criticism, as defined above, may of course apply to any of the arts you 
mention. Within literary study, it may apply to any “level” of interpreta-
tion—storyworld, story emotion, plot interest, artifact emotion, ethical 
or political theme. Clearly, we want to spend at least some of this chapter 
on ethical and political themes. However, before turning to those, I would 
like to consider the application of social criticism to the storyworld. Spe-
cifically, it is clear that the dominant trend in current literary criticism is 
historicist and culturalist. In other words, when critics approach a nar-
rative, they are concerned with altering our encoding of that work by 
reference to historically and culturally particular ideas, events, and prac-
tices. This is, of course, very important. As you know, a great deal of my 
own work on postcolonial literature and film involves relocating works 
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in their cultural contexts.4 To take a very simple example, a non-Indian 
viewer will probably misinterpret the storyworld of a film, perhaps sig-
nificantly, if he or she sees a young woman with red in the parting of 
her hair. Indeed, such a viewer may not encode this at all (i.e., again, 
select and integrate the information with cognitive processes—a differ-
ent idea than your “shaping,” I believe). In any case, he or she is unlikely 
to recognize that this coloring indicates that the woman is married. For 
sometimes very simple reasons (such as this), and sometimes for much 
more complex reasons, cultural context is imperative for the criticism 
and interpretation of narratives.
FlA: Once again, I think it is important to be clear about the level of abstrac-
tion and therefore generality and even universality in which we are situ-
ating our analysis. Yes, interpretation can play an important function, 
but it is not working at the same level of abstraction as a scientific the-
ory of narrative. Theoretical physics belongs to a level of analysis—and 
therefore generality and universality—that is quite higher than so-called 
applied physics. Of course, there is no Chinese wall separating theoretical 
from applied physics or theoretical mathematics from applied mathemat-
ics, to mention only two examples. Still, there is a difference that makes a 
difference. And this difference is precisely the degree of the explanatory 
power attained at the highest level of abstraction (theory) as compared to 
the lower level (interpretation).
  Such a distinction is even more necessary, more indispensable, when 
we are talking about literary theory precisely because in general our 
training in the humanities does not give us that much knowledge con-
cerning the analysis of concepts made in philosophy, nor does it give the 
specific training in scientific methodology. So we have to make do with 
what we have learned. This does not mean that we have to settle for what 
we are given.
  The point is that there is a constant confusion (conflation even) of 
levels of what is strictly a scientific theory of narrative fiction and lit-
erary criticism or literary interpretation (idiosyncratic reading) of such 
and such a token of literary fiction or such and such a genre in the best-
case scenario. Most so-called postclassical narratology, or so-called con-
textualized narratology, does not at all constitute a scientific theory of 
 4. For example, the analyses in Colonialism and Cultural Identity and Understanding 
Indian Movies are very culturally oriented.
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narrative fiction. In the best-case scenario, postclassical narratology are 
limited applications of certain aspects of narrative theory.
  Most work done at this level of applied literary criticism has not had 
any kind of impact on the development of a scientific theory of narra-
tive fiction. The explanatory power and range of these applications and 
local interpretations is very small. The reason for this lack of explanatory 
power and impact is simply that most of the work published under this 
rubric is idiosyncratic interpretations of one narrative fiction or another; 
they are idiosyncratic in approach, in their method of analysis or inter-
pretation, and in their findings. They cannot actually be taught to the 
next generation; the next generation can only become adept at mimick-
ing the approaches. In the best-case scenario, what the students learn is 
to mimic a literary style, an idiosyncratic terminology, procedures that 
in actual fact do not lead to real verifiable generalizations. They are really 
local and idiosyncratic in their nature.
  Of course, as I’ve said before, everybody can take their pleasure where 
they want. That said, perhaps this is a good place for us to distinguish 
clearly idiosyncratic from scientific approaches and outcomes. As we 
both know well, apples are not oranges.
ProBlems WitH HistoriCism
PcH: In principle, historical sensitivity could oppose the sort of idiosyncrasy 
you are rightly criticizing. But for a moment, I would like to consider 
some of the problems with an approach to criticism that is entirely his-
toricist and/or culturalist. To do that, it might be valuable to begin with 
the usual objection to cognitive literary study, an objection that I am sure 
you have heard as much as I have. When the speaker is polite, it has some-
thing like the following form: “Cognitive science may have some valuable 
insights. But don’t you feel that it leaves out culture and history?” When 
asked questions of this sort, cognitivists—including myself—usually 
fumble about apologetically, saying that yes, some of us are guilty and we 
really need to do more to integrate culture into our cognitive analyses.5
  But, on reflection, it seems that this gets things rather badly wrong. In 
fact, it is fairly rare to find cognitivist literary critics who simply ignore 
culture and history. The bias of the profession as a whole is such that 
 5. A version of the following arguments was presented at the Modern Language Associa-
tion annual convention in 2011. I am grateful to Lisa Zunshine, the organizer of the session, and 
to the participants and audience members for their comments and questions [PCH].
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one simply has to know certain things about, say, Shakespeare’s time and 
place if one is going to be accepted as a critic of Shakespeare, if one is 
going to publish on Shakespeare, and so on. It simply is not possible, for 
example, to treat Shakespeare’s language and references as if they were 
not historically specific. Of course, this is not to say that the cultural part 
of cognitive literary study is always done well. But the same point holds 
for the cultural part of cultural studies. For example, one could argue that 
an unfortunate amount of postcolonial criticism in the culture studies 
mode is somewhat tone-deaf to ethical, metaphysical, or other nuances 
in, say, South Asian cultural traditions. But the crucial point is that dis-
cursive and institutional constraints inhibit the degree to which criticism 
from any theoretical orientation can ignore history or culture.
  In contrast, there seem to be no constraints whatsoever on the degree 
to which criticism can ignore neuroscience, cognitive and affective 
research, developmental studies, group dynamics, or any other forms of 
understanding that contribute to our sense of cross-cultural and trans-
historical commonality. In other words, it simply is not the case that cog-
nitivists grossly ignore culture and history. But it is commonly the case 
that culturalists grossly ignore cognitivist and related research.
FlA: My take on this problem is at once like-minded and different. I agree that 
the criticisms (culturalist or otherwise) leveled at those with a scientific 
bent are hugely imbalanced, irrational, limited and limiting. Largely, I’ve 
learned to do as the Dante-character’s journey through the nine circles of 
hell: to look and move on. I do believe that the foundation of a scientific 
theory of narrative fiction must include a rigorous formulation of how 
story and discourse function. All sciences and, beyond that, all knowl-
edge is ancillary to the scientific study of narrative fiction. From my point 
of view, all forms of knowledge are subordinate to the scientific theory of 
narrative fiction.
  By this I mean that once I have developed an understanding of how 
narrative fiction works—and from this point of view, a key tool is narra-
tology—I can enrich my interpretations of specific, concrete instances of 
narrative fiction artifacts. For instance, I consider that socio-neurobiol-
ogy has a very important contribution to make to our understanding of 
the creative process involved in the production (authors) of the artifacts 
and their reception (readers). I consider that the same science has a huge 
contribution to make toward our understanding of how authors are able 
to create and how readers are able to re-create emotions and reactions. 
If we study how the affective or emotional system works, we can better 
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understand how the author creates characters endowed with fictional 
(selected and selective) emotion systems and how they are re-created by 
the readers.
  Undoubtedly, philosophy can teach us a lot about how the moral 
behavior of characters is invented by authors and perceived by readers. 
To this, we must add all sorts of knowledge. Quite often this includes our 
knowledge of history, current events (present politics, for instance), eco-
nomics, and geography. We can say the same of cognitive science, devel-
opmental psychology, our knowledge of logic, mathematical thinking, 
the reasoning based on causality and counterfactual scenarios. All this 
can be very useful for the interpretation of particular works. However, 
none of these sciences separately nor all of them together constitute a 
scientific theory of narrative fiction.
  This scientific theory that exists merely in embryonic form today can 
only develop if it reaches general or universal findings and conclusions. 
These findings have to be centered on the two pillars of narrative fic-
tion, story and discourse. They have to be centered on how specifically 
these two pillars work, how the application of the generative operator 
of discourse yields an organic unity of subject matter and form in the 
creating of the fiction. And this not in regards to such and such a novel, 
film, story, film, or such and such an author of sixteenth-century Spain 
as opposed to France, say—but an understanding of how story and dis-
course work universally.
PcH: You certainly do not have to convince me of the value of studying uni-
versals. But even the recognition of universals requires cultural and his-
torical knowledge. That is why I am stressing that the entire discussion 
of cognition and culture is topsy-turvy. Indeed, this leads us to ask what 
difference it would make if we tried to correct the problem by introduc-
ing cognitive study into culturalism. Here, we may briefly consider Gal-
lagher and Greenblatt’s well-known discussion of the potato debate, the 
debate over the use of potatoes as food for English workers. Gallagher 
and Greenblatt have discussed this topic in an illuminating way. Noth-
ing I wish to say undermines their historical work. But some conclusions 
they draw from this seem problematic. Specifically, they show that a wide 
range of factors were involved in the debate and in the rejection of pota-
toes by English workers. They conclude from this that there is a “need 
for a thorough historicization of what counted as food and what felt like 
hunger” (125).
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  My point here is not to argue that this claim is entirely wrong. Gal-
lagher and Greenblatt are certainly getting at something. But they have 
formulated their conclusion in a way that grossly overstates the case. As 
such, it seems more mistaken than correct. This is largely because they 
leave out any sense of what constitutes hunger.
FlA: Yes, it is true that they leave out important considerations in their 
approach to hunger—you mention physiological and cultural reasons. I 
would tread cautiously with Gallagher and Greenblatt for this and other 
reasons.
  As you know well, the general principle of the philosophy of science 
should be kept centrally in mind. That is, no addition of examples of any 
phenomena will lead to the establishment of a science. No science is sim-
ply the sum of examples. No science is simply the sum of interpretations 
based on ideological or political considerations. No science is based on 
evidence that is made to fit the interpretation. And certainly no science 
can be based on evidence that is forged.
  Nothing that I say here undermines factually Gallagher and Green-
blatt’s study. Yet, knowing that historians are not always the purest exam-
ples of intellectual probity, I also do not take their conclusions at face 
value. I believe that we have to go to the evidence and to many other his-
torians and compare and contrast their accounts.
  On the one hand there is what is actually the case—the matters of 
fact in the case of this famine, from the historical point of view. On the 
other hand, there are other matters such as the cultural and physiologi-
cal. Once these facts are established, there remains the fact that the big 
genocidal famines have all been politically motivated, and executed for 
strictly political reasons.
PcH: It seems important to make some background points here—about emo-
tion or motivation in general—before turning to hunger in particular. 
Emotion or motivation systems are largely subcortical systems, acti-
vated by a combination of endogenous and exogenous (body-internal 
and body-external) stimuli, which lead to subjective experiences of posi-
tive or negative hedonic tone and orient one toward behavior that will 
reduce aversive experiences or enhance pleasurable experiences. The 
basic operation of these systems is adaptive in that central cases of aver-
sive experiences are harmful and central cases of pleasurable experiences 
are conducive to health or reproduction. For example, the fear system 
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produces an aversive feeling and leads to flight from potentially danger-
ous situations. The different emotion systems may enhance or inhibit one 
another. For example, fear and attachment tend to be mutually inhibit-
ing. Finally, there are connections between prefrontal cortex and emo-
tion systems such that emotional response may affect inferential and 
related processing, but emotional response may also be modulated by 
such processing. For example, fear responses may guide one’s long-term 
planning, but one’s reflection on a situation may serve to inhibit one’s fear 
response—perhaps one’s aversive feeling or perhaps only one’s behavior.
FlA: Nicely put, Patrick. Yes, there is undoubtedly the mind/brain system spe-
cialized in reasoning that may have an impact on the limbic system, just 
as the limbic system may have an impact on the reasoning system. This 
reciprocal mechanism is constantly at work through the intermediary of 
the blueprint that the author creates and that readers reprocess in their 
gap-filling activities.
  As I have mentioned before, directors, authors, artists make a myriad 
of decisions in the course of producing a film, novel, or comic book, and 
in this, their emotive and reason systems are at work. The emotion and 
reason systems are part and parcel of these myriad decisions. They gener-
ate the blueprint out of decisions that always concern subject matter or 
shape. To a lesser degree, the same applies to the reader/audience’s gap 
filling—an interpretation and constant ascription of meaning to what-
ever is being read, heard, or viewed. Thanks to this specific activity of the 
audience, the artifact is infused with life and acquires its existence as an 
aesthetic object.
PcH: Turning to hunger. As it happens, hunger is a surprisingly complex case. 
First, there appear to be two distinct but interrelated systems that are 
sometimes referred to as “hunger.” (On these systems, see chapters 4 and 5 
of Wong.) One is the taste-preference system. This is a system that bears 
on our hedonic relation to the experience of eating certain things. Like 
other motivation systems, this has both innate and acquired compo-
nents. The innate component involves, for example, an evolved aversion 
to the taste of certain toxins. The acquired component is largely a matter 
of habituation to certain tastes, as well as the association of tastes with 
emotional memories, particularly in critical-period experiences. (These 
emotional memories might include, for example, the association of a par-
ticular food with food poisoning.)
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  The other relevant motivational system is that of feeding. Feeding 
behavior is a result of blood sugar regulation, gene expression related to 
amount of fatty tissue (see Gilliam, Kandel, and Jessell 47), and to some 
extent other factors such as the stimulation of stretch receptors in the 
stomach (see Wong 91). This system is closer to what we would ordinar-
ily refer to as “hunger,” as in the phrase “I feel hungry” or when we say “I 
need to eat something.” In contrast, the taste-preference system is more 
relevant to such expressions as “I am hungry for a piece of cheesecake” or 
“I want something tasty.” These two systems are probably mutually excit-
atory and mutually inhibitory (though the relation may be asymmetri-
cal). In addition, both are partially inhibited by disgust, though disgust 
appears to have a stronger impact on taste preference than on feeding 
motivation.
FlA: As you remark, hunger has two components: the physiological and the 
social or cultural. Of course, there is a third, crucial component: the polit-
ical component. The decision to inflict starvation on populations that 
results in genocide is a political move that has been made many times 
in history.
  Famine is a very dreadful, terrible weapon used against the people. 
All famines are man-made. Famine is genocide in a very cruel way—kill-
ing thousands, sometimes millions, of people by inflicting a very slow 
and painful death on the people from children to elders.
  This is the conclusion arrived at by Thomas Keneally in Three Fam-
ines: Starvation and Politics. He focuses on Ireland, Bengal, and Ethiopia. 
Today, the ongoing famine in Somalia is another example of this arti-
ficial political starving of large populations. There is tons of wheat and 
flour and food staples held in these huge UN warehouses. It is the war-
lords, by military means, who halt the distribution of these foods. There 
is today a totally artificially created famine, just as there was in Ethiopia. 
There are dozens of other examples of famines created for political pur-
poses such as that created by Stalin in the Soviet Union. Mao Tse-tung 
also used this method in the 1950s. Starvation of the masses is an instru-
ment used by rulers to control the population, to instill fear and pain 
massively among us.
  There are other less drastic forms of manipulation of the production 
and distribution of food. After the 1910–17 Revolution in Mexico, the 
farmers owned the plots of land called “ahijados” that allowed for the 
self-sustenance of their families. The Mexican government then modified 
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the constitution of the country and de facto made the ahijados disap-
pear, turning them into private property and therefore commodities to 
be sold to the big U.S. corporations, a move that was accompanied by the 
establishing of a free-trade treaty with the United States. The end result: 
thousands of farmers became extremely impoverished and tried to solve 
the problem by immigrating to the United States or to the big cities in 
Mexico. This was what largely spurred on the rapid growth of both the 
legal and illegal migration of people from Mexico to the United States.
  If we compare the figures from January 1, 1991, when NAFTA (the 
North American Free Trade Agreement) was signed and today, we can 
see that the migration has been massive. Why? Because people are lit-
erally starving in the countryside. Today, too, even when the border is 
more dangerous to cross than ever and the probability of being spotted 
and sent back (in the best of situations) is high, young and old, men and 
women still attempt to migrate in massive numbers because they are lit-
erally starving.
PcH: First, just to be clear, I am not saying that “hunger has two components: 
the physiological and the social or cultural.” I am, rather, saying that 
there are two separate biological systems that might be referred to as 
“hunger.” Like all motivational systems, these have innate components, 
critical-period components, and emotional-memory components. Some 
of the critical-period and emotional-memory components may (or may 
not) manifest differential patterns across cultures. I want to be careful to 
distinguish this view from the commonplace that there is always some 
biology and some culture—this idea is probably true, but it has no clear 
descriptive or explanatory value. Even worse than this commonplace is 
the common view that biology and culture are the only contributing fac-
tors—thus leaving aside individual experience, developmental patterns, 
group dynamics, physical constraints, and so on. Indeed, even differ-
ences in literary or artistic traditions are usually not a matter of “cul-
ture,” as the term is ordinarily used. For example, the apparently unusual 
recurrence of parent–child separation and reunion plots in Japanese 
tradition probably results initially from the prominence of The Tale of 
Genji with its focus on such plots. It probably does not suggest some 
broader cultural pattern (e.g., parenting practices that foster attachment 
insecurity).
  In any case, having noted the existence of different hunger sys-
tems, we may return to Gallagher and Greenblatt’s claims, specifically 
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their assertion that we need to historicize hunger. An understanding of 
human hunger motivation suggests the following. First, it is extremely 
unlikely that feeding motivation in general varies historically. There are 
some limited exceptions in extreme conditions. In cases of traumatic 
overarousal, neurological systems suffer damage. This is presumably 
true of the hunger system. Thus chronic hunger undoubtedly produces 
changes—almost certainly deleterious changes—in the operation of the 
feeding system. One may speak of this as “historical” if one wishes. But 
the real variable is not historical culture, but famine (whatever the ambi-
ent culture might be).
  So, if English workers generally felt hunger in the same ways and for 
the same reasons as we do today (changes in blood glucose, decline in 
fatty tissue, etc.), what explains the rejection of the potato? A neurologi-
cal model suggests that there must have been some sort of inhibition of 
the feeding system. This leads to three possibilities. First, there could be 
inhibition from taste preference. Second, there could be inhibition from 
the disgust system. Finally, there could be prefrontal inhibition.
  Undoubtedly, there was some taste-preference inhibition. It seems 
that our emotion systems are calibrated slightly toward dispreference. 
For example, when faced with a stranger, our initial impulse is not trust 
but mild distrust or wariness (see Oatley, Best 73; for the more gen-
eral point, see Zajonc 35). This is presumably the case for our taste and 
indeed feeding systems as well. Thus the lack of habituation to potatoes 
would produce a slight aversion. This is one implication of Gallagher and 
Greenblatt’s argument that is unsurprising. It seems clear that taste pref-
erence is historically and culturally differentiated in certain respects.
  Even more importantly, Gallagher and Greenblatt make a good case 
that the debates over the potato involved the invocation of repulsive 
imagery, particularly of dirt. Cognitively, this rhetoric would have the 
effect of associating potatoes with disgust-relevant emotional memories. 
Thus we have another form of inhibition that we would expect—the inhi-
bition of both taste preference and feeding by an activated disgust sys-
tem. Here, too, the conclusion is not terribly surprising.
FlA: Patrick, let me just say that I find Gallagher and Greenblatt’s claim sus-
pect simply from a common-sense perspective and knowing that his-
torians (social, cultural, and so on) can be strongly guided by political 
aims. There have been many documented cases of historians deliberately 
destroying and deliberately misinterpreting documents. After the disin-
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tegration of the Soviet Union, many archives were open to general histo-
rians and other scholars. There was the British historian Robert Service, 
who had an all-expense-paid trip to Moscow and the KGB archives that 
contained a treasure trove of political documents—not to mention man-
uscripts of novels and poetry by Russian Soviet writers. In spite of this 
access, Service’s biographies of Lenin and Trotsky have been proved to be 
complete fabrications. Many other so-called historians who had access to 
the KGB archives wrote articles and books with the sole purpose of fur-
thering their political pet theories.
  I am not sure we should take at face value Gallagher and Greenblatt’s 
assertion that workers were willing to starve their families. We know that 
the Stalinist bureaucracy used famine—the deliberate slaughtering of cat-
tle and burning of crops—to turn the people against the Bolsheviks.
  Already, common sense and history point us to a different material 
reality than that based on Gallagher and Greenblatt’s analysis—but of 
course, at the end of the day, I would need to do either the archival work 
itself or compare and contrast the facts excavated by historians along 
with their respective interpretations. Once the facts are established, I 
might further ask how the physiological and the cultural play a part in 
the use of famine as a political weapon—as a method of genocide. The 
long and the short of it is that scholarly titles and credentials do not make 
for competent seekers of the facts.
PcH: You raise valuable points. Among other things, it is important that we 
are dealing with abstract debates here, not a hungry person faced directly 
with a steaming plate of potato pancakes. But Gallagher and Greenblatt’s 
analysis seems plausible for the conditions it addresses. Indeed, we really 
have not yet explained the rejection of the potato as outlined in their 
argument. For example, empirical studies show that the disgust system 
does not have strong inhibitory force on feeding behavior (see Hoefling 
and colleagues). At the very least, it would seem that the disgust system 
would have to be activated with something more than the mild aversion 
produced by unfamiliarity and some rhetorical imagery. This is where 
Gallagher and Greenblatt’s analysis is most revealing. Or, rather, this is 
where their analysis could be revealing, if it were integrated with neuro-
science of motivation (rather than being framed in terms of Saussurean 
“signifiers” [112]).
  Specifically, Gallagher and Greenblatt suggest two other reasons for 
the rejection of the potato. First, there is anti-Irish feeling and the asso-
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ciation of the Irish with the potato. It is well established that out-groups 
inspire anterior insula activation, which suggests disgust (see Fiske, 
Harris, and Cuddy). Gallagher and Greenblatt’s argument indicates that 
group division can lead to intensified activation of the disgust system 
regarding foods that are distinctively associated with the out-group. If 
valid, the suggestion genuinely advances our understanding of human 
motivation systems as well as our understanding of intergroup relations. 
I know of no research on disgust that makes this connection. Thus it is an 
example of the ways in which historical and cultural study can advance 
cognitive knowledge. On the other hand, we can gain this insight only 
by recognizing that hunger should not be subjected to “thorough histo-
ricization.” Rather, a partial historicization should be integrated with our 
understanding of human motivation systems.
  The second point about Gallagher and Greenblatt’s analysis is that not 
all the rejection is due to disgust. As their discussion makes clear, there 
were rational reasons to resist the food insecurity that tended to go along 
with reliance on the potato crop. This gives us a reason for the inhibi-
tion of feeding motivations that is not first of all subcortical but rather 
prefrontal. This too is remarkable. It suggests, for example, that at least 
some of the workers were led to inhibit potentially strong motivational 
impulses due to long-term planning. This is something that one rarely 
associates with masses. But it is implied by Gallagher and Greenblatt’s 
research—though, again, this implication is recoverable only when that 
research is combined with neuroscientific work.
FlA: I think my position is clear on this score, so I’ll simply state that we have 
to ask, will a cultural, historical, physiological approach to hunger tell 
us anything of importance about the political use of famine as a tool of 
genocide?
literature and soCial Betterment
PcH: We might now turn to the issue of thematic criticism and the inter-
pretation of political and ethical concerns in literary works. We might 
begin with a common view that literature improves us. This is an idea 
that achieved prominence in the Romantic period, but appears in differ-
ent forms at different times and places. A recent view is that literature is 
“adaptive” in providing “offline” practice at resolving problems while not 
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risking the harm that would result from actual, online activity. This idea 
is most famously associated with Steven Pinker (543), but it is quite wide-
spread (see, for example, Tooby and Cosmides).6
  We might stay with the adaptationist idea for a moment. It is undoubt-
edly the case that the cognitive process of simulation—hence concrete, 
causally constrained, hypothetical and counterfactual imagining—is 
adaptive. Moreover, literary narrative clearly involves simulation. The 
question is whether specifically literary simulation has any unique selec-
tive advantage or any selective advantage at all. The idea seems to me, 
well, ludicrous. Suppose I am thinking about going to a place for berries. 
I imagine going there, then imagine bears in the vicinity (recruiting rel-
evant memories). I therefore avoid going for the berries and avoid being 
killed by bears. That clearly increases my chances of reproducing. (Recall 
that “adaptive” does not mean “good” or “smart” or “moral”; it just means 
providing a selective advantage in the passing on of the relevant genes.) 
But just how does reading The Sound and the Fury do this?
FlA: I think it is worth repeating that from my point of view so-called criti-
cism or interpretation has no direct contribution to make to a scientific 
study of narrative fiction—and this is true not only with respect to the 
political or ethical but in general. The problem with so-called thematic 
criticism—whatever the orientation of the scholar—is that it is the kind 
of criticism that by its very nature knows no boundaries.
  Let me explain in more detail. In my view, narrative fiction is not an 
imitative (mirroring) phenomenon. It is not a simulation either—at least 
not in your sense. It is not a dry run for real-life circumstances, emotions, 
and conflicts. Narrative fiction is not a replica in any way of reality.
  Rather, I consider that narrative fiction is a creation. It is not some-
thing that reproduces reality but instead adds to reality. It is literally a 
creation. It always adds something new. This creation uses as building 
blocks any and all materials coming from reality. The author is free to 
use everything from the real world—another novel, a short story, a book 
of philosophy or history, an image of a child with soiled pants. From the 
point of view of thematics, nothing is off-limits. The author is a shame-
less pillager of everything out there in the world. The author uses these 
building blocks to provide the foundation for creating something new—
an addition to reality and not a replica of reality, just as a chair, a table, a 
spear all add to reality.
 6. For further discussion of evolution and literature, see chapter 8 of Hogan, Cognitive 
Science and “On the Origin.”
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  Thematic analysis is limitless. Those that specialize in thematic criti-
cism only select a handful of fields such as history, politics, economics, 
oppression, and so on. Thematic analysis is actually unmanageable. The 
few attempts at thematic analysis using a formal classification of themes 
as we see with Lévi-Strauss and Propp were so unconvincing that their 
work hasn’t turned into a scientific research program.
  I believe that for the relation to an object to be aesthetic it has to be a 
nonutilitarian relation. All the other relations we have with the world are 
in one way or another utilitarian; they seek specific goals. The aesthetic 
relation is the only relation we have with the world where we do not take 
the object as a tool for anything. I regard a bowl made by Cellini as a work 
of art. My relationship to this bowl is not a utilitarian relation: if I own 
one, I am not going to use it as a tool for eating my cereal in the morning. 
If I do and when I do, I cease to have an aesthetic relation with the object.
  The aesthetic relation with the object is one of a nonutilitarian con-
templation (a contemplation that here even goes beyond the Kantian 
sense of disinterested relation). The moment I establish a utilitarian rela-
tion with the object, I interrupt the aesthetic relation—and even eventu-
ally destroy it, if, for instance, I used the bowl as a hammer. The moment 
I go to Absalom! Absalom! to determine what the relations were between 
African Americans and Anglos during and after the Civil War, I have 
interrupted my aesthetic relation with Absalom! Absalom!
  Thematic criticism does not acknowledge that narrative fiction is 1) a 
creation and not a reproduction of reality, and 2) an aesthetic object that 
acquires its status only within an aesthetic relation—a nonutilitarian rela-
tion. It is not an aesthetic object per se. Narrative fiction in its existence 
as part of material reality creates an aesthetic situation in which the aes-
thetic relation can take place. For instance, I write a novel as a work of art. 
The novel that I have just written, the material thing I have in my hands, 
is not yet an aesthetic object because there is no aesthetic relation with it. 
It is a material object that creates an aesthetic situation (your aesthetic 
event, I believe). It creates a situation that may lead to an aesthetic rela-
tion. This manuscript is a material reality that opens up the possibility of 
an aesthetic relation. I have created a new situation in the world in which 
there is a possibility of a new aesthetic relation of subject with this object 
newly created.
  To sum up: The aesthetics is in neither  the object nor the subject. It 
is not the relation between the object and subject. Since the object is not 
yet an aesthetic object, it represents a possibility for the realization of an 
aesthetic relation.
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  Thematic analysis is infinite because the building blocks of narrative 
fiction on which it rests are potentially infinite. Nobody can say at what 
moment creation will cease forever, so the potential number of aesthetic 
objects out there is limitless. For his aesthetic purpose in the writing of 
Absalom! Absalom! Faulkner chooses to focus on the interaction of Afri-
can Americans, Anglos, and racially mixed characters, and therefore he 
builds his story from those blocks of reality. Since human relations are 
tinged with moral dilemmas, moral options, Faulkner ends up address-
ing morals in the novel as well as racial politics—the politics derived 
from the historical situation in the United States before and after the 
Civil War. But also among the building blocks, he makes omnipresent a 
wisteria vine, Southern architecture, and, of course, horses. The choice 
of morals and politics is a very obvious one. The fact itself of characters 
interacting in the story will involve (to different degrees of explicitness) 
moral relations among them as well as, very likely, political relations; 
inventing characters entails ascribing to them their social essence.
  So a thematic approach that attends to race, class, gender, and so on 
in the novel is not a totally arbitrary choice, because of the prevalence of 
the moral and political dimension of narrative fiction. At the same time, 
there is a certain arbitrariness to this kind of focus since one could by the 
same token attend to botany in the novel, for instance.
  I agree with you, Patrick, that narrative fiction does not edify. There 
are many examples of culturally refined people committing the worst 
atrocities. No music, poetry, or novel has stopped the butchers from 
slaughtering and the torturers from inflicting pain. The burden of the 
proof is on those who claim that narrative fiction edifies to give a plau-
sible explanation as to why the so-called culturally refined and well-read 
can commit such atrocities. Nazi officers reciting passages from Sorrows 
of Young Werther (1774) all while committing acts of genocide.
  The survival value, the evolutionary value, of narrative fiction is 
equally speculative. Let us assume that narrative fiction is found every-
where since the dawn of time. So, then, how much exposure to narrative 
fiction does one have to have in order for it to have an evolutionary value, 
and what kind of narrative fiction produces such value? Is it all kinds, 
or only certain kinds? We haven’t identified a narrative fiction gene that 
is transmitted from generation to generation. Again, the burden of the 
proof is on the shoulders of those who make such claims, and not on 
ours. We do not have to bring empirical proof that they are wrong. They 
have to bring empirical proof to show us that they are right.
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PcH: Just a point of clarification—simulation is a cognitive process that does 
not replicate the world but rather forms particular counterfactual or 
hypothetical trajectories of actions or events. The counterfactual or 
hypothetical simulation of these events is constrained by some princi-
ples of real-world activity. The constraints are to some extent based on 
memory (as we know from the process of induction and from recent 
neurological research [see Schacter, Addis, and Buckner]). There are pre-
sumably both innate and critical-period principles as well. Simulation 
involves, in part, perceptionlike imaginings that give rise to emotional/
motivational responses.
  In any case, often, the claims about benefits of literature concern its 
specifically moral influence. (The idea is ubiquitous. As such, it appears 
even among literary Darwinists; see for example Brian Boyd 197.) But 
there are at least two problems with this idea. First, it tends to treat the 
study of literature as a form of ethical training—often, in effect, propa-
ganda.7 Personally, I am not fond of the idea that we should be shaping 
the morals of our students.
  Of course, it is also important not to misidentify what constitutes 
propaganda. This is the difficulty with the demand of the political Right 
that teachers be politically neutral. By “politically neutral,” they in effect 
mean “political in a way that fits ‘normal’ ideas.” It seems that a wide 
range of people (not solely conservatives) consider something to be polit-
ical propaganda only when it does not conform to common opinions. 
In one standard view, it is not political propaganda to condemn terror-
ism simplistically as absolute evil, the mere incomprehensible desire to 
harm. In contrast, it is propaganda to discuss the reasons terrorists give 
for their actions and the conditions that motivate their actions. To take a 
literary example, it is not propaganda to discuss the display of Christian 
virtue in a medieval literary work. But it is propaganda to consider the 
ways in which one medieval work suggests lesbian sexuality or to critique 
another such work for misogyny.
  In fact, it is a key political task of criticism to help students encode 
unnoticed political aspects of a work and to think about those aspects 
 7. Needless to say, not all views of the ethical benefits of literature necessitate a particular 
stand on specific ethical issues, still less the support of propaganda. For example, Schiller’s 
general idea of aesthetic education and the training of sensibility does not seem to require par-
ticular ethical positions. The difficulty with such accounts (i.e., those that do not entail specific 
ethical stances) is different. It is often not clear that they isolate genuine ethical consequences 
at all. 
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critically. In this way, the actual situation is almost the precise opposite 
of the common view. It is precisely when criticism challenges common 
views that it is not propaganda. Nonetheless, this does not mean that 
we should set moral improvement as a primary task or as a task at all. 
Put differently, this only suggests that our criticism and interpretation 
should not contribute to the further moral and political degradation of 
our students.
FlA: I agree wholeheartedly, Patrick. I would, however, push us in the direc-
tion of foundations vis-à-vis pedagogical goals and the achieving of these 
goals. What am I to teach, and how do I teach? In the classroom I am, 
above all, a teacher. My code of conduct is secular. That is, I do not seek 
the moral or political education of our students at all. I seek to teach facts 
and how to interpret facts according to the best scientific methodology at 
hand. I teach students how they themselves can conduct research to dis-
cover facts. It is an education that seeks to eradicate as much as possible 
ideology and ideological considerations in the transmission of verifiable 
information and the research leading to the discovery of new verifiable 
information.
  From this point of view, when we do literary criticism or interpreta-
tion in the classroom—not to be confused with the scientific study of 
narrative fiction—of such and such a novel or short story, for instance, 
or such and such a film or comic book, I can and I must discuss the most 
salient features of the text at hand. Among those features, very commonly 
there are political and moral ingredients that are worthwhile to analyze 
to see how such thematic features work within the aesthetic relation we 
have with the object.
  Of course, other features are also salient. Often in our texts we need to 
excavate and then bring to the fore the emotion of love. This, along with 
many other emotions that are also very common (anger, hate, envy, grief, 
and so on), I along with my students submit to examination as they pres-
ent themselves. Facts need interpretation. They do not need to be repre-
sented in terms of our own personal like and dislikes.
  Students come to my classroom wanting to learn the method, 
approach, and findings of a scientific approach to narrative fiction—and 
not my opinions. My obligation when I sign up with the university is to 
be a teacher—that is, a secular teacher. So it is my obligation to give stu-
dents what corresponds to a secular education.
PcH: Earlier, I mentioned two problems with the view that literature improves 
us. The second problem, already suggested, is that a lot of literature does 
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just the opposite. It does not make us more human. Rather, it makes us 
more nationalistic, racist, sexist, ethnocentric, and so on. There is an 
entire branch of literary criticism devoted to isolating and evaluating 
these deleterious processes. It is called “ideological critique.” Literary 
works operate to inculcate beliefs, to form in-group/out-group catego-
ries, to valorize internal group hierarchies (e.g., patriarchy), to support 
wars, and to do many other heinous things. Of course, not all literary 
works do this. Moreover, the sorts of work favored by literature profes-
sors tend to do this much less, and they even criticize common ideo-
logical tendencies. Nonetheless, the participation of narrative fiction in 
racist, sexist, classist, and other discourses seems undeniable.
  Consider a book I recently got around to reading—Margaret Mitch-
ell’s enormously popular, Pulitzer Prize–winning novel, Gone With the 
Wind. It is in many ways a highly polished novel, worthy of high esteem 
as a literary accomplishment. Scarlett O’Hara is a magnificent character. 
Mitchell appropriates Romantic Satanism to create this smart, driven, 
amoral heroine who again and again proves herself the superior of all the 
men around her in intelligence, business acumen, ability to survive—and 
even in the ability to kill. Mitchell also takes up the common dichotomy 
of the good girl and the bad girl, presenting remarkable variations on 
that patriarchal theme. First, she repeats the division among women in 
Melanie and Scarlett—but, in doing so, she gives Melanie inner attitudes 
that are almost as strong as those of Scarlett. Second, and perhaps more 
significantly, she, so to speak, turns the tables on men by repeating the 
dichotomy with two men—Ashley Wilkes and Rhett Butler.
  Yet the book is shocking for its racism. It celebrates the Ku Klux Klan 
as a group of high-minded men who bravely take on the national enemy 
to protect their women from rape. She repeatedly characterizes slavery 
as a benevolent institution, insisting that African resentment of slav-
ery resulted only from the propaganda of the Yankees preying on the 
infantile intellectual capacities of Africans. She even appropriates Under-
ground Railroad narratives to tell the outrageous tale of a former slave 
who escapes his employer in the North to return to the plantation where 
he was a slave. She presents the murder of Yankees, assertive Africans, 
and collaborationists—even outside the context of war—as permissible 
and at times highly laudable.
FlA: Most likely, by the time the book is chosen from the shelf, the reader is 
simply looking for confirmation of his or her opinion. I would need a 
mountain of evidence and support (causal and correlated) to convince 
me that a work of fiction (or works of fiction) can have the power to 
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shape opinion, conviction—worldview. What a fantastic power that 
would be—infinitely more powerful than films or television and even 
more so than peers. (Teenagers seem to collect more ideological bag-
gage from their peers than from parents or from the mass media they 
consume.) Whether for good or bad, it is investing works of literature 
with a power whose source is unexplained. Further, one would want to 
know how narrative fiction could end up having a much larger impact in 
establishing neurological connections in the brain than any other media.
  In any event, the richness and complexity of the social, built, and nat-
ural environment is such that even if we had a steady diet of television or 
video games—as some kids do—the influence is still negligible.
PcH: Well, as I mentioned, there is empirical evidence for such effects. The 
case of The Birth of a Nation, cited by Prentice and Gerrig, seems directly 
comparable to Mitchell. In light of this research, we probably for the most 
part just want to avoid teaching a book such as Gone With the Wind. If 
we do teach it, we do not want to allow its propaganda to work on our 
students. Thus we want to consider the ways in which Mitchell radically 
distorts history, dehumanizes Africans, fosters a xenophobic Confeder-
ate nationalism, and so on. In doing this, it is important to consider not 
only facts and inferences, not only ideas, but also feelings. Gone With the 
Wind is a powerful book precisely because of the feelings it arouses. Gone 
With the Wind not only gets many of the facts wrong; perhaps even more 
importantly, it gets many of the feelings “wrong.”
  Here, we might consider a single point in the novel, critically exam-
ining how it works in contrast with a very different sort of narra-
tive—Rabin dranath Tagore’s short story “Kabuliwallah.” Tagore’s story 
concerns a huge Afghani man named Rahamat who sells fruit in Cal-
cutta. He forms an unusual friendship with a young girl, Mini, giving 
her fruit and laughing with her. Outside the tender relationship with this 
girl, he is rough and sometimes violent. At one point in the story, he 
is convicted of stabbing a man in a fight and sent to prison. On being 
released years later, he goes to Mini’s home. It is her wedding day now, 
and Rahamat asks her father to give her a little present of fruit from him. 
The father tries to send Rahamat away, seeing his presence as inauspi-
cious. But, in conversation, he learns that the man has a daughter of his 
own, the same age, whom he misses terribly. That is what underlay his 
relationship with Mini. Rahamat takes out a little piece of paper with 
the girl’s handprint—he could hardly afford a photograph. For me, this 
is a deeply moving example of the way in which Tagore uses attachment 
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relations to humanize characters who would otherwise be categorized as 
alien, as almost inhuman.
  Now, we might consider the following scene from Gone With the 
Wind. A Yankee soldier arrives at Scarlett’s home. It is during the Civil 
War (or war of secession or even war of independence, from the Con-
federate point of view). The Yankees have systematically brutalized the 
local people and are widely feared as terrorists. This man has a weapon, 
but he has put it away. Other than trespassing on her property, he has 
not done much. Simply being a Yankee is enough for Scarlett. She puts 
a gun to his face and blows his brains out (literally). She and Melanie 
then take his money and begin to go through his goods. One of the first 
things they find is “a miniature of a little girl in a gold frame” (436). For 
a moment, it looks as if they will be forced to recognize that Scarlett 
has killed a person, a man with a little girl back home. For a moment, 
it seems that Mitchell will do exactly what Tagore did, humanizing this 
out-group member by foregrounding his attachment relations. But this 
possibility is immediately undermined. The list of items in the knapsack 
becomes strange and inconsistent with this interpretation. Suddenly, 
Melanie realizes that the man stole all these things (437). He thereby 
becomes further dehumanized—and his murder seems more fully jus-
tified—because he not only lacks attachment relations himself; he has 
violated the attachment relations of others by stealing the child’s picture 
simply out of greed for the gold frame.
FlA: If Gone With the Wind (1936) does not contaminate professors (readers) 
like us, I wonder if it likewise would not contaminate students—or any-
one else for that matter.
  The vast majority of the population in the most developed of coun-
tries really does not read. Literature as such really does not have much 
of an impact on the population. Not to mention that the majority of fic-
tion out there is lazy fiction; the bricks of narrative taken from moral, 
political, emotional reality out there are those of the common doxa—the 
dominant ideology. In book after book after book we come across the 
same worldviews, emotion systems, and the like.
  Of course, students have very little time for their studies, so we want 
to teach narrative fiction that is rich in its total aesthetic system. This 
would be my criterion for teaching Absalom! Absalom! and not teach-
ing Gone With the Wind—a thick book that would require a lot of read-
ing time and that would become boring rather quickly. It is the aesthetic 
value that I use to make my selection.
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  In actual practice, these days, I teach short stories high in aesthetic 
content and shape. This way, the students can learn a lot about narrative 
devices and the treatment of a whole variety of subject matter. Such sto-
ries demand a great concentration of narrative devices and plot to hit 
their target (their intended effect on the reader) with as few means and 
as quickly as possible. In a few pages or even in only a paragraph or a 
page, these short narrative fictions present a rich array of worldviews and 
moral options. They reveal much about how, for instance, U.S. Latino 
and Latin American authors create vivid fictional worlds (settings, geog-
raphies, chronologies, durations, and speeds) inhabited by interesting 
characters depicted with psychological complexity and immersed in 
moral dilemmas.
PcH: I do not wish to end by indicating that this means works such as Gone 
With the Wind are simply bad, politically or aesthetically. Given the lev-
els of racism in the United States today, given the degree to which white 
people particularly are prone to dehumanize blacks, I do feel that it is 
probably better not to encourage anyone to read this novel (especially if 
it would mean not reading something else, such as Faulkner). However, 
there are many things that one can learn from Mitchell’s book—ethical 
and political things—if one understands “learning” in an appropriately 
complex way. Indeed, a work such as Gone With the Wind suggests some 
of the problems with some common approaches to political criticism in 
literary study.
  To put the matter as baldly as possible, I believe that most liberal 
Americans will learn much more about colonialism from reading Gone 
With the Wind than from reading many postcolonial works, including 
some of the most famous. Speaking personally, I found the novel reve-
latory; it suggested to me what many Southern whites must have felt 
about the Civil War, about the Union, and about Reconstruction. I was 
raised to believe unreflectively that the Civil War was a “good” war. It 
ended slavery, surely one of the great abominations of human history, 
and thus stood with World War II and its (tragically late) ending of the 
Holocaust. I had some sense that the Civil War was also a war of colonial 
conquest. But it was only in reading Gone With the Wind that I came to 
have a real sense of the human loss and material deprivation suffered 
by the majority population in the Southern states during and after the 
war. The novel chronicles the physical destruction of Atlanta, the brute 
insensitivity of invading troops (or at least what was seen as brute insen-
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sitivity), the burning of homes and crops, the loss of lives, the mutilation 
of bodies, the devastation of society.
  The incident with the Yankee soldier is therefore important in two 
ways. First, as we have seen, it shows Mitchell’s ability to dehumanize 
out-group members. Second, and no less important, it shows her ability 
to represent the rage born from suffering and humiliation. Given what 
they have gone through, how could Scarlett and Melanie think any differ-
ently about the Union soldier? One imagines that there are thousands of 
Scarletts and Melanies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan today. Indeed, 
her account of the development of the Ku Klux Klan would seem relevant 
to a range of terrorist organizations.
  Of course, the racial attitudes of Scarlett, Melanie, and Mitchell her-
self (given what one can infer from the novel) are heinous. But that is 
important too. Societies all have prejudices and internal violence. That 
does not make war against those societies any less colonialist, any less 
violent and destructive itself. Indeed, it suggests once again the impor-
tance of finding solutions to problems that avoid violence, as well as the 
associated humiliation. I wonder if part of the current political discrep-
ancy between, say, New England and the South is the result of a historical 
legacy that, in the South, associates Northern liberalism with cruelty and 
dehumanization. Of course, I do not at all wish to compare the suffer-
ing of whites during and after the Civil War to the suffering of slaves or 
to that of postemancipation African Americans. Nor do I wish to sug-
gest that Northern prejudices against Southerners, however demeaning, 
are in any way comparable to the attitudes of Northern and Southern 
whites toward blacks. However, it may be that we would all be better off if 
we recognized the colonialist elements in North–South relations and the 
partial truths in a work such as Gone With the Wind—while, of course, 
not losing sight of its more serious falsities as well.
FlA: I agree with your ethical and political criticism of the novel and the 
comparison you make between the novel and contemporary situations. 
However, if I were to study the novel in the classroom, I would provide 
enough contextual (historical, social, cultural) information for the stu-
dents to connect the dots between past and present and focus the major-
ity of the time sleuthing out how the generative devices work in the 
shaping of the story. That is, I would try to be consistently secular in my 
approach, analysis, and discussion with my students.
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PolitiCs and motivation
PcH: This leads to a final topic. A fundamental implication of work in affec-
tive science is that there is no action without motivation and thus no 
action without the engagement of some motivational system. I have often 
had the thought that one difference between the Right and Left in this 
country is that the Right has its eye on actual material benefits while the 
Left wants to have a sense of moral superiority. This is, of course, overly 
simple. People across the political spectrum want both material advan-
tage and self-esteem. Nonetheless, I wonder if there is some validity to 
my intuitive (over)generalization.
  Consider affirmative action. The “conservative” position on the issue 
is that it involves prejudice against whites. Whites who oppose affirma-
tive action tend to want, say, medical school admissions for themselves, 
for their relatives, and so on. In contrast, the arguments one hears from 
liberal whites in support of affirmative action tend to take the form of 
assertions about the need to give blacks an opportunity to catch up from 
their disadvantaged starting point. In a sense, liberal whites accept the 
view that affirmative action does lead to prejudice against whites. But 
they accept this prejudice in part because it gives them a feeling of moral 
purity.
  One might ask at this point just what the other options are. One option 
is recognizing that in-group/out-group divisions strongly bias our evalu-
ations. Even arbitrary assignment to groups affects people’s evaluation 
of in- and out-group members’ work (Duckitt 68–69). In consequence, 
we would expect hiring and admissions practices to be skewed toward 
in-group preferences. A minimal affirmative action program would be a 
matter of compensating for this biasing effect, which undermines demo-
cratic equality in civil society and, ultimately, in governance as well. For 
example, it might tie hiring to the demographics of the qualified applicant 
pool over a particular period. There are obviously difficulties with any 
such approach (e.g., due to issues of constitutionality). The point is that 
something along these lines is unlikely to be considered anyway because 
it does not appeal to the motivations of either the Right or the Left.
FlA: I would come at this from a slightly different position, Patrick. Oppres-
sion and exploitation in societies worldwide are becoming more and 
more evident. It is becoming more and more difficult to simply use ideol-
ogy to try to hide this reality or to justify it. People everywhere are more 
and more determined to end this situation. It is an awareness that we 
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see in the Middle East, Europe, Northern Africa, Wisconsin, Ohio, and 
California, as well as in Mexico and Chile. However, people’s strength is 
not just in their numbers. They have to create their own organizations in 
their daily struggles. They have to be always extremely vigilant to ensure 
that their organizations remain representations of their interests and stop 
the ruling classes from taking over those organizations.
  There is one form of organization of the people that is remarkable 
because it has, since it appeared in the late nineteenth century, constantly 
reappeared in all parts of the world where the struggle of the people has 
reached a high intensity and level of organization. It first emerged in 1871 
under the name of the Paris Commune, reemerging over time under dif-
ferent names: workers councils, soldiers councils, and peasant councils in 
Russia (universally known as soviets).
  What is characteristic about these organizations is that they are the 
most democratic form of organization there is. Those members of the 
councils that represent the people who are mobilized and struggling and 
fighting on behalf of their own interests are elected directly in the work-
places via a mandate or series of orders. They are literally representing 
the workers and fulfilling their mandates. In this capacity, they can be 
removed at a moment’s notice by the workers they represent if, for what-
ever reason, the workers do not consider that the mandate has been car-
ried out. There is immediate, direct accountability in the councils. All 
workers of the workplace are eligible to be representatives of the workers. 
Representation is never a privilege. You continue to earn a regular salary 
and return to the workplace when you are replaced by another represen-
tative. Nobody becomes a professional representative, and no one can be 
a representative without a mandate, obligation to the people who elected 
him or her. This is a real democratic form of organization and represen-
tation. We saw this recently developing in the central square of Tunis, 
Tunisia. Together with this form of organization the workers have devel-
oped their political organizations—their political parties.
  Together with the struggle of the creation of councils, there has been 
the struggle to create trade unions representing exclusively the economic 
interests of the workers. Unfortunately, as we know, this has rarely been 
the policy of trade unions. As we know historically, unfortunately, the 
leadership of these parties has systematically passed to the enemy and 
has led the organizations to a policy of supporting the policies of the rul-
ing classes.
  A huge obstacle in the mobilization of the working people remains 
the leadership of trade unions and labor parties—organizations that do 
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not possess at all the virtues that we find in workers councils; that is, the 
virtues of radical democracy.
  In my mind I do not really see or analyze political problems in terms 
of Right and Left or in terms of which of the two major parties in the 
United States is more democratic. In my view of things, the basic and 
most fundamental forces acting in society are today centered in the 
working class (working people generally) and the building of their inde-
pendent organizations based on true democracy: this is the form of orga-
nization we see with the workers councils.
  This is our present and future. If we are to survive and not be 
destroyed by the huge arsenal that will wipe us from the face of this 
planet, and if we are to save the planet, undoubtedly the interest of the 
working people and the democratic forms of the working people must 
prevail and become the norm of all political representation the world 
over.
PcH: Very good points. I certainly do not wish to confine politics to govern-
mental programs. However, in-group/out-group divisions and biases 
often require the establishment of compensatory policies even in the 
sorts of groups you mention.
  I’ll end with a suggestion that is perhaps less “suspicious,” as Ricoeur 
might say (referring to a form of interpretation that sets out to dissipate 
illusions [see chapter 2 of his Freud])—or, more simply put, a suggestion 
that is more optimistic. We have already noted the evolutionary impor-
tance of simulation. As already noted, I have argued that there has to 
be some pleasure associated with simulation or we would never engage 
in aversive imaginings, such as imagining being attacked by bears when 
going to pick berries.8 Simulation would lose its adaptive value if we sim-
ply avoided such aversive imaginings.
  By the same token, however, simulation would lose its adaptive 
value if there were not some reward preference for truth. If we equally 
enjoyed true and false simulations, simulation would have no beneficial 
consequences. In short, we should have some sort of enhanced hedonic 
response to truth. This is at least consistent with our often strong aversive 
response to deception, even in cases where the deception has no practical 
consequences for our well-being. In interpersonal relations, this is bound 
up with another, related set of emotional responses—trust and distrust. 
Most significantly, it is involved with the “survival-related responses to 
 8. See What Literature 29.
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anticipation” involving endogenous rewards for “correct predictions,” as 
Vuust and Kringelbach put it (266)—and for learning, as I added earlier.
  So, here is the suggestion. Some social critics are not motivated pri-
marily by a striving for enhanced self-esteem (or wealth and power). 
Rather, they are motivated by a strong aversive response to falsity and 
an enhanced reward-system response to veracity. (Like other emotional 
responses, the degree of hedonic response to truth no doubt varies indi-
vidually.) Of course, this does not mean that they always get things right. 
Anyone can make mistakes. Sometimes social critics of this sort make a 
lot of mistakes. But that does not mean the motivation is not one of seek-
ing truth.
  This seems to me the case with a writer such as Noam Chomsky. Per-
sonally, I do not believe that Chomsky’s social criticism is motivated by 
self-esteem considerations. (Of course, being widely considered one of 
the greatest minds ever may diminish the degree to which one needs to 
bolster one’s self-esteem.) Indeed, much of the power of his political criti-
cism results from its different motivational source. Specifically, Chomsky 
seems to me to be someone with an unusually strong aversive response to 
falsity and an unusually strong reward response to truth.
FlA: Yes, some social critics are definitely inclined to favor truth and even to 
situate truth among the highest values such as fairness, equality, beauty, 
for instance. Of course, this does not just apply to certain social critics 
such as Noam Chomsky and before him Bertrand Russell—both strongly 
motivated by the attainment of truth.
  I would say that truth is what motivates the work of most scientists 
and some scholars in the humanities as well. Of course, the concept of 
truth only applies to assertions and therefore linguistic expressions and 
mathematical formulae. To the world of art as a whole, the concept of 
truth only applies to the arts that involve the use of language, such as 
written narrative fiction or filmic or comic book narrative fiction, and so 
on.
  We find truth, for instance, in certain assertions within fiction, when 
those assertions refer to building blocks of reality that have been incor-
porated into the building of the fiction. So truth in fiction when it is there 
and can be there is always a derivative truth. It is a truth based on the 
assertions concerning the materials taken from the real world.
  Together with the search for truth there is a search for effective rea-
soning and effective methods of reasoning. So we have, along with the 
aspiration of discovering truth, the aspiration to create scientific explana-
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tions that exhibit internal coherence, balance, and a structure based on 
the most economical explanations: the principle of Occam’s razor and 
the principle of parsimony, for instance. These notions are both scientific 
and aesthetic. That is, they are notions that point to beauty and that have 
certain affinities with beauty while being at the same time fundamental 
ingredients of scientific knowledge—of science in general.
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